A look, Gricean, at Carnapiana
The 1920s.
1922 Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, dissertation, in Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, n. 56
--- on space as synthetic a priori
1925 "Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften der Raumes von denen der Zeit" in Kant-Studien, 30
--- the correspondence of 'space' (raum) and 'time' (zeit). Spatio-temporal continuants.
1926 Physikalische Begriffsbildung, Karlsruhe : Braun, (Wissen und Wirken ; 39)
--- physicalist as narrowly interpreted: three levels: lower one being 'perceived things or objects and their properties'.
1928 Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie, Berlin : Weltkreis-Verlag
'schein' being Carnap for 'pseudo-'. Literally, 'apparent'. Cfr. "pirots karulize...". Pseudo-sense, nonsense? We don't think so. Uninterpreted at most.
1928 Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Leipzig : Felix Meiner Verlag (English translation The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1967)
aufbau really gives 'house'. Speranza's father being an architect, he knows. Bauhaus. Bauer, architect. So this is, more poetically, the house of the world.
1929 (with Otto Neurath and Hans Hahn) Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis, Vienna : A. Wolf
-- a lovely historical reference: "Wiener Kreis" the Vienna Circle. Cfr. all the refs. by Grice (Prejudices and predilections, Actions and Events, PPQ, to "Vienna")
1929 Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen, Vienna : Springer
1932 "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" in Erkenntnis, II (English translation The Unity of Science, London : Kegan Paul, 1934)
-- interesting idea of the 'characteristica universalis'.
1934 Logische Syntax der Sprache (English translation The Logical Syntax of Language, New York : Humanities, 1937)
tr. by E. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin. Includes the "pirots karulize elatically" manifesto.
1935 Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London : Kegan Paul
1936 "Testability and meaning" in Philosophy of Science, III (1936) and IV (1937)
-- Interesting for the language game including: to prove, to test, to verify. Cfr. Popper, to falsify. Observational vs. theoretical.
1938 "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 1, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1939 "Foundations of Logic and Mathematics" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 3, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1942 Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
1943 Formalization of Logic, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
--- Carnap as a formalist. Formal logic, symbolic logic. Grice on formalists vs. informalists. Important topic: the meaning of the connectors. Connectors formally defined, connectors syntactically defined. Pseudo-questions in the search for the 'meaning' of the connectives, etc.
1947 Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
--- Carnap on 'must'. A must here! Cfr. Grice on must, Gr. 2001.
1950 Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
-- vis a vis Grice on Kneale. The metaphysical bearing of probability. Induction, primary and secondary.
1952 "Meaning postulates" in Philosophical Studies, III (now in Meaning and Necessity, 1956, 2nd edition)
-- Carnap on 'entailment'. He uses the 'horseshoe' as early as 1937 -- list of symbols online. A meaning postulate formulated with the horseshoe. Moore on entailment. Grice's take on "Bachelors are unmarried males" in "In defense of a dogma" (with Strawson). "Meaning postulates" as correctly defining 'meaning'. The vagaries of the term 'postulate', revived by Johnson/Lakoff to apply to Grice's pragmatic generalisations (as 'conversational postulates' -- and thus in terms of Carnapian entailments).
1952 The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1954 Einführung in die Symbolische Logik, Vienna : Springer (English translation Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications, New York : Dover, 1958)
-- Symbolic, rather than formal logic now.
1956 "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, ed. by H. Feigl and M. Scriven, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press
--- on Ramsey, observational vs. theoretical. Against a more 'theoretical' take by Ramsey (Ramsification), Carnap opts for a 'pragmatic' approach to theoretical concepts. Grice on theoretical concepts in philosophical psychology: "... thinks that..." as theoretical. For Grice, the questions of psychology are _theoretical_, not a matter for mere _analysis_.
1958 "Beobacthungssprache und theoretische Sprache" in Dialectica, XII (English translation "Observation Language and Theoretical Language" in Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975)
--- Good in providing the German for 'observation', a tricky English term if ever there was one. It's be-ob-acht-ung in German.
1966 Philosophical Foundations of Physics, ed. by Martin Gardner, New York : Basic Books
--- cfr. Grice on "Eddington's Tables". Surely Grice's knowledge of physics can't compare with Carnap's, but he can always play.
1977 Two Essays on Entropy, ed. by Abner Shimony, Berkeley : University of California Press
Other Sources
1962 Logic and Language: Studies Dedicated to Professor Rudolf Carnap on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Oddly, Grice would contribute to Flew's volume, "Language and Logic"!
1963 The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillp, La Salle, Ill. : Open Court Pub. Co.
1970 PSA 1970: Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: In Memory of Rudolf Carnap, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
1971 Analiticità, Significanza, Induzione, ed. by Alberto Meotti e Marco Mondadori, Bologna, Italy : il Mulino
1975 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist. Materials and Perspectives, ed. by Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Carnap as a "logical" empiricist rather than as a logical 'positivist'. The importance of slogans, or lack thereof!
1986 Joëlle Proust, Questions de Forme: Logique at Proposition Analytique de Kant a Carnap, Paris, France: Fayard (English translation Questions of Forms: Logic and Analytic Propositions from Kant to Carnap, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press)
--- Interesting in that they skip Locke that R. B. Jones and I love: Note Jones's website for Locke on 'trifling propositions' in the Essay of 1690!
1990 Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work, ed. by Richard Creath, Berkeley : University of California Press
--- Quine wrote extensively on Grice, too. Very good excerpts in Chapman's book on Grice. Quine would attend parties at Grice's college, St. John's, etc. This was the hedyday of "Dogmas of Empiricism" -- that gave Carnap (if not Carnap) the 'dogmatic' slur. The fact that Grice came to the defense of the underdog did not help! ('underdog' being Grandy's 'joke').
1991 Maria Grazia Sandrini, Probabilità e Induzione: Carnap e la Conferma come Concetto Semantico, Milano, Italy : Franco Angeli
1991 Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, ed. by Wolfgang Spohn, Dordrecht; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991 Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991 Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press; [Konstanz] : Universitasverlag Konstanz
---- Grice cites Reichenbach at some length in his PPQ 1986.
1995 L'eredità di Rudolf Carnap: Epistemologia, Filosofia delle Scienze, Filosofia del Linguaggio, ed. by Alberto Pasquinelli, Bologna, Italy : CLUEB
--- Etc.
Tuesday, 16 February 2010
System C, System G
By J. L. Speranza
R. B. Jones entitles his recent post, "meaningless 'systems'" or rather he refers to that phrase as provoked by Chapman on Grice.
The mention of 'system' is very relevant here.
Grice was fortunate to have a friend like Myro. In unpublished work -- but also in Myro's contribution to the Grice festschrift, Myro introduces the "System G".
This is of course apres Grice.
Grice had done the very same thing when inventing a System Q for Quine, which he had presented to the Quine festschrift. What amused me is that Quine responded, with a one-page long, "Reply to H. P. Grice" where he finds Grice's system to be 'forbiddingly complex' (Quine's word).
So we need a System C for comparison.
These Systems -- are indeed FL for short -- comprise
Syntactics: this is actually the _second_ component, since the 'vocabulary' is not even listed.
Semantics (optional): the truth-tables and the interpretations I, I', ... under a model M, M', ... etc.
Pragmatics (informal): where issues such as 'assertion', 'implicature' are considered.
So the idea of a 'meaningless' system relates to the "semantics" component. Many notions (if we may call them so) are perfectly manageable at the syntactics level only. This is the Hilbertian influence on Carnap. And it is what lies behind the very idea of a well-formed formula.
I often find 'well-formed' and 'formula' to trade on the redundant. After all a formula has to be well formed. An ill-formed formula is not a formula:
(x) Px --> Kx
Pirots karulise elatically.
is a wff.
The other possibilities
pirots elatically karulise
karulise pirots elatically
karulise elatically pirots.
elatically pirots karulise
elatically karulise pirots
seem okay but none of that freedom at the syntactic formal level.
Only
(x) Px --> Kx
is well formed. Also of course
(x) Kx --> Px
(x) Kx --> Kx
(x) Px --> Px
-- i.e. "Every karuliser is a pirot", "Karulisers karulise" and "pirots pirotise".
But you cannot have things like
Kx(x) Px-->
which is just an ill-formed formula, i.e. not a wff, i.e not a formula.
In some systems, any string from vocabulary items is deemed a formula and so the above "Kx(x)Px -->" would count as a formula. The syntactic rules (formation and transformation rules -- I'm using the latter apres Carnap) define a 'wff'. This gives 'wff' a value-oriented side to it. Like 'sentence', to use Grice's example, the idea of a formula is built upon our notion of a good formula, or well formed one. Etc.
R. B. Jones entitles his recent post, "meaningless 'systems'" or rather he refers to that phrase as provoked by Chapman on Grice.
The mention of 'system' is very relevant here.
Grice was fortunate to have a friend like Myro. In unpublished work -- but also in Myro's contribution to the Grice festschrift, Myro introduces the "System G".
This is of course apres Grice.
Grice had done the very same thing when inventing a System Q for Quine, which he had presented to the Quine festschrift. What amused me is that Quine responded, with a one-page long, "Reply to H. P. Grice" where he finds Grice's system to be 'forbiddingly complex' (Quine's word).
So we need a System C for comparison.
These Systems -- are indeed FL for short -- comprise
Syntactics: this is actually the _second_ component, since the 'vocabulary' is not even listed.
Semantics (optional): the truth-tables and the interpretations I, I', ... under a model M, M', ... etc.
Pragmatics (informal): where issues such as 'assertion', 'implicature' are considered.
