--- By J. L. S. of the Grice Club
------------for the Carnap Corner
I WOULD THINK that if you ask a German to say "neo-Carnapianism" in German he may say "neo-Carnapism". Google so far gives just one hit for that:
[PDF] Radical Interpretation, Normativity,
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
This amounts to a certain Neo-Carnapism which leads to the (re-)introduction of analyticity into L1. 11) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p.25. ...
www.mbph.de/Language/normanaly.pdf
Sunday 28 February 2010
The Carnap-Grice Conversation (cf. The Carnap-Strawson Conversation)
--- By J. L. S.
----------- I WOULD THINK CARNAP was pretty fortunate, if that's a word, in having Strawson contribute to his Living Philosopher volume. It gave the occasion not so much to read the rather verbose thing by Strawson, but, to reply to it!
It may do to approach that 'conversation' bit by bit. While it's one stretch followed by 1/4 of same stretch by Carnap, it may be best to 'analyse' or dissect it in terms of particular conversational moves. I will provide a few clues:
---- STRAWSON starts the conversation. He proposes some neologisms or terms to 'frame' the question: constructionists versus _us_.
CARNAP replies that he rather speaks of 'naturalists', short for 'linguistic naturalists' for Strawson's ilk.
STRAWSON proposes to criticise Carnap on 'explanation.
CARNAP replies that Strawson fails to honour Carnap's own preferrence for the word 'explication' and that he totally forgets (not disingenously) to mention that role of 'clarification'. For Carnap it's first clarification, and then explication.
STRAWSON never provides one clear example. Except Carnap's own, "The room is warm" vs. "The temperature of the room is 20C". Quality versus Quantity. Strawson offers this example as a counter-example to Carnap on metaphysics. Strawson wants to say that 'has temperature 20C' fails to encapsulate the issue of 'is warm'.
CARNAP questions this.
STRAWSON brings in another example. The interpretation of '.' (the symbol he uses, after Principia Mathematica) and '-', the tilde or squiddly, also used in Principia. He does not, fortunately, care to state what they stand for (He made a point about this in "'.' and 'and'" and "'-' and 'not'" in the book most criticised by Grice in his lifetime, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952).
CARNAP takes up the issue.
STRAWSON wants to say that there may be a difference or divergence of meaning (between '.' and 'and' and '-' and 'not'. He is suggesting there may be valid inferences in the vernaculars of NL that are not reproduced in the analogues of FL.
CARNAP considers this but is not worried. He himself proposes a more interesting, perhaps, case of 'or', not as 'v' but as 'w'. His point is that, if a divergence IS noted, it can still be marked, or remarked by the use of a new symbol (the exclusive 'disjunction') (All this has Gricean relevance -- since Grice's metier is to elucidate how we go on multiplying senses, or avoiding common mistakes in both constructionalists and naturalists).
STRAWSON brings in 'science', and 'common sense', and 'philosophy'.
CARNAP is unimpressed and makes some sharp criticism to OLP (ordianary langauge philosopher), drawing from Sellars, etc, and being especially punny and playful that he IS NOT MEANING Strawson!
STRAWSON continues to bring in the philosophical relevance of ordinary language.
CARNAP goes on, in his perhaps most effective, or at least most amusing move, to declare the 'barbarity' of the new world. He is identifying Strawson with the Good Old World of England and Oxford and Grice and Germany and Ruhr, and Vienna and Jena. Instead, Carnap opposes the New World (! With old-worlders like that!). His geographical metaphor is just that: he wants to say that, to use Grice's term, there is no SANCTITY in ordinary language, and that barbarous expressions WILL be tolerated.
STRAWSON continues to dwell on how ordinary our philosophical practice is.
CARNAP criticises the 'naturalists' with sticking with what is 'talent' for them -- things they are used to -- as a fixation, and an ability to expand the horizons, and just be more blooming tolerant. "This does not apply to Strawson, of course", Carnap concludes!
A good tour-de-force!
----------- I WOULD THINK CARNAP was pretty fortunate, if that's a word, in having Strawson contribute to his Living Philosopher volume. It gave the occasion not so much to read the rather verbose thing by Strawson, but, to reply to it!
It may do to approach that 'conversation' bit by bit. While it's one stretch followed by 1/4 of same stretch by Carnap, it may be best to 'analyse' or dissect it in terms of particular conversational moves. I will provide a few clues:
---- STRAWSON starts the conversation. He proposes some neologisms or terms to 'frame' the question: constructionists versus _us_.