So the idea of a 'meaningless' system relates to the "semantics" component. Many notions (if we may call them so) are perfectly manageable at the syntactics level only. This is the Hilbertian influence on Carnap. And it is what lies behind the very idea of a well-formed formula.
I often find 'well-formed' and 'formula' to trade on the redundant. After all a formula has to be well formed. An ill-formed formula is not a formula:
(x) Px --> Kx
Pirots karulise elatically.
is a wff.
The other possibilities
pirots elatically karulise
karulise pirots elatically
karulise elatically pirots.
elatically pirots karulise
elatically karulise pirots
seem okay but none of that freedom at the syntactic formal level.
Only
(x) Px --> Kx
is well formed. Also of course
(x) Kx --> Px
(x) Kx --> Kx
(x) Px --> Px
-- i.e. "Every karuliser is a pirot", "Karulisers karulise" and "pirots pirotise".
But you cannot have things like
Kx(x) Px-->
which is just an ill-formed formula, i.e. not a wff, i.e not a formula.
In some systems, any string from vocabulary items is deemed a formula and so the above "Kx(x)Px -->" would count as a formula. The syntactic rules (formation and transformation rules -- I'm using the latter apres Carnap) define a 'wff'. This gives 'wff' a value-oriented side to it. Like 'sentence', to use Grice's example, the idea of a formula is built upon our notion of a good formula, or well formed one. Etc.
Carnap and Grice on Morris
By J. L. Speranza
In his note on Chapman on Carnap, Jones takes issue with Chapman's rather simplified view of syntactics vs. semantics.
We are discussing
pirots karulize elatically
A is a pirot
-----
A karulizes elatically
-- tr. from the German original
by A. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin, 1937
---
Chapman notes that Carnap is sticking to 'syntax'. A point she and indeed Carnap fails to give enough attention to is that some sem- (call it semantics) is present in the above: nothing is said about the morphogrammatical words like the -s marker for singular, the -ly marker for adverb, and the totally meaningful formation of "is a" (in "A is a pirot").
So, what Carnap seems to be concerned here -- but I wouldn't know what form he gives to universally quantified sentences:
(x) Px --> KEx
Pa & KEa
i.e. he _is_ using "A" as a singular term ("A is a pirot"). In Quine's scheme, and indeed Grice, in his talk "How pirots karulize elatically", this "A" comes out as "a" as per above.
Then we have to turn onto a semantic bloc the idea of karulising-elatically (KE) because the logical form of adverbial modifiers was unknown till Davidson's first shots at this in "The logical form of action sentences".
But if we see the above, we see that it's only with the "extension" of predicates:
"P" and "K" (or "KE" if you wish) that he is concerned as leaving 'meaning-free', or as I prefer, "interpretation" free. This may be, as Jones suggests, a bit of an influence from Hilbert (rather than Frege) and that's a very good thing to have, if we are going to deem Carnap a die-hard formalist, for nobody can be more of a formalist than Hilbert was.
I _love_ the label 'formalist' because that's precisely the one that Grice uses to oppose these people (say Hilbertians -- here we may need to see the Hilbert/Russell-Whitehead interface) and, ... Strawson! (Who Grice, amusingly, calls an 'INformalist'). Later, Grice learned the lesson and changed this into modernists versus neo-traditionalists!
---
Roger Bishop Jones writes of Carnap's oevure where, to use Jones's apt wording, he
"he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts" (emphasis mine. JLS).
For it's precisely that what we want. Let's propose four words here:
to semiotise: to turn into a semiotic system.
This has three subbranches:
The first is indeed:
to syntactise: to turn syntactic. Where syntactics is that branch of semiotics that deals with formation and transformation rules -- Carnap was enamoured with syntax, and so was Grice. Carnap wrote of "the logical syntax of language"; Grice has an unpublished thing on "The syntax of illusion" (for an investigation of phenomenalist talk _sans_ physicalist backing: 'that stick is bent').
Then we have
(b) to semanticise. This is done via interpretations. It's the truth-table thing. BUT it can be done more 'formally' via 'syntactising'. I.e. no interpretation required, or truth-table indeed. The system remains purely a syntactic one.
(c) to pragmaticise. This is done via leaving room for things like 'assertion', which is Carnap's paradigmatical pragmatic notion. One can have a syntactic string ("(x)Px --> Kx") and we may go on to semanticise it ("P" -- meaning postulate, "K", meaning postulate") and we may go on to pragmaticise it by examining what belief the utterer is endorsing when he asserts to pirots karulising elatically.
Etc.
In his note on Chapman on Carnap, Jones takes issue with Chapman's rather simplified view of syntactics vs. semantics.
We are discussing
pirots karulize elatically
A is a pirot
-----
A karulizes elatically
-- tr. from the German original
by A. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin, 1937
---
Chapman notes that Carnap is sticking to 'syntax'. A point she and indeed Carnap fails to give enough attention to is that some sem- (call it semantics) is present in the above: nothing is said about the morphogrammatical words like the -s marker for singular, the -ly marker for adverb, and the totally meaningful formation of "is a" (in "A is a pirot").
So, what Carnap seems to be concerned here -- but I wouldn't know what form he gives to universally quantified sentences:
(x) Px --> KEx
Pa & KEa
i.e. he _is_ using "A" as a singular term ("A is a pirot"). In Quine's scheme, and indeed Grice, in his talk "How pirots karulize elatically", this "A" comes out as "a" as per above.
Then we have to turn onto a semantic bloc the idea of karulising-elatically (KE) because the logical form of adverbial modifiers was unknown till Davidson's first shots at this in "The logical form of action sentences".
But if we see the above, we see that it's only with the "extension" of predicates:
"P" and "K" (or "KE" if you wish) that he is concerned as leaving 'meaning-free', or as I prefer, "interpretation" free. This may be, as Jones suggests, a bit of an influence from Hilbert (rather than Frege) and that's a very good thing to have, if we are going to deem Carnap a die-hard formalist, for nobody can be more of a formalist than Hilbert was.
I _love_ the label 'formalist' because that's precisely the one that Grice uses to oppose these people (say Hilbertians -- here we may need to see the Hilbert/Russell-Whitehead interface) and, ... Strawson! (Who Grice, amusingly, calls an 'INformalist'). Later, Grice learned the lesson and changed this into modernists versus neo-traditionalists!
---
Roger Bishop Jones writes of Carnap's oevure where, to use Jones's apt wording, he
"he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts" (emphasis mine. JLS).
For it's precisely that what we want. Let's propose four words here:
to semiotise: to turn into a semiotic system.
This has three subbranches:
The first is indeed:
to syntactise: to turn syntactic. Where syntactics is that branch of semiotics that deals with formation and transformation rules -- Carnap was enamoured with syntax, and so was Grice. Carnap wrote of "the logical syntax of language"; Grice has an unpublished thing on "The syntax of illusion" (for an investigation of phenomenalist talk _sans_ physicalist backing: 'that stick is bent').
Then we have
(b) to semanticise. This is done via interpretations. It's the truth-table thing. BUT it can be done more 'formally' via 'syntactising'. I.e. no interpretation required, or truth-table indeed. The system remains purely a syntactic one.
(c) to pragmaticise. This is done via leaving room for things like 'assertion', which is Carnap's paradigmatical pragmatic notion. One can have a syntactic string ("(x)Px --> Kx") and we may go on to semanticise it ("P" -- meaning postulate, "K", meaning postulate") and we may go on to pragmaticise it by examining what belief the utterer is endorsing when he asserts to pirots karulising elatically.
Etc.
A Fantasy World: Was Carnap's Pirots Gricefied
By J. L. Speranza
for the Carnap Corner
--- R. B. Jones, our Carnap expert, does, very amusingly and interestingly, take up my reference to S. R. Chapman. She teaches English at Liverpool and has published extensively on various philosophers, including Chapman. We are discussing her references to Carnap/Grice (in particular the interface). I thought that Chapman cared to quote a specific passage from the Grice lectures (which Grice _amusingly_ thought of titling, "How pirots karulize elatically: some simpler ways", but did not), but she doesn't. So the actual written ref. by Grice on this continues to be the already published "Gr75 repr. Gr91:140" ("pirots (which Russell and Carnap...")).
In any case, I'm pleased Jones uses 'fantasy':
"Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe..."
And this is serendipitous, because Chapman uses 'fantasy' in particular the same context, only he thinks it's Grice who's the fantasier (and I follow her there!)
She wants to say that the pirots inhabit a fantasy world. I like that! I like Peter Pan, too -- and I'm amused that Grice saw Q in the Never-Never Land --. In a way the city of eternal truth is also a bit of fantasy, if you ask me!
Anyway, Chapman (in a way, aptly) contrasts the motivations of Carnap and Grice here:
---1) Carnap is writing (or being translated in 1937)
---2) Grice is lecturing in California in the 1970s.
Chapman writes about the pirots. Do not be confused, she says, by these two authors using the same word (same 'nonsense' I would go on to say), for:
"Carnap wanted to use SEMANTICALLY OPAQUE forms"
-- read 'nonsense'
"to hint at how an analysis of syntax"
-- syntactics I wrote on my margin. Cfr. Carnap on semeiosology, or something that he uses: he is indeed working on this originally Peircean idea that semiosis includes three branches: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
"might proceed without reference to meaning"
-- here the problem is that Carnap is already using 'semiosiology' or something, and this, alas, makes a reference to 'sem-', which is the Greek for 'meaning'. There is an overlap, in mere roots of words, between SEMiosis, and SEMantics. So one has to be careful here.
"[On the other hand, though not necessarily the right one] Grice's intention in borrowing his [i.e. Carnap's] example is to consider what concepts might be necessary to the discussion of MEANING and reference, freed from the normal preconceptions of such a discussion".
This is sort of alright. For in this 'fantasy world' that pirots inhabit, Chapman cares to quote, slighly condescendingly as her wont is, how Grice "treated his audience to pieces of" [things like]:
I quote directly from Grice now:
"a pirot _a_ can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng: also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o1 as being fid to one another"
--- These notes are transcripts (by one wonders who) from a tape. So there are some typos there: notably, 'karulize' is spelled 'carulise'!
Etc.
for the Carnap Corner
--- R. B. Jones, our Carnap expert, does, very amusingly and interestingly, take up my reference to S. R. Chapman. She teaches English at Liverpool and has published extensively on various philosophers, including Chapman. We are discussing her references to Carnap/Grice (in particular the interface). I thought that Chapman cared to quote a specific passage from the Grice lectures (which Grice _amusingly_ thought of titling, "How pirots karulize elatically: some simpler ways", but did not), but she doesn't. So the actual written ref. by Grice on this continues to be the already published "Gr75 repr. Gr91:140" ("pirots (which Russell and Carnap...")).
In any case, I'm pleased Jones uses 'fantasy':
"Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe..."
And this is serendipitous, because Chapman uses 'fantasy' in particular the same context, only he thinks it's Grice who's the fantasier (and I follow her there!)
She wants to say that the pirots inhabit a fantasy world. I like that! I like Peter Pan, too -- and I'm amused that Grice saw Q in the Never-Never Land --. In a way the city of eternal truth is also a bit of fantasy, if you ask me!
Anyway, Chapman (in a way, aptly) contrasts the motivations of Carnap and Grice here:
---1) Carnap is writing (or being translated in 1937)
---2) Grice is lecturing in California in the 1970s.
Chapman writes about the pirots. Do not be confused, she says, by these two authors using the same word (same 'nonsense' I would go on to say), for:
"Carnap wanted to use SEMANTICALLY OPAQUE forms"
-- read 'nonsense'
"to hint at how an analysis of syntax"
-- syntactics I wrote on my margin. Cfr. Carnap on semeiosology, or something that he uses: he is indeed working on this originally Peircean idea that semiosis includes three branches: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
"might proceed without reference to meaning"
-- here the problem is that Carnap is already using 'semiosiology' or something, and this, alas, makes a reference to 'sem-', which is the Greek for 'meaning'. There is an overlap, in mere roots of words, between SEMiosis, and SEMantics. So one has to be careful here.
"[On the other hand, though not necessarily the right one] Grice's intention in borrowing his [i.e. Carnap's] example is to consider what concepts might be necessary to the discussion of MEANING and reference, freed from the normal preconceptions of such a discussion".
This is sort of alright. For in this 'fantasy world' that pirots inhabit, Chapman cares to quote, slighly condescendingly as her wont is, how Grice "treated his audience to pieces of" [things like]:
I quote directly from Grice now:
"a pirot _a_ can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng: also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o1 as being fid to one another"
--- These notes are transcripts (by one wonders who) from a tape. So there are some typos there: notably, 'karulize' is spelled 'carulise'!
Etc.
Chapman and Carnap's "Meaningless" systems
By Roger Bishop Jones
for the Carnap Corner
On Tuesday 16 Feb 2010 00:08, J. L. Speranza wrote:
> As Chapman notes, the agenda of regimenting FL vs. NL is already
> there in the Intro to this book (Cfr. Carnap's two lectures in
> London):
>
> "In the introduction to The Logical Syntax of Language", Chapman
> expands, "Carnap presents a typically LOGICAL POSITIVIST accont of
> the PHILOSOPHER's reason for taking language seriously."
>
> Seriously? This seems like the antonymy of seriousness to me, but I
> see her point.
>
> "A suitably rigorous language will provide the necessary tools for
> logical and SCIENTIFIC exposition. This language is to be a FORMAL
> SYSTEM, concerned with types and orders of symbols but paying no
> attention to MEANING."
Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe, though I have not
actually read "Logical Syntax".
I believe Carnap, as a formalist, is like Hilbert (probably was
influenced in this by Hilbert rather than Frege).
Hilbert was not a formalist who regarded formal languages as
meaningless.
His formalism consisted in requiring meaning to be expressed
purely through a formal axiomatisation (often called an implicit
definition).
Carnap systematised this idea in his Philosophy of Logical Syntax, in
which he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts.
He did not regard his formal languages as meaningless, he simply
advocated that the semantics be rendered through the rules which
defined the analytic sentences.
RBJ
Monday, 15 February 2010
Gricean Look at Carnap Biblio
This is a further look at some of the later publications by Carnap too.
1922. Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, no. 56. His Ph.D. thesis.
--- We have discussed this. The Space as a synthetic-apriori category in Kant. The fact that Carnap narrows the focus to 'wissenschaftslehre' suggests he may be into Kant's rather dogmatic presumption that Newton had to be right regardless (as he wasn't).
1926. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Karlsruhe: Braun.
This is about 'physics' rather than physicalism, which is usually understood more narrowly (as Carnap will, in other publications) to deal with third-person reports of mental ascriptions of behaviour ("He is thinking of a platter of spaghetti"). This one touches on phenomenalism rather in the sections on 'perceived objects and their properties'. This is the lowest level (qualitative) from which Carnap raises to quantitative and abstract higher levels.
1928. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Pseudoproblems of Philosophy). Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag.
Shows his concern with methodological questions. Pseudoproblems will become in linguistic key his pseudo-statemens. E.g. Heidegger, Nothing noths.
1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. English translation by Rolf A. George, 1967. The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. University of California Press.
1929. Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen. Springer.
1934. Logische Syntax der Sprache. English translation 1937, The Logical Syntax of Language. Kegan Paul. This was tr. By A. Smeaton, countess of Zeppelin, and includes the charming, "Pirots karulize elatically; A is a pirot; thus A karulizes elatically". Formal calculus. Formation rules, etc.
1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK: Thoemmes. Excerpt.
1939, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 3. University of Chicago Press.
1942. Introduction to Semantics. Harvard Uni. Press.
1943. Formalization of Logic. Harvard Uni. Press.
1956 (1947). Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press.
1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-15 online.
1950. "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20-45.
1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. University of Chicago Press.
1958. Introduction to Symbolic Logic with Applications. Dover.
1963, "Intellectual Autobiography" in Schilpp (1963: 1-84). Vide Roger Bishop Jones, and ch. ii of Bishop Roger Jones and J. L. Speranza.
1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Martin Gardner, ed. Basic Books. Online excerpt.
1971. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 1. University of California Press.
1977. Two essays on entropy. Shimony, Abner, ed. University of California Press.
1980. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 2. Jeffrey, R. C., ed. University of California Press.
2000. Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik. Edited from unpublished manuscript by T. Bonk and J. Mosterín. Darmstadt: Wissenschftliche Buchgesellschaft. 167 pp. ISBN 3-534-14298-5.
------ Pirot, you've gone a long way!
1922. Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, no. 56. His Ph.D. thesis.
--- We have discussed this. The Space as a synthetic-apriori category in Kant. The fact that Carnap narrows the focus to 'wissenschaftslehre' suggests he may be into Kant's rather dogmatic presumption that Newton had to be right regardless (as he wasn't).
1926. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Karlsruhe: Braun.
This is about 'physics' rather than physicalism, which is usually understood more narrowly (as Carnap will, in other publications) to deal with third-person reports of mental ascriptions of behaviour ("He is thinking of a platter of spaghetti"). This one touches on phenomenalism rather in the sections on 'perceived objects and their properties'. This is the lowest level (qualitative) from which Carnap raises to quantitative and abstract higher levels.
1928. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Pseudoproblems of Philosophy). Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag.
Shows his concern with methodological questions. Pseudoproblems will become in linguistic key his pseudo-statemens. E.g. Heidegger, Nothing noths.
1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. English translation by Rolf A. George, 1967. The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. University of California Press.
1929. Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen. Springer.
1934. Logische Syntax der Sprache. English translation 1937, The Logical Syntax of Language. Kegan Paul. This was tr. By A. Smeaton, countess of Zeppelin, and includes the charming, "Pirots karulize elatically; A is a pirot; thus A karulizes elatically". Formal calculus. Formation rules, etc.
1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK: Thoemmes. Excerpt.
1939, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 3. University of Chicago Press.
1942. Introduction to Semantics. Harvard Uni. Press.
1943. Formalization of Logic. Harvard Uni. Press.
1956 (1947). Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press.
1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-15 online.
1950. "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20-45.
1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. University of Chicago Press.
1958. Introduction to Symbolic Logic with Applications. Dover.
1963, "Intellectual Autobiography" in Schilpp (1963: 1-84). Vide Roger Bishop Jones, and ch. ii of Bishop Roger Jones and J. L. Speranza.
1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Martin Gardner, ed. Basic Books. Online excerpt.
1971. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 1. University of California Press.
1977. Two essays on entropy. Shimony, Abner, ed. University of California Press.
1980. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 2. Jeffrey, R. C., ed. University of California Press.
2000. Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik. Edited from unpublished manuscript by T. Bonk and J. Mosterín. Darmstadt: Wissenschftliche Buchgesellschaft. 167 pp. ISBN 3-534-14298-5.
------ Pirot, you've gone a long way!