CARNAP replies that he rather speaks of 'naturalists', short for 'linguistic naturalists' for Strawson's ilk.
STRAWSON proposes to criticise Carnap on 'explanation.
CARNAP replies that Strawson fails to honour Carnap's own preferrence for the word 'explication' and that he totally forgets (not disingenously) to mention that role of 'clarification'. For Carnap it's first clarification, and then explication.
STRAWSON never provides one clear example. Except Carnap's own, "The room is warm" vs. "The temperature of the room is 20C". Quality versus Quantity. Strawson offers this example as a counter-example to Carnap on metaphysics. Strawson wants to say that 'has temperature 20C' fails to encapsulate the issue of 'is warm'.
CARNAP questions this.
STRAWSON brings in another example. The interpretation of '.' (the symbol he uses, after Principia Mathematica) and '-', the tilde or squiddly, also used in Principia. He does not, fortunately, care to state what they stand for (He made a point about this in "'.' and 'and'" and "'-' and 'not'" in the book most criticised by Grice in his lifetime, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952).
CARNAP takes up the issue.
STRAWSON wants to say that there may be a difference or divergence of meaning (between '.' and 'and' and '-' and 'not'. He is suggesting there may be valid inferences in the vernaculars of NL that are not reproduced in the analogues of FL.
CARNAP considers this but is not worried. He himself proposes a more interesting, perhaps, case of 'or', not as 'v' but as 'w'. His point is that, if a divergence IS noted, it can still be marked, or remarked by the use of a new symbol (the exclusive 'disjunction') (All this has Gricean relevance -- since Grice's metier is to elucidate how we go on multiplying senses, or avoiding common mistakes in both constructionalists and naturalists).
STRAWSON brings in 'science', and 'common sense', and 'philosophy'.
CARNAP is unimpressed and makes some sharp criticism to OLP (ordianary langauge philosopher), drawing from Sellars, etc, and being especially punny and playful that he IS NOT MEANING Strawson!
STRAWSON continues to bring in the philosophical relevance of ordinary language.
CARNAP goes on, in his perhaps most effective, or at least most amusing move, to declare the 'barbarity' of the new world. He is identifying Strawson with the Good Old World of England and Oxford and Grice and Germany and Ruhr, and Vienna and Jena. Instead, Carnap opposes the New World (! With old-worlders like that!). His geographical metaphor is just that: he wants to say that, to use Grice's term, there is no SANCTITY in ordinary language, and that barbarous expressions WILL be tolerated.
STRAWSON continues to dwell on how ordinary our philosophical practice is.
CARNAP criticises the 'naturalists' with sticking with what is 'talent' for them -- things they are used to -- as a fixation, and an ability to expand the horizons, and just be more blooming tolerant. "This does not apply to Strawson, of course", Carnap concludes!
A good tour-de-force!
Carnap and Grice on Linguistic Naturalism
----- By J. L. S.
--------- for the Carnap Corner
LEARNING FROM
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap63.htm
that Sir Peter Strawson (once collaborator with Grice) did contribute with "Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy", which prompted his (commisioned, we realise), "Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism" I am tempted to imagine a closer conversation here with Strawson's mentor in the field: Grice!
--------- for the Carnap Corner
LEARNING FROM
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap63.htm
that Sir Peter Strawson (once collaborator with Grice) did contribute with "Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy", which prompted his (commisioned, we realise), "Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism" I am tempted to imagine a closer conversation here with Strawson's mentor in the field: Grice!
Good online link for Carnap on metametaphysics!
---- JLS
for the Carnap Corner
----- I AM PLEASED that I THINK I'm 'guiding' if that's the word, Jones towards the use of 'metaphilosophy'. In any case, here is 'meta-metaphyics', and it has a good essay, which I'll have to analyse in some more detail on 'ontological pluralism'. I arrived at it via googling for "Austinian Carnapian", and the Austinian glee is there alright!
Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology - Google Books ResultDavid John Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman - 2009 - Philosophy - 529 pages
... by shrugging it off with Carnapian tolerance for many different answers, or by insisting with Austinian glee that the answer is laughably trivial''.14 ...
books.google.com/books?isbn=0199546002...
for the Carnap Corner
----- I AM PLEASED that I THINK I'm 'guiding' if that's the word, Jones towards the use of 'metaphilosophy'. In any case, here is 'meta-metaphyics', and it has a good essay, which I'll have to analyse in some more detail on 'ontological pluralism'. I arrived at it via googling for "Austinian Carnapian", and the Austinian glee is there alright!
Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology - Google Books ResultDavid John Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman - 2009 - Philosophy - 529 pages
... by shrugging it off with Carnapian tolerance for many different answers, or by insisting with Austinian glee that the answer is laughably trivial''.14 ...
books.google.com/books?isbn=0199546002...
"More Carnapian than Austinian"
--- by J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Circle
----------- For the Carnap Corner
-- An online source -- I'm retrieving some crossreferences Austin/Carnap, and find this one from
REFRAINING (1979), by R. E. Moore
where a reference is made to Myles Barnd (1971)
Brand "describes his project there as "more Carnapian
than Austinian". (p. 45), so most probably he never
intended that (D5) capture our ordinary ...
www.springerlink.com/index/X23Q0505H020W550.pdf
--- So one could visualise something like
On many occasions -- R. B. Jones is a specialist in J. L. Austin, so he knows --, Grice would feel the burden of the Austinian Code a heavy one.
Grice had more of a theoretical spirit than Austin ever _tried_. Grice looked for generalities, abstractions, regularities beyond 'statistics'.
It would not be unreasonable to see Grice's choosing and sticking so ardently with Carnap's 'pirots' as Grice's feeling "more Carnapian than Austinian" in more than one respect!
----------- For the Carnap Corner
-- An online source -- I'm retrieving some crossreferences Austin/Carnap, and find this one from
REFRAINING (1979), by R. E. Moore
where a reference is made to Myles Barnd (1971)
Brand "describes his project there as "more Carnapian
than Austinian". (p. 45), so most probably he never
intended that (D5) capture our ordinary ...
www.springerlink.com/index/X23Q0505H020W550.pdf
--- So one could visualise something like
On many occasions -- R. B. Jones is a specialist in J. L. Austin, so he knows --, Grice would feel the burden of the Austinian Code a heavy one.
Grice had more of a theoretical spirit than Austin ever _tried_. Grice looked for generalities, abstractions, regularities beyond 'statistics'.
It would not be unreasonable to see Grice's choosing and sticking so ardently with Carnap's 'pirots' as Grice's feeling "more Carnapian than Austinian" in more than one respect!
Grice's "More Positivistic Vein"
--- By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club.
------------ for the Carnap Corner
IN A POST in GriceClub.Blogspot, "Grice on adaptiveness" I quote at some length, inviting a comment by Kramer, from Gr91, i.e. Grice's Conception of Value. This book actuall comprises two sepearate pieces: the 1983 Paul Carus Lectures, and the much earlier, Gr75, i.e. "Method in philosophical pscyhology". These things should be taken into consideration when viewing the CarnapGrice interface, as it were -- if we want to check a 'development' of this or that idea.
In the quotes from Gr75 in that post then, I direct the attention to Grice's 'turn of phrase':
"in a more positivistic vein"
---
Vis a vis the very interesting things that R. B. Jones has said, and is able to say, on 'positivism' as a _creed_, I will defer commentary! But not quite!
What Grice is willing to say is that
'a change of idiom'
may be just what it takes from one bete noire (e.g. Mechanism) to its twin enemy (Finalism).
Thus, he is considering 'pirots' (which he borrows from Carnap). These are _not_ animals, for the simple reason that they don't have an anima! (Grice is sceptical of 'animism' here).
Similarly, he envisages that someone may be, rightly, sceptical of attributions of 'causa finalis', telos.
-- for specific claims about 'pirots' -- in terms of their continued operancy.
Thus, in its stead, he proposes:
survival utilty.
Grice is willing to say that
finality =df survival utility
I.e what is a turn of phrase in one bete noire ('survival utility') -- i.e. Grice when in the 'positivistic mood' -- may well get translated to a turn of phrase in its corresponding twin bete: finalism.
--- For each bete noire, then, and for the mother of them all, Minimalism, Grice seems to be suggesting a corresponding turn of phrase. This has methodological consequences in that it gives clues as to what constitutes each 'bete noire' and how to fight her!
JLS
------------ for the Carnap Corner
IN A POST in GriceClub.Blogspot, "Grice on adaptiveness" I quote at some length, inviting a comment by Kramer, from Gr91, i.e. Grice's Conception of Value. This book actuall comprises two sepearate pieces: the 1983 Paul Carus Lectures, and the much earlier, Gr75, i.e. "Method in philosophical pscyhology". These things should be taken into consideration when viewing the CarnapGrice interface, as it were -- if we want to check a 'development' of this or that idea.