A Gricean Look at Carnap's Publications
The early Carnap wrote, naturally enough, in German. Here is what a neo-Grice finds of interest, today, of some of what Carnap wrote:
1921
Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der hohen philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Jena. (Jena: Universität Jena, 1921)
--- the space. Obviously, the ROOM, literally, but not as in the living room (but cfr. lebensraum). This is indeed the synthetic a priori category of Kant's space. Grice will show an interest in this vis a vis his student Strawson writing a book on Kant and the 'bounds of sense'. The topic merges with Carnap in that 'sense' is pretty ambiguous as used by Kant. What goes beyond the a priori, yet synthetic constraints of the apperception of 'space' dictates what we find and fail to find meaningful.
Contents: Introduction. Formal space. Intuitive space. Physical space. The mutual relation among formal, intuitive, and physical space.
--- the idea of 'formal space' would have pleased the late Grice, with all his emphasis on Platonic supralunary entities. The formal space is the space of Greek geometry of course, and it merges with ideas that the analytic statements of our cathedral of learning are both algebraic (or arithmetical) _and_ geometrical statements.
The relations between experience and knowledge of space. Bibliography and suggested reading. Biography.
---- Strawson was the big one here to focus on 'spatio-temporal continuity' as a metaphysical constraint on our conception of things. Grice was more of a mentalist, phenomenalist, memory-theoretical one (he saw 'memory' rather than spatio-temporal continuity as providing the key questions to the self).
1922
"Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre." Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte Nr. 56. (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1922). 87 pages.
1923
"Über die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Einfachstheit" Kant-Studien (Berlin), Band 28 Heft 1/2 (1923), pp. 90 - 107.
1924
"Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen" Annalen der Philosophy und Philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 3 (1924), pp. 105-130.
The idea of 'causality' will feature large in some of Strawson's and Grice's metaphysical views. The early Grice (WoW) has some essays on the notion of 'cause' as involving a 'willing' element to be avoided by critics of ordinary language.
1925
"Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der Zeit" Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 30 Heft 3/4 (1925), pp. 331-345
-- Here the spatio-temporal continuity is considered, with the dropping of 'zeit' (time, literally, 'tide') onto the bargain.
1926
"Physikalische Begriffsbildung" in Ungerer, Emil (ed.) Wissen und Wirken, Einzelschriften zu den Grundfragen des Erkennens und Schaffens, Band 39 (Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun, 1926). 66 pages.
--- intersting for the early use of 'physicalist' or 'physicalic' literally.
Contents: Introduction, the task of physics. The first level of physical concept formation, qualitative level: Perceived things and properties. The second level of physical concept formation, quantitative level: Physical magnitudes. The third level of physical concept formation, abstract level: The four-dimensional world process. Bibliography. Index of topics and individuals cited.
---- it seems to be the first level: the qualitative level of perceived things and properties that will keep interesting Grice for _decades_, vide his "Remarks about the senses" in WoW: indeed, the phenomenalist challenge: how to transcend the phenomeanlist level of perceived things and properties to higher levels (quantitative and abstract).
1927
1. Carnap wrote a synopsis of Physikalische Begriffsbildung: "Physikalische Begriffsbildung" Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 6, Heft 4 (July 18, 1927), pp. 76 - 77.
2. "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe" Symposion: Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache (Berlin-Schlachtensee) Band 1 Heft 4 (1927), pp. 355 - 374.
In the Schilpp volume, "Aussprache" is written "Ausprache."
1928
1. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928). 290 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna, May 1928). Introduction: Task and Plan of the Investigations. Preparatory Elucidations. On the form of scientific assertions. Overview of the types of objects and their relations. The problems of form of a constitution system. The forms of level. The form of system. (Formal investigations. Material investigations.) The basis. (The basic elements. The basic relations.) The form of objects. The form of presentation of a constitution system. Development of a constitution system. The lower levels: Objects of one's own psyche. The middle level: physical objects.
--- it's these two levels that will concern Grice:
lower level: object or content of one's own psyche.
middle level: material objects.
The upper levels: mental objects and objects of other psyches.
--- there seems to be an asymmetry with Grice at this level. Grice does not seem to have considered too serioulsy the problem of 'Other Minds', perhaps because he was Oxon, and he thought that Wisdom had bored people enough about it! But the later Grice HAS to give an answer to this: his functionalist manifesto is a third-person programme for the development of 'third-person' descriptions of 'mental predicates' ("Jack is thinking about Jill"). But this third-person programme needs adaptation by Grice to render first-person ascriptions possible ("I am thinking about Jill"): here Grice considers privileged access and incorrigibility which are NOT available, ceteris paribus, in third-person ascriptions.
Clarification of some philosophical problems on the basis of the constitution theory. Some problems of being. The psycho-physical problem.
It's good that Carnap, sticking with German -- and thus Greek -- keeps the Greek root of 'psyche'. The philosophical jargon Grice had to endure was that of 'mind', and he made a point of calling his thing 'philosophical psychology'. So the continuity that Carnap suggests between scientific and philosophical psychology would have pleased Grice.
The constitutional or empirical problem of reality. The problem of metaphysical reality. Task and limits of Science. Summary. Bibliography and index.
2. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928). 46 pages.
1929
1. Notice of Paul Bommersheim Beiträge zur Lehre von Ding und Gesetz. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 36 Heft 1 (1929), pp. 27-28 of the separately paged reviews (= ger. "Literaturberichte")
---- interesting: Ding und Gesetz has an awful Quinean ring to it. Grice contributed to Quine's festshcrift, Word (Gesetz) and Object (Ding).
2. Abriss der Logistik, Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen Volume two in the series "Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, edited by Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick. (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1929). 114 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna in January 1929). System of Logistic (sections 1 through 29). The task of logistic. Functions. Truth-functions.
---- The early Grice was a thoroughly truth-functionalist. His whole polemic with Strawson originated because of this. Grice would often retreat to Whitehead/Russell, PM, for relaxation!
Axioms. Theorems of propositional logic. Universal and existential propositions. Symbols. Classes. The theory of types. Class operations. Relations. Operations of relations. The hierarchy of types. Symbolic functions of converse, regions and field. Chains. Operations. Three and many-placed relations. The classes of 0, 1, and 2; freedom from ambiguity. The principle of abstraction. The cardinal numbers. isomorphism; the relational (ordinal?) numbers. The R-chains. Groups. Finite and infinite. Various analyses of relation. Progressions. Series. Limit concepts. Continuity. Applied logistic. Section thirty, on the axiomatic method.
--- Grice entered logic seriously (as late as 1969, for the Hintikka/Davidson festschrift for Quine when the vogue for axiomatic presentations was kaput, and Gentzen was all over the place. Grice relies on Mates, Elementary Logic. However, the spirit is pretty much 'axiomatic' in this sense Carnap is alluding to here.
Set theory and arithmetic (sections 31 and 32). AS [Axiom system] of set theory. Peano's axiom system for the natural numbers. Geometry (sections 33 - 35). Axioms of topology (axioms of surroundings). Axioms of projective geometry (first form: planes as classes). Axiom system of projective geometry (second form: planes as relations). Physics (sections 36 - 37). Axiom system of space-time topology. Determination and causality. Theory of relationship [Verwandtschaft] (section 38). Axiom system of relationship-relations [Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen] among people.
---- This sounds interesting, "among people". I don't think Grice went as far as to symbolise people like that, but people I know (Rosenschein, Levinson, etc, me on a good day) did!
Analysis of knowledge (section 39). The lowest levels of the constitution system. Analysis of language (sections 40 - 43). Logical semasiology of a definite language. Exhibition of the logical skeleton of presented sentences. Mass numbers. Situations and events. Place and time. Appendix (sections 44 -50). Exercises. Overview of the most important logistical symbols. Bibliography. Suggested reading. Index of people and topics, with comparitive terminology. List of logical constants.
3. A notice of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 8 Heft 1/2 (15 May 1929), page 10 of separately paged "Literatureberichte."
4. Tagung fuer Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften. In Prag, von Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn und Hans Reichenbach. Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik Band 8 Heft 4/5 (31 July 1929) pp. 113-114.
-- the idea of 'epistemology' as erknenntinislehre is an interesting one. Grice himself did not expand on 'epistemology' as such, since he focused on general psychological attitudes (judicative attitudes, perceptual attitudes) and rarely on larger issues regarding the _truth_ of these attitudes!
Proceedings of this congress were published in Erkenntnis (Band 1 Heft 2/4, pp. 89-339).
5. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis Von Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, und Rudolf Carnap. Veröffentlichung des Vereines Ernst Mach Heft I. (Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929). 64 pages.
--- good for an early ref. to the Vienna Circle (Coffa has written extensively on this).
Contents: Preface (Vienna, August 1929). The Vienna circle of the scientific world-view. Prehistory. The Circle around Schlick. The scientific world-view. Problem areas. Foundations of Arithmetic. Foundations of physics. Foundations of geometry. The problem of foundations in biology and psychology.
--- this is topical. The problem of Emergentism, I assume. You talk to a philosophical biologist and they are so onto telos and against mechanism. I am expecting Carnap took the idea of a mechanistic reduction seriously enough!
Foundations of the socal sciences. Review and outlook. Suggested readings. Bibliography. The members of the Vienna Circle. Authors closest to the Vienna Circle. Leading representatives of the scientific world-view. Index of names.
---- I like the 'adolescent' idea that you have a circle with members. Grice was like that. He has notes where he writes:
"Anscombe, no; Murdoch, no; Dummett, no" -- people NOT accepted as members of Austin's kindergartens (they were called Kindergartens because everyone had to be younger than Austin, b. 1911).
6. Review of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Kant Studien (Berlin) Band 34 Heft 3/4 (1929), pp. 428-429.
7. Review of Karl Menger, Dimensionstheorie in ibid., pp. 457-458.
************************************
The 1930s.
1930
1. Notice. Herbert Feigl Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 37 Heft 1 (1930), p. 6 of seperately paged "Literatureberichte."
2. "Die alte und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 heft 1 (1930), pp. 12 - 26.
---- Grice was at odds when doing history of logic. While Carnap speaks of old and new, Grice speaks of: traditionalism, modernism, neo-traditionalism, neo-modernism. Confusing!
---
3. "Einheitswissenschaft auf physischer Basis. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Review of Felix Kaufmann, Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung, Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Leipzig), 51. Jahrgang (3. Folge, 1. Jahrgang) Heft 35 (August 30, 1930), cols. 1674-1678.
5. "Die Mathematik als Zweig der Logik" Blätter für deutsche Philosophie (Berlin) Band 4 Heft 3/4 (1930), pp. 298 - 310.
6. "Diskussion über Wahrschenlichkeit." Von Edgar Zilsel und anderen. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 Heft 2/4 (1930) pp. 260 - 285.
verosimilitude (wahrschenlichkeit).
7. Bericht über Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik. Ibid., pp. 303 - 307.
8. A bibliography of Rudolf Carnap in Ibid., pp. 315 - 317.
1931
1. "Ergebnisse der logischen Analyse der Sprache" Forschungen und Fortschritte (Berlin) 7. Jahrgang, Nummer 13 (May 1, 1931), pp. 183 - 184.
2. A review of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 1 (1931), pp. 73 - 75.
--- Grice often speaks (WoW:RE) of the 'heirs of PM' so we know who he is talking about now.
3. A review of Eino Kaila, Der logistische Neupositivismus. Ibid., pp. 75 - 77.
The idea of the logical positivists as neo-positivists is appealing. Grice has Positivism (and see the -ismus ending in German here) when he is really onto neo-Positivismus.
4. "Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 2/3 (1931), pp. 91 - 105.
5. "Diskussion zur Grundlegung der Mathematik" Von Hans Hahn und anderen. Ibid., pp. 135 - 149.
1932
1. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 4 (1932), pp. 219 - 241.
*****************This is the Classic, where ueberwindung was perhaps too grossly tr. as 'rejection'.
2. "Die Sprache der Physik" Ibid., p. 311.
3. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid., p. 311.
4. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 5/6 (1932), pp. 432 - 465.
--- this is referred to by Roger Bishop Jones in a post to HIST-ANAL. Physicalist speech as universal speech of science. This is fascinating in that the idea of the universalsprache is so ... well debabelized! Speranza has studied different attempts at 'characteristica universalis', and here is one of the most important ones! It will become Americanised, of course, as the idea of a unified science.
5. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid. Band 3 Heft 2/3 (December 30, 1932), pp. 107 - 142.
6. "Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker" Ibid., pp. 177 - 188.
7. "Über Protokollsätze" Ibid., pp. 215 - 228. A reply to Neurath's article in the same issue of Erkenntnis on pp. 204 - 214.
---- this is interesting, as it concerns O-T terms, observational and theoretical. To what extent are protokollsaetze observational and to what extent are they theory-laden? Grice deals with some of these questions in his Method repr. 1991.
1933
1. A review of Philipp Frank, Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen in Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 38 Heft 1/2 (1933), p. 275.
He had spoken of Kausalitaet, now it's kausalgesetz, where gesetz is ambiguous as to law, principle, what have you. Not to be confused with the synthetic a priori, "Every event has a cause" beloved of Oxonians like Pears.
2. "L'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Logique" Trad. du generale Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 76. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1933). 36 pages.
Revised translation of 1930-2.
3. Review of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 3 Heft 4/6 (September 5, 1933), pp 436 - 437.
1934
1. "On the Character of Philosophic Problems," translated by W.M. Malisoff, in Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) volume 1 number 2 (April 1934), p. 251.
2. A review of Walter Dubislav Die Philosophie der Mathematik in der Gegenwart, Erkenntnis (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 1 (May 8, 1934), pp. 64 - 65.
3. A review of C.I. Lewis & C.H. Langford Symbolic Logic, Ibid., pp. 65 - 66.
---- This is intersting in that Lewis supersedes the material implication and enters metaphysical waters with his strict implication. So we are not talking of common or garden truth-functionalists here.
4. The Unity of Science, translated and with an introduction by Max Black in Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 63 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934). 101 pages.
--- Black will have occasion to discuss Grice at large ("Literary Theory", 1970).
Contents: Introduction by M. Black. Author's introduction (Prague, January 1934). Advice to the reader. Physics as a universal science. The heterogeneity of science. Languages. Protocol language. The physical language as an intersubjective language.
--- this topic is anti-Wittgensteinian. I don't think discussed by Grice, but by Griceans, e.g. Colin McGinn, in Woodfield, Thought and Object: to what extent can an intention-based semantics respond to the solipsistic challenge?
The physical language as a universal language. Protocol language as a part of physical language. Unified science in physical language.
5. Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik Einheitswissenschaft, schriften hrsg. von Otto Neurath in Verbindung mit Rudolf Carnap und Hans Hahn. Heft 3. (Wien: Verlag Gerold & Co., 1934). 30 pages.
6. Logische Syntax der Sprache Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, hrsg. von Philipp Frank und Moritz Schlick, Band 8 (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1934). 274 pages.
Contents: Introduction--What is Logical syntax? Languages as calculi.
-- the use of the term 'calculus' here is interesting in that it predates the OED for 'predikatkalkuel' that Grice uses.
Part I--The definite language I. Formation and transformation rules, and remarks on definite forms of language.
The ref. to transformational rules is Chomskyan apres la lettre.
Part II--Formal construction of the syntax of language I. Part III--The indefinite language II. Formation and transformation rules, along with further investigations. Part IV--General syntax. Object language and syntax language.
This must be a development of Russell, who speaks of object-language and meta-language. People often drop 'object-' but they shouldn't.
The syntax of an arbitrary language (in general; variables; arithmetic; translation; extensionality). Part V--Philosophy and Syntax. On the form of the sentences of the logic of science. Logic of science as syntax. Bibliography and Index.
The English translation of Logische Syntax appears here also as 1937-1.
7. "Meaning, Assertion, and Proposal" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) vol. 1 no. 3 (July 1934), pp. 359 - 360. This is a reply to Dewey's article of the same title in Ibid., pp. 237 - 238.
--- Grice gave a John Dewey Lecture. Carnap will get Gricean when he expands on 'assertion' as the basic statement for pragmatics (within what he calls semiosology).
8. La Science et la Metaphysique devant L'Analyse Logique du Langage Trad. du general Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 172. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1934). 44 pages. Revised translation of 1932-1.
9. "Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen" Natur und Geist (Dresden) 2. Jahrgang Nummer 9 (September 1934), pp. 257 - 260.
--- excellent dichotomy that will figure large in the later Carnap. The questions are theoretical, but the decisions as to what the ANSWERS to such questions are are practical. Inconsistency there?
10. "The Rejection of Metaphysics" Psyche: An Annual of General and Linguistic Philosophy (Cambridge and London), vol. 14 (1934), pp. 100 - 111.
---- This has Cantab. connection. No wonder he was not so well known in Oxon.
11. "Die Antinomien und die Unvollständigkeit der Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 41 Heft 2 (1934), pp. 263 - 284.
1935
1. Philosophy and Logical Syntax [Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 70] (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935). 100 pages.
A revised version of three lectures given on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of October 1934 at the University of London. See 1934-10 and 1944-1.
Contents: Preface (Prague, Nov. 1934). The rejection of metaphysics.
--- this is interesting. The title of his early essay. Heidegger in mind: Nothing noths. Nicht nichtet.
Verifiability.
--- excellent in that it is considering Confirmationism and Inductivism as the offspring of Positivism, and is preparing his criticisms to Popper.
Metaphysics. Problems of reality. Ethics. Metaphysics as expression. Psychology. Logical analysis. Logical syntax of language. "Formal" theory. Formation rules. Transformation rules. Syntactical terms. L-terms. Content. Pseudo-object sentences. The material and the formal modes of speech. Syntax as the method of philosophy. The material mode of speech. Modalities. Relativity in regard to language. Pseudo-questions. Epistemology. Natural philosophy. What physicalism asserts. What physicalism does not assert. The unity of Science. Literature.
2. "Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 1 (March 31, 1935), pp. 30 - 37.
--- the problem that Carnap must face is that if his thing is a formal one (formalwissenschaft), how does it deal with 'empirical' questions of, say, physics?
3. "Les Concepts psychologiques et les concepts physiques sont-ils foncierement differents?" Trad. par Robert Bouvier. Revue de synthese (Paris), t. 10, no. 1 (April 1935), pp. 43 - 53.
The original German version of this article was not published.
4. "Ein Gültigkeitskriterium für die Sätze der klassischen Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 42 Heft 1 (1935), pp. 163 - 190.
5. A bibliography of Carnap in Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 2/3 (June 18, 1935), pp. 187 - 188.
6. A review of Willard van Orman Quine A System of Logistic, in Ibid., Band 5 Heft 4 (July 31, 1935), pp. 285 - 287.
--- Quine knew well and wrote about both Carnap and Grice. The correspondence Quine/Carnap now available, "Dear Van", he called him.
7. A review of Walter Dubislav, Naturphilosophie, in Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.
8. A review of Arend Heyting, Mathematische Grundlagenforschung, in Ibid., pp. 288 - 289.
9. A review of Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung, in Ibid., pp. 290 - 294.
cfr. Verifiability above.