In the quotes from Gr75 in that post then, I direct the attention to Grice's 'turn of phrase':
"in a more positivistic vein"
---
Vis a vis the very interesting things that R. B. Jones has said, and is able to say, on 'positivism' as a _creed_, I will defer commentary! But not quite!
What Grice is willing to say is that
'a change of idiom'
may be just what it takes from one bete noire (e.g. Mechanism) to its twin enemy (Finalism).
Thus, he is considering 'pirots' (which he borrows from Carnap). These are _not_ animals, for the simple reason that they don't have an anima! (Grice is sceptical of 'animism' here).
Similarly, he envisages that someone may be, rightly, sceptical of attributions of 'causa finalis', telos.
-- for specific claims about 'pirots' -- in terms of their continued operancy.
Thus, in its stead, he proposes:
survival utilty.
Grice is willing to say that
finality =df survival utility
I.e what is a turn of phrase in one bete noire ('survival utility') -- i.e. Grice when in the 'positivistic mood' -- may well get translated to a turn of phrase in its corresponding twin bete: finalism.
--- For each bete noire, then, and for the mother of them all, Minimalism, Grice seems to be suggesting a corresponding turn of phrase. This has methodological consequences in that it gives clues as to what constitutes each 'bete noire' and how to fight her!
JLS
Saturday 20 February 2010
Überwindung
* * * * * * * * * By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
* * * * * * * * * * * * * For the Carnap Corner.
"Überwindung" is the word Carnap used in his "Überwindung" essay. It has been translated, by A. P. (it "was" translated, indeed) as "elimination" but that's perhaps too strong.
I think 'windung' is cognate with 'winding' as in Sir Paul (McCartney), The long and winding road".
"Über" brings a sense of finality to it, and while this preposition is not usually capitalised, but written as "über", it _is_ when prefixing a noun, like '-windung' which yields "elimination".
---- The sentence in focus is
Heidegger
"Das Nichts selbst nichtet"
-- Carnap omits, but we need broader context, the 'selbst', as it is, perhaps, otiose.
Now: the arguments for the 'rejection' and 'elimination' of a whole enterprise surely cannot rest on a solecism, and Carnap KNEW it.
But analytic philosophers (unlike Quine: he cannot have his cake and eat it, so he's no more an 'analytic philosopher' to me) will like to analyse in some detail. So whatever Heidegger's "external" considerations, we want to focus on this particular sentence. And more importantly, on Carnap's arguments for 'rejecting' or ueberwinden-ing it. But later,
JLS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * For the Carnap Corner.
"Überwindung" is the word Carnap used in his "Überwindung" essay. It has been translated, by A. P. (it "was" translated, indeed) as "elimination" but that's perhaps too strong.
I think 'windung' is cognate with 'winding' as in Sir Paul (McCartney), The long and winding road".
"Über" brings a sense of finality to it, and while this preposition is not usually capitalised, but written as "über", it _is_ when prefixing a noun, like '-windung' which yields "elimination".
---- The sentence in focus is
Heidegger
"Das Nichts selbst nichtet"
-- Carnap omits, but we need broader context, the 'selbst', as it is, perhaps, otiose.
Now: the arguments for the 'rejection' and 'elimination' of a whole enterprise surely cannot rest on a solecism, and Carnap KNEW it.
But analytic philosophers (unlike Quine: he cannot have his cake and eat it, so he's no more an 'analytic philosopher' to me) will like to analyse in some detail. So whatever Heidegger's "external" considerations, we want to focus on this particular sentence. And more importantly, on Carnap's arguments for 'rejecting' or ueberwinden-ing it. But later,
JLS
Friday 19 February 2010
Carnap and Grice on nonsense
-----------By J. L. S. of the Grice Club
for the Carnap Corner
From an online source:
“Caesar times 17 is purple.”
---
indeed, but only under a certain light.
I think I do Like Carnap's syntactic period.
-- where 'period' is ambiguous.
"Caesar is and"
indeed is not a wff.
"Caesar times 17 is purple" is a different type of nonsense. I would not call ill-formed formulae "nonsense" because, to me, nonsense applies to 'semantic', not to syntactics.