10. "Le Probleme de la logique de la science. Science formelle et science du reel." Trad. due general Ernest Vouillemin, Actualites scientifiques et industrielles 291. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1935). 37 pages.
Translation of 1934-5 and 1935-2.
1936
1. "Discussion" in Actes du huiteme Congres international de philosophie a Prague 2 - 7 septembre 1934 (Prague: Comite d'organisation du Congres, 1936). Despositaire: Orbis, S.A., Prague. 1103 pages.
Work by Carnap and Neurath appears on pp. 244 - 245.
2. "Die Methode der logischen Analyse" appears in Ibid., pp. 142 - 145. There is a discussion by Carnap and others on pp. 158 - 159.
3. "Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik" in Actes du Congres international de philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 388. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936). pp. 36 - 41.
4. "Über die Einheitssprache der Wissenschaft: Logische Bemerkungen zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie" Ibid., [fasc.] 2. Unite de la science Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 389. Pp. 60 - 70.
5. "Wahrheit und Bewährung" Ibid., [fasc.] 4. Induction et probabilite. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 391. Pp. 18 - 23.
6. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" The Journal of Symbolic Logic (Menasha, Wisconsin), volume 1 number 2 (June 1936), p. 59.
This is an abstract of a paper Carnap presented on September 1, 1936 at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences. The full paper was not published.
7. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Menasha, Wisconsin and New York), volume 42 number 9, part 1 (September 1936), p. 642.
The same as the preceding item.
8. "Existe-t-il des premisses de la science qui soient incontrolables?" Trad. par Henri Buriot-Darsiles. "Scientia" (Rivista di scienza) (Bologna). Volume 60, Number 293 (September 1 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
Carnap's original German paper was never published.
9. "Über Extremalaxiome" Von Rudolf Carnap und Friedrich Bachmann. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 6 Heft 3 (October 31, 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
10, "Testability and Meaning" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) Volume 3 Number 4 (October 1936), pp. 419 - 471; Volume 4 Number 1 (January 1937), pp. 1 - 40.
cfr. Verifiability above, but also semantic range of 'provability'. To test, to prove. What is it that is proved?
Contents: Introduction (sections 1 - 4)--Our problem: Confirmation. Testing and meaning. The older requirement of veriafiability. Confirmation instead of verification. The material and the formal idioms. Logical analysis of Confirmation and testing (sections 5 - 10)--Some terms and symbols of Logic. Reducibility of confirmation. Definitions. Reduction sentences.
--- important vis a vis Grice's reductionism (bete noire) and his caveats regarding a healthy reductive analysis but a more dangerous reductionist eliminationist agenda.
Introductive chains. Reduction and definition. Empirical analysis of confirmation and testing (sections 11 - 16)--Observable and realizable predicates. Confirmability. Method of testing. Testability. A remark about positivism and physicalism. Sufficient bases. The construction of a language-system (sections 17 - 28)--The problem of a criterion of meaning. The construction of a language-system L. Atomic sentences; primitive predicates. The choice of a psychological or a physical basis.
--- the choice here is interesting. I would have expected, 'phenomeanlist' vs. physicalist, but Carnap is talking 'pscyhological' tout court (this suggest he saw, sense-datum sentences as psychological complete with empirical psychological subjects attached to them ("I see that...")).
--- Introduced atomic predicates. Molecular sentences. Molecular languages. The critical problem: Universal and existential sentences. The scale of languages. Incompletely confirmable hypotheses in physics. The principle of empiricism.
--- Interesting vis a vis Grice's Empiricism as bete noire.
Confirmability of predictions. Bibliography.
1937
1. The Logical Syntax of Language Translated by
*************************************
Amethe Smeaton, Countess von Zeppelin.
**************************************
The poor woman. I imagined her frustration,
"Dear Rudolf,
I'm on p. 2 and can't understand.
What _is_ a pirot. The Count does
not know.
Merry Christmas."
--
International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, gen. ed., C. K. Ogden. (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937). 352 pages.
Revised and enlarged translation of 1934-6.
Contents [to be linked here] -- in comments.
Index of Carnap's Syntactic Variables with Page References -- to be linked here -- in comments.
2. "Logic" in Factors Determining Human Behavior by Edgar Douglas Adrian and others. Harvard Tercentenary Publications. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937). Pp. 107 - 118.
3. "Einheit der Wissenschaft durch Einheit der Sprache" in Travaux du IXe Congres international de philosophie, Congres Descartes [fasc.] 4. L'Unite de la science: La Methode et les methodes, [Ier partie]. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, number 533. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1937). Pp. 51 - 57.
4. Notes For Symbolic Logic Chicago, 1937. Distributed by the University of Chicago Bookstore. 37 mimeographed pages.
Notes for a course in logic at the University of Chicago.
----
But of course there's zillions more -- but do not despair.
If you have been good and followed Carnap's developments this far, the rest is, as he would say, a piece of apfelstrudel.
1921
Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der hohen philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Jena. (Jena: Universität Jena, 1921)
--- the space. Obviously, the ROOM, literally, but not as in the living room (but cfr. lebensraum). This is indeed the synthetic a priori category of Kant's space. Grice will show an interest in this vis a vis his student Strawson writing a book on Kant and the 'bounds of sense'. The topic merges with Carnap in that 'sense' is pretty ambiguous as used by Kant. What goes beyond the a priori, yet synthetic constraints of the apperception of 'space' dictates what we find and fail to find meaningful.
Contents: Introduction. Formal space. Intuitive space. Physical space. The mutual relation among formal, intuitive, and physical space.
--- the idea of 'formal space' would have pleased the late Grice, with all his emphasis on Platonic supralunary entities. The formal space is the space of Greek geometry of course, and it merges with ideas that the analytic statements of our cathedral of learning are both algebraic (or arithmetical) _and_ geometrical statements.
The relations between experience and knowledge of space. Bibliography and suggested reading. Biography.
---- Strawson was the big one here to focus on 'spatio-temporal continuity' as a metaphysical constraint on our conception of things. Grice was more of a mentalist, phenomenalist, memory-theoretical one (he saw 'memory' rather than spatio-temporal continuity as providing the key questions to the self).
1922
"Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre." Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte Nr. 56. (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1922). 87 pages.
1923
"Über die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Einfachstheit" Kant-Studien (Berlin), Band 28 Heft 1/2 (1923), pp. 90 - 107.
1924
"Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen" Annalen der Philosophy und Philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 3 (1924), pp. 105-130.
The idea of 'causality' will feature large in some of Strawson's and Grice's metaphysical views. The early Grice (WoW) has some essays on the notion of 'cause' as involving a 'willing' element to be avoided by critics of ordinary language.
1925
"Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der Zeit" Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 30 Heft 3/4 (1925), pp. 331-345
-- Here the spatio-temporal continuity is considered, with the dropping of 'zeit' (time, literally, 'tide') onto the bargain.
1926
"Physikalische Begriffsbildung" in Ungerer, Emil (ed.) Wissen und Wirken, Einzelschriften zu den Grundfragen des Erkennens und Schaffens, Band 39 (Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun, 1926). 66 pages.
--- intersting for the early use of 'physicalist' or 'physicalic' literally.
Contents: Introduction, the task of physics. The first level of physical concept formation, qualitative level: Perceived things and properties. The second level of physical concept formation, quantitative level: Physical magnitudes. The third level of physical concept formation, abstract level: The four-dimensional world process. Bibliography. Index of topics and individuals cited.
---- it seems to be the first level: the qualitative level of perceived things and properties that will keep interesting Grice for _decades_, vide his "Remarks about the senses" in WoW: indeed, the phenomenalist challenge: how to transcend the phenomeanlist level of perceived things and properties to higher levels (quantitative and abstract).
1927
1. Carnap wrote a synopsis of Physikalische Begriffsbildung: "Physikalische Begriffsbildung" Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 6, Heft 4 (July 18, 1927), pp. 76 - 77.
2. "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe" Symposion: Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache (Berlin-Schlachtensee) Band 1 Heft 4 (1927), pp. 355 - 374.
In the Schilpp volume, "Aussprache" is written "Ausprache."
1928
1. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928). 290 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna, May 1928). Introduction: Task and Plan of the Investigations. Preparatory Elucidations. On the form of scientific assertions. Overview of the types of objects and their relations. The problems of form of a constitution system. The forms of level. The form of system. (Formal investigations. Material investigations.) The basis. (The basic elements. The basic relations.) The form of objects. The form of presentation of a constitution system. Development of a constitution system. The lower levels: Objects of one's own psyche. The middle level: physical objects.
--- it's these two levels that will concern Grice:
lower level: object or content of one's own psyche.
middle level: material objects.
The upper levels: mental objects and objects of other psyches.
--- there seems to be an asymmetry with Grice at this level. Grice does not seem to have considered too serioulsy the problem of 'Other Minds', perhaps because he was Oxon, and he thought that Wisdom had bored people enough about it! But the later Grice HAS to give an answer to this: his functionalist manifesto is a third-person programme for the development of 'third-person' descriptions of 'mental predicates' ("Jack is thinking about Jill"). But this third-person programme needs adaptation by Grice to render first-person ascriptions possible ("I am thinking about Jill"): here Grice considers privileged access and incorrigibility which are NOT available, ceteris paribus, in third-person ascriptions.
Clarification of some philosophical problems on the basis of the constitution theory. Some problems of being. The psycho-physical problem.
It's good that Carnap, sticking with German -- and thus Greek -- keeps the Greek root of 'psyche'. The philosophical jargon Grice had to endure was that of 'mind', and he made a point of calling his thing 'philosophical psychology'. So the continuity that Carnap suggests between scientific and philosophical psychology would have pleased Grice.
The constitutional or empirical problem of reality. The problem of metaphysical reality. Task and limits of Science. Summary. Bibliography and index.
2. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928). 46 pages.
1929
1. Notice of Paul Bommersheim Beiträge zur Lehre von Ding und Gesetz. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 36 Heft 1 (1929), pp. 27-28 of the separately paged reviews (= ger. "Literaturberichte")
---- interesting: Ding und Gesetz has an awful Quinean ring to it. Grice contributed to Quine's festshcrift, Word (Gesetz) and Object (Ding).
2. Abriss der Logistik, Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen Volume two in the series "Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, edited by Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick. (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1929). 114 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna in January 1929). System of Logistic (sections 1 through 29). The task of logistic. Functions. Truth-functions.
---- The early Grice was a thoroughly truth-functionalist. His whole polemic with Strawson originated because of this. Grice would often retreat to Whitehead/Russell, PM, for relaxation!
Axioms. Theorems of propositional logic. Universal and existential propositions. Symbols. Classes. The theory of types. Class operations. Relations. Operations of relations. The hierarchy of types. Symbolic functions of converse, regions and field. Chains. Operations. Three and many-placed relations. The classes of 0, 1, and 2; freedom from ambiguity. The principle of abstraction. The cardinal numbers. isomorphism; the relational (ordinal?) numbers. The R-chains. Groups. Finite and infinite. Various analyses of relation. Progressions. Series. Limit concepts. Continuity. Applied logistic. Section thirty, on the axiomatic method.
--- Grice entered logic seriously (as late as 1969, for the Hintikka/Davidson festschrift for Quine when the vogue for axiomatic presentations was kaput, and Gentzen was all over the place. Grice relies on Mates, Elementary Logic. However, the spirit is pretty much 'axiomatic' in this sense Carnap is alluding to here.
Set theory and arithmetic (sections 31 and 32). AS [Axiom system] of set theory. Peano's axiom system for the natural numbers. Geometry (sections 33 - 35). Axioms of topology (axioms of surroundings). Axioms of projective geometry (first form: planes as classes). Axiom system of projective geometry (second form: planes as relations). Physics (sections 36 - 37). Axiom system of space-time topology. Determination and causality. Theory of relationship [Verwandtschaft] (section 38). Axiom system of relationship-relations [Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen] among people.
---- This sounds interesting, "among people". I don't think Grice went as far as to symbolise people like that, but people I know (Rosenschein, Levinson, etc, me on a good day) did!
Analysis of knowledge (section 39). The lowest levels of the constitution system. Analysis of language (sections 40 - 43). Logical semasiology of a definite language. Exhibition of the logical skeleton of presented sentences. Mass numbers. Situations and events. Place and time. Appendix (sections 44 -50). Exercises. Overview of the most important logistical symbols. Bibliography. Suggested reading. Index of people and topics, with comparitive terminology. List of logical constants.
3. A notice of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 8 Heft 1/2 (15 May 1929), page 10 of separately paged "Literatureberichte."
4. Tagung fuer Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften. In Prag, von Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn und Hans Reichenbach. Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik Band 8 Heft 4/5 (31 July 1929) pp. 113-114.
-- the idea of 'epistemology' as erknenntinislehre is an interesting one. Grice himself did not expand on 'epistemology' as such, since he focused on general psychological attitudes (judicative attitudes, perceptual attitudes) and rarely on larger issues regarding the _truth_ of these attitudes!
Proceedings of this congress were published in Erkenntnis (Band 1 Heft 2/4, pp. 89-339).
5. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis Von Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, und Rudolf Carnap. Veröffentlichung des Vereines Ernst Mach Heft I. (Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929). 64 pages.
--- good for an early ref. to the Vienna Circle (Coffa has written extensively on this).
Contents: Preface (Vienna, August 1929). The Vienna circle of the scientific world-view. Prehistory. The Circle around Schlick. The scientific world-view. Problem areas. Foundations of Arithmetic. Foundations of physics. Foundations of geometry. The problem of foundations in biology and psychology.
--- this is topical. The problem of Emergentism, I assume. You talk to a philosophical biologist and they are so onto telos and against mechanism. I am expecting Carnap took the idea of a mechanistic reduction seriously enough!
Foundations of the socal sciences. Review and outlook. Suggested readings. Bibliography. The members of the Vienna Circle. Authors closest to the Vienna Circle. Leading representatives of the scientific world-view. Index of names.
---- I like the 'adolescent' idea that you have a circle with members. Grice was like that. He has notes where he writes:
"Anscombe, no; Murdoch, no; Dummett, no" -- people NOT accepted as members of Austin's kindergartens (they were called Kindergartens because everyone had to be younger than Austin, b. 1911).
6. Review of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Kant Studien (Berlin) Band 34 Heft 3/4 (1929), pp. 428-429.
7. Review of Karl Menger, Dimensionstheorie in ibid., pp. 457-458.
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The 1930s.
1930
1. Notice. Herbert Feigl Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 37 Heft 1 (1930), p. 6 of seperately paged "Literatureberichte."
2. "Die alte und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 heft 1 (1930), pp. 12 - 26.
---- Grice was at odds when doing history of logic. While Carnap speaks of old and new, Grice speaks of: traditionalism, modernism, neo-traditionalism, neo-modernism. Confusing!
---
3. "Einheitswissenschaft auf physischer Basis. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Review of Felix Kaufmann, Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung, Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Leipzig), 51. Jahrgang (3. Folge, 1. Jahrgang) Heft 35 (August 30, 1930), cols. 1674-1678.
5. "Die Mathematik als Zweig der Logik" Blätter für deutsche Philosophie (Berlin) Band 4 Heft 3/4 (1930), pp. 298 - 310.
6. "Diskussion über Wahrschenlichkeit." Von Edgar Zilsel und anderen. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 Heft 2/4 (1930) pp. 260 - 285.
verosimilitude (wahrschenlichkeit).
7. Bericht über Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik. Ibid., pp. 303 - 307.
8. A bibliography of Rudolf Carnap in Ibid., pp. 315 - 317.
1931
1. "Ergebnisse der logischen Analyse der Sprache" Forschungen und Fortschritte (Berlin) 7. Jahrgang, Nummer 13 (May 1, 1931), pp. 183 - 184.
2. A review of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 1 (1931), pp. 73 - 75.
--- Grice often speaks (WoW:RE) of the 'heirs of PM' so we know who he is talking about now.
3. A review of Eino Kaila, Der logistische Neupositivismus. Ibid., pp. 75 - 77.
The idea of the logical positivists as neo-positivists is appealing. Grice has Positivism (and see the -ismus ending in German here) when he is really onto neo-Positivismus.
4. "Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 2/3 (1931), pp. 91 - 105.
5. "Diskussion zur Grundlegung der Mathematik" Von Hans Hahn und anderen. Ibid., pp. 135 - 149.
1932
1. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 4 (1932), pp. 219 - 241.
*****************This is the Classic, where ueberwindung was perhaps too grossly tr. as 'rejection'.
2. "Die Sprache der Physik" Ibid., p. 311.
3. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid., p. 311.
4. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 5/6 (1932), pp. 432 - 465.
--- this is referred to by Roger Bishop Jones in a post to HIST-ANAL. Physicalist speech as universal speech of science. This is fascinating in that the idea of the universalsprache is so ... well debabelized! Speranza has studied different attempts at 'characteristica universalis', and here is one of the most important ones! It will become Americanised, of course, as the idea of a unified science.
5. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid. Band 3 Heft 2/3 (December 30, 1932), pp. 107 - 142.
6. "Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker" Ibid., pp. 177 - 188.
7. "Über Protokollsätze" Ibid., pp. 215 - 228. A reply to Neurath's article in the same issue of Erkenntnis on pp. 204 - 214.
---- this is interesting, as it concerns O-T terms, observational and theoretical. To what extent are protokollsaetze observational and to what extent are they theory-laden? Grice deals with some of these questions in his Method repr. 1991.
1933
1. A review of Philipp Frank, Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen in Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 38 Heft 1/2 (1933), p. 275.
He had spoken of Kausalitaet, now it's kausalgesetz, where gesetz is ambiguous as to law, principle, what have you. Not to be confused with the synthetic a priori, "Every event has a cause" beloved of Oxonians like Pears.
2. "L'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Logique" Trad. du generale Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 76. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1933). 36 pages.
Revised translation of 1930-2.
3. Review of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 3 Heft 4/6 (September 5, 1933), pp 436 - 437.
1934
1. "On the Character of Philosophic Problems," translated by W.M. Malisoff, in Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) volume 1 number 2 (April 1934), p. 251.
2. A review of Walter Dubislav Die Philosophie der Mathematik in der Gegenwart, Erkenntnis (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 1 (May 8, 1934), pp. 64 - 65.
3. A review of C.I. Lewis & C.H. Langford Symbolic Logic, Ibid., pp. 65 - 66.
---- This is intersting in that Lewis supersedes the material implication and enters metaphysical waters with his strict implication. So we are not talking of common or garden truth-functionalists here.
4. The Unity of Science, translated and with an introduction by Max Black in Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 63 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934). 101 pages.
--- Black will have occasion to discuss Grice at large ("Literary Theory", 1970).
Contents: Introduction by M. Black. Author's introduction (Prague, January 1934). Advice to the reader. Physics as a universal science. The heterogeneity of science. Languages. Protocol language. The physical language as an intersubjective language.
--- this topic is anti-Wittgensteinian. I don't think discussed by Grice, but by Griceans, e.g. Colin McGinn, in Woodfield, Thought and Object: to what extent can an intention-based semantics respond to the solipsistic challenge?