----
Carnap compares:
Caesar is a prime number
with
Caesar is a general.
---
Oddly, Grice has
You're the cream in my coffee.
as a categorial mistake -- alla Caesar is a prime number -- and triggering a metaphor. But we are not here to find scenarios where nonsense becomes sense. We are here to provide an exegesis of ... Heidegger?
---
The Absolute is lazy
once repeated a few, becomes sensical -- O'Connor -- even if it may be difficult to see what sensory experience could verify it.
Chomsky's infamous
Colourless green ideas sleep furiously,
is "buttered with carnaps" all over again --.! (And without a credit!)
Etc.
When Grice was fighting for a def. of "... means ..." in one way or other, he must have been having Carnap's "nonsense" in mind, too. Etc.
for the Carnap Corner
From an online source:
“Caesar times 17 is purple.”
---
indeed, but only under a certain light.
I think I do Like Carnap's syntactic period.
-- where 'period' is ambiguous.
"Caesar is and"
indeed is not a wff.
"Caesar times 17 is purple" is a different type of nonsense. I would not call ill-formed formulae "nonsense" because, to me, nonsense applies to 'semantic', not to syntactics.
----
Carnap compares:
Caesar is a prime number
with
Caesar is a general.
---
Oddly, Grice has
You're the cream in my coffee.
as a categorial mistake -- alla Caesar is a prime number -- and triggering a metaphor. But we are not here to find scenarios where nonsense becomes sense. We are here to provide an exegesis of ... Heidegger?
---
The Absolute is lazy
once repeated a few, becomes sensical -- O'Connor -- even if it may be difficult to see what sensory experience could verify it.
Chomsky's infamous
Colourless green ideas sleep furiously,
is "buttered with carnaps" all over again --.! (And without a credit!)
Etc.
When Grice was fighting for a def. of "... means ..." in one way or other, he must have been having Carnap's "nonsense" in mind, too. Etc.
"Caesar is a prime number"
------------By J. L. S.
From an online source:
"In “The Elimination of Metaphysics” Carnap describes what kinds of sentences or phrases we should think of as meaningless."
"The first example he gives is."
i. Caesar is and.
"Now clearly this is meaningless, no problem (or at least it seems obvious to me that such a serious break of syntax leads to that result.)"
"However, Carnap then presents the second meaningless sentence."
ii. Caesar is a prime number.
"Carnap’s analysis of this statement is that it is meaningless in virtue of it being neither true nor false."
"He claims that if we were to say that this is a meaningful, false statement, that we would be committed to saying that Caesar is divisible by another whole number. Since Caesar is neither a prime number nor divisible by another whole number, the statement, “Caesar is a prime number,” is, not false, but meaningless."
"But why think a thing like that? Surely, we would instead want to say that there is a set of all prime numbers and that, in virtue of Caesar not being identical to any member of that set, the statement “Caesar is a prime number,” is false."
"Clearly this is an instance of a category mistake but don’t we know to call it a category mistake in virtue of the fact that we know we know what the statement means?"
"And further, my professor thinks that Carnap would claim that the statement “Caesar is not a prime number” is true. But how could this be the case if its negation is false?"
"Several members of the class agreed with Carnap as did my professor and I just cannot make any sense of it. Any help would be greatly appreciated."
---- Tomorrow.
--Personally, I don't see why we cannot name a number, "Caesar".
"Mary brought Caesar gifts to the party"
"3" as it happens.
"3" is indeed a number in some formal systems, no?
Harrison considers a different case:
"Snow is white"
"Arthur is white"
-- surely we could call "snow" "Arthur". But here the problem, Harrison notes, is that 'snow' is a natural kind. And natural kinds don't get to get names like those. Etc.
---
I agree with this student's professor that "Caesar is not a prime number" is true.
Etc.
From an online source:
"In “The Elimination of Metaphysics” Carnap describes what kinds of sentences or phrases we should think of as meaningless."
"The first example he gives is."
i. Caesar is and.
"Now clearly this is meaningless, no problem (or at least it seems obvious to me that such a serious break of syntax leads to that result.)"
"However, Carnap then presents the second meaningless sentence."
ii. Caesar is a prime number.
"Carnap’s analysis of this statement is that it is meaningless in virtue of it being neither true nor false."
"He claims that if we were to say that this is a meaningful, false statement, that we would be committed to saying that Caesar is divisible by another whole number. Since Caesar is neither a prime number nor divisible by another whole number, the statement, “Caesar is a prime number,” is, not false, but meaningless."