The physical language as a universal language. Protocol language as a part of physical language. Unified science in physical language.
5. Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik Einheitswissenschaft, schriften hrsg. von Otto Neurath in Verbindung mit Rudolf Carnap und Hans Hahn. Heft 3. (Wien: Verlag Gerold & Co., 1934). 30 pages.
6. Logische Syntax der Sprache Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, hrsg. von Philipp Frank und Moritz Schlick, Band 8 (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1934). 274 pages.
Contents: Introduction--What is Logical syntax? Languages as calculi.
-- the use of the term 'calculus' here is interesting in that it predates the OED for 'predikatkalkuel' that Grice uses.
Part I--The definite language I. Formation and transformation rules, and remarks on definite forms of language.
The ref. to transformational rules is Chomskyan apres la lettre.
Part II--Formal construction of the syntax of language I. Part III--The indefinite language II. Formation and transformation rules, along with further investigations. Part IV--General syntax. Object language and syntax language.
This must be a development of Russell, who speaks of object-language and meta-language. People often drop 'object-' but they shouldn't.
The syntax of an arbitrary language (in general; variables; arithmetic; translation; extensionality). Part V--Philosophy and Syntax. On the form of the sentences of the logic of science. Logic of science as syntax. Bibliography and Index.
The English translation of Logische Syntax appears here also as 1937-1.
7. "Meaning, Assertion, and Proposal" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) vol. 1 no. 3 (July 1934), pp. 359 - 360. This is a reply to Dewey's article of the same title in Ibid., pp. 237 - 238.
--- Grice gave a John Dewey Lecture. Carnap will get Gricean when he expands on 'assertion' as the basic statement for pragmatics (within what he calls semiosology).
8. La Science et la Metaphysique devant L'Analyse Logique du Langage Trad. du general Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 172. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1934). 44 pages. Revised translation of 1932-1.
9. "Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen" Natur und Geist (Dresden) 2. Jahrgang Nummer 9 (September 1934), pp. 257 - 260.
--- excellent dichotomy that will figure large in the later Carnap. The questions are theoretical, but the decisions as to what the ANSWERS to such questions are are practical. Inconsistency there?
10. "The Rejection of Metaphysics" Psyche: An Annual of General and Linguistic Philosophy (Cambridge and London), vol. 14 (1934), pp. 100 - 111.
---- This has Cantab. connection. No wonder he was not so well known in Oxon.
11. "Die Antinomien und die Unvollständigkeit der Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 41 Heft 2 (1934), pp. 263 - 284.
1935
1. Philosophy and Logical Syntax [Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 70] (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935). 100 pages.
A revised version of three lectures given on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of October 1934 at the University of London. See 1934-10 and 1944-1.
Contents: Preface (Prague, Nov. 1934). The rejection of metaphysics.
--- this is interesting. The title of his early essay. Heidegger in mind: Nothing noths. Nicht nichtet.
Verifiability.
--- excellent in that it is considering Confirmationism and Inductivism as the offspring of Positivism, and is preparing his criticisms to Popper.
Metaphysics. Problems of reality. Ethics. Metaphysics as expression. Psychology. Logical analysis. Logical syntax of language. "Formal" theory. Formation rules. Transformation rules. Syntactical terms. L-terms. Content. Pseudo-object sentences. The material and the formal modes of speech. Syntax as the method of philosophy. The material mode of speech. Modalities. Relativity in regard to language. Pseudo-questions. Epistemology. Natural philosophy. What physicalism asserts. What physicalism does not assert. The unity of Science. Literature.
2. "Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 1 (March 31, 1935), pp. 30 - 37.
--- the problem that Carnap must face is that if his thing is a formal one (formalwissenschaft), how does it deal with 'empirical' questions of, say, physics?
3. "Les Concepts psychologiques et les concepts physiques sont-ils foncierement differents?" Trad. par Robert Bouvier. Revue de synthese (Paris), t. 10, no. 1 (April 1935), pp. 43 - 53.
The original German version of this article was not published.
4. "Ein Gültigkeitskriterium für die Sätze der klassischen Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 42 Heft 1 (1935), pp. 163 - 190.
5. A bibliography of Carnap in Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 2/3 (June 18, 1935), pp. 187 - 188.
6. A review of Willard van Orman Quine A System of Logistic, in Ibid., Band 5 Heft 4 (July 31, 1935), pp. 285 - 287.
--- Quine knew well and wrote about both Carnap and Grice. The correspondence Quine/Carnap now available, "Dear Van", he called him.
7. A review of Walter Dubislav, Naturphilosophie, in Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.
8. A review of Arend Heyting, Mathematische Grundlagenforschung, in Ibid., pp. 288 - 289.
9. A review of Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung, in Ibid., pp. 290 - 294.
cfr. Verifiability above.
10. "Le Probleme de la logique de la science. Science formelle et science du reel." Trad. due general Ernest Vouillemin, Actualites scientifiques et industrielles 291. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1935). 37 pages.
Translation of 1934-5 and 1935-2.
1936
1. "Discussion" in Actes du huiteme Congres international de philosophie a Prague 2 - 7 septembre 1934 (Prague: Comite d'organisation du Congres, 1936). Despositaire: Orbis, S.A., Prague. 1103 pages.
Work by Carnap and Neurath appears on pp. 244 - 245.
2. "Die Methode der logischen Analyse" appears in Ibid., pp. 142 - 145. There is a discussion by Carnap and others on pp. 158 - 159.
3. "Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik" in Actes du Congres international de philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 388. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936). pp. 36 - 41.
4. "Über die Einheitssprache der Wissenschaft: Logische Bemerkungen zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie" Ibid., [fasc.] 2. Unite de la science Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 389. Pp. 60 - 70.
5. "Wahrheit und Bewährung" Ibid., [fasc.] 4. Induction et probabilite. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 391. Pp. 18 - 23.
6. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" The Journal of Symbolic Logic (Menasha, Wisconsin), volume 1 number 2 (June 1936), p. 59.
This is an abstract of a paper Carnap presented on September 1, 1936 at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences. The full paper was not published.
7. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Menasha, Wisconsin and New York), volume 42 number 9, part 1 (September 1936), p. 642.
The same as the preceding item.
8. "Existe-t-il des premisses de la science qui soient incontrolables?" Trad. par Henri Buriot-Darsiles. "Scientia" (Rivista di scienza) (Bologna). Volume 60, Number 293 (September 1 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
Carnap's original German paper was never published.
9. "Über Extremalaxiome" Von Rudolf Carnap und Friedrich Bachmann. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 6 Heft 3 (October 31, 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
10, "Testability and Meaning" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) Volume 3 Number 4 (October 1936), pp. 419 - 471; Volume 4 Number 1 (January 1937), pp. 1 - 40.
cfr. Verifiability above, but also semantic range of 'provability'. To test, to prove. What is it that is proved?
Contents: Introduction (sections 1 - 4)--Our problem: Confirmation. Testing and meaning. The older requirement of veriafiability. Confirmation instead of verification. The material and the formal idioms. Logical analysis of Confirmation and testing (sections 5 - 10)--Some terms and symbols of Logic. Reducibility of confirmation. Definitions. Reduction sentences.
--- important vis a vis Grice's reductionism (bete noire) and his caveats regarding a healthy reductive analysis but a more dangerous reductionist eliminationist agenda.
Introductive chains. Reduction and definition. Empirical analysis of confirmation and testing (sections 11 - 16)--Observable and realizable predicates. Confirmability. Method of testing. Testability. A remark about positivism and physicalism. Sufficient bases. The construction of a language-system (sections 17 - 28)--The problem of a criterion of meaning. The construction of a language-system L. Atomic sentences; primitive predicates. The choice of a psychological or a physical basis.
--- the choice here is interesting. I would have expected, 'phenomeanlist' vs. physicalist, but Carnap is talking 'pscyhological' tout court (this suggest he saw, sense-datum sentences as psychological complete with empirical psychological subjects attached to them ("I see that...")).
--- Introduced atomic predicates. Molecular sentences. Molecular languages. The critical problem: Universal and existential sentences. The scale of languages. Incompletely confirmable hypotheses in physics. The principle of empiricism.
--- Interesting vis a vis Grice's Empiricism as bete noire.
Confirmability of predictions. Bibliography.
1937
1. The Logical Syntax of Language Translated by
*************************************
Amethe Smeaton, Countess von Zeppelin.
**************************************
The poor woman. I imagined her frustration,
"Dear Rudolf,
I'm on p. 2 and can't understand.
What _is_ a pirot. The Count does
not know.
Merry Christmas."
--
International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, gen. ed., C. K. Ogden. (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937). 352 pages.
Revised and enlarged translation of 1934-6.
Contents [to be linked here] -- in comments.
Index of Carnap's Syntactic Variables with Page References -- to be linked here -- in comments.
2. "Logic" in Factors Determining Human Behavior by Edgar Douglas Adrian and others. Harvard Tercentenary Publications. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937). Pp. 107 - 118.
3. "Einheit der Wissenschaft durch Einheit der Sprache" in Travaux du IXe Congres international de philosophie, Congres Descartes [fasc.] 4. L'Unite de la science: La Methode et les methodes, [Ier partie]. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, number 533. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1937). Pp. 51 - 57.
4. Notes For Symbolic Logic Chicago, 1937. Distributed by the University of Chicago Bookstore. 37 mimeographed pages.
Notes for a course in logic at the University of Chicago.
----
But of course there's zillions more -- but do not despair.
If you have been good and followed Carnap's developments this far, the rest is, as he would say, a piece of apfelstrudel.
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