"But why think a thing like that? Surely, we would instead want to say that there is a set of all prime numbers and that, in virtue of Caesar not being identical to any member of that set, the statement “Caesar is a prime number,” is false."
"Clearly this is an instance of a category mistake but don’t we know to call it a category mistake in virtue of the fact that we know we know what the statement means?"
"And further, my professor thinks that Carnap would claim that the statement “Caesar is not a prime number” is true. But how could this be the case if its negation is false?"
"Several members of the class agreed with Carnap as did my professor and I just cannot make any sense of it. Any help would be greatly appreciated."
---- Tomorrow.
--Personally, I don't see why we cannot name a number, "Caesar".
"Mary brought Caesar gifts to the party"
"3" as it happens.
"3" is indeed a number in some formal systems, no?
Harrison considers a different case:
"Snow is white"
"Arthur is white"
-- surely we could call "snow" "Arthur". But here the problem, Harrison notes, is that 'snow' is a natural kind. And natural kinds don't get to get names like those. Etc.
---
I agree with this student's professor that "Caesar is not a prime number" is true.
Etc.
The Go-Between: Carnap, Grice -- and Sir Freddie
===== By J. L. S.
Ayer was playing with "The Nothing nothings" early enough.
He writes:
"This formulation of the verification principle fails."
"Take some experiential proposition… “O”
i. The pillar box is red.
, and any “nonsensical” statement “N”
ii. The nothing nothings.
"Then, since the observation statement “O” can be deduced from “N”, together with “if N then O”, but not from “if N then O” on its own, “N” counts as
factually meaningful
according to this formulation of the verification principle."
"Thus, if we take “N” to be “the Nothing nothings” and “O” to be “that pillar box is red”, we can establish that “the Nothing nothings” is factually significant."
But it ain't!
Grice was impressed by Ayer, and he didn't hide it!
Grice's example in "Causal theory of perception" as it happens is:
iii. The pillar box _seems_ red.
How much more phenomenalist can YOU get?
So, according to this initial interpretation of the Verification Principle sentences such as ‘the Nothing nothings’ are still factually
Ayer was playing with "The Nothing nothings" early enough.
He writes:
"This formulation of the verification principle fails."
"Take some experiential proposition… “O”
i. The pillar box is red.
, and any “nonsensical” statement “N”
ii. The nothing nothings.
"Then, since the observation statement “O” can be deduced from “N”, together with “if N then O”, but not from “if N then O” on its own, “N” counts as
factually meaningful
according to this formulation of the verification principle."
"Thus, if we take “N” to be “the Nothing nothings” and “O” to be “that pillar box is red”, we can establish that “the Nothing nothings” is factually significant."
But it ain't!
Grice was impressed by Ayer, and he didn't hide it!
Grice's example in "Causal theory of perception" as it happens is:
iii. The pillar box _seems_ red.
How much more phenomenalist can YOU get?
So, according to this initial interpretation of the Verification Principle sentences such as ‘the Nothing nothings’ are still factually
He is teavy
===========By J. L. S.
From an online source:
"There are statements which are ... pointless to work out. Examples given by Carnap include:
i. The average weight of the inhabitants of Vienna
whose telephone number ends with a 3
is x.
ii. In 1910 Vienna had only 6 inhabitants’.
He says of such sentences that
"they are really meaningful,
though they are pointless; for
it is only meaningful sentences
that are even divisible into
(theoretically) fruitful and sterile, true and false."
"It can be seen that there are two types of meaningless sentences or propositions, either strings of utter gibberish using ‘words’ which are not contained in our language, or sentences..."
"‘made of regular ... words… [which] because they are grammatical from a superficially syntactic point of view… [give] a kind of illusion of understanding.'"
"This second type is called a "pseudo-statement" because it appears to be grammatically a normal statement or proposition."
"Statements of Metaphysics are held to be pseudo-statements because although they are grammatically correct they are, in themselves meaningless, either because they are entirely nonsensical or because they contain a word whose meaning is not verifiable."
"Carnap gives the example"
iii. He is teavy.
"We would say that"
"‘in order to learn the meaning of this word, we ask him about its criterion of application: how is one to ascertain in a concrete case whether a given thing is teavy or not?’"
"If there are no circumstances in which we can empirically verify the meaning of the word then why should we believe that objects could have the attribute ‘teavy’ since it makes no difference to the world if it is true or false?"
"The Logical Positivists argued that the same thing could be held true of most of the claims of Metaphysics."
Etc.
His other examples in that "Elimination" essay are:
iv. Caesar is a prime number
and
v. Nothing noths.
The essay was first tr. to English by Swiss-born philosopher Arhur Pap (who died in 1959) and published by Ayer in 1959. Etc.
From an online source:
"There are statements which are ... pointless to work out. Examples given by Carnap include:
i. The average weight of the inhabitants of Vienna
whose telephone number ends with a 3
is x.
ii. In 1910 Vienna had only 6 inhabitants’.
He says of such sentences that
"they are really meaningful,
though they are pointless; for
it is only meaningful sentences
that are even divisible into
(theoretically) fruitful and sterile, true and false."
"It can be seen that there are two types of meaningless sentences or propositions, either strings of utter gibberish using ‘words’ which are not contained in our language, or sentences..."
"‘made of regular ... words… [which] because they are grammatical from a superficially syntactic point of view… [give] a kind of illusion of understanding.'"
"This second type is called a "pseudo-statement" because it appears to be grammatically a normal statement or proposition."
"Statements of Metaphysics are held to be pseudo-statements because although they are grammatically correct they are, in themselves meaningless, either because they are entirely nonsensical or because they contain a word whose meaning is not verifiable."
"Carnap gives the example"
iii. He is teavy.
"We would say that"
"‘in order to learn the meaning of this word, we ask him about its criterion of application: how is one to ascertain in a concrete case whether a given thing is teavy or not?’"
"If there are no circumstances in which we can empirically verify the meaning of the word then why should we believe that objects could have the attribute ‘teavy’ since it makes no difference to the world if it is true or false?"
"The Logical Positivists argued that the same thing could be held true of most of the claims of Metaphysics."
Etc.
His other examples in that "Elimination" essay are:
iv. Caesar is a prime number
and
v. Nothing noths.
The essay was first tr. to English by Swiss-born philosopher Arhur Pap (who died in 1959) and published by Ayer in 1959. Etc.
Thursday 18 February 2010
Das Nichts Nichtet
------------- By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
for The Carnap Corner
--- To consider rather seriously:
Heidegger's claim
(i) Das Nichts nichtet
"Nothing noths"
Does it compare with
(ii) Pirots karulise elatically.
?
It would seem that syntactically, Carnap should tolerate (i)!
for The Carnap Corner
--- To consider rather seriously:
Heidegger's claim
(i) Das Nichts nichtet
"Nothing noths"
Does it compare with
(ii) Pirots karulise elatically.
?
It would seem that syntactically, Carnap should tolerate (i)!
Asserting
-------------- By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Circle
for The Carnap Corner
I AM GLAD to see that Brandom, a good philosopher, has paid good attention to 'asserting' qua verb, in a title of one of his essays, with special reference to the Carnap, shall we say, and Grice 'interface'.
For Carnap, to 'assert' is a, or the, pragmatic concept par excellence. He was possibly influenced by Morris on this, as to 'assertion' being 'evidence' for 'belief' -- and in turn Morris would have been influenced by Peirce.
The route to Grice is similar. He was also influenced by Peirce and Morris, and would use, as any Oxonian worth his name would, use 'assert' and 'state' perhaps interchangeably to deal with issues of 'belief' "expression".
A good point here is
Moore
It is raining but I don't believe it.
This amused Grice in ways that probably did not amuse Carnap. Grice spends a good whole pasage to deal with in in terms of the _semantics_ (rather than the 'pragmatics') of 'asserting'.
--- I drop these notes, because as we consider the sub-components or modules of a system (System C, System G, you name it), we may come to believe (and yet, also assert) that the pragmatic subcomponent is about _this_.
One problem of divergence of Carnap and Grice would be their reactions to Quine's idiocies (I use 'idiocy' alla Aristotle, to refer to his idiosyncratic things). In "Word and Object" he considers various alternatives to the analysis (the cheek! He thinks there's no such thing!) of
Paul asserts that p.
He wants "asserts that p" to be treated as a monadic predicate. Since he won't believe in "Paul" either, that comes out as:
Fx & Gx.
i.e. x is paulising and x is asserting that p. None of that nonsense (Grice calls it 'stupidity' in WoW:RE, last page) in Carnap or Grice.
In Grice it's all very complicated, but 'assert' is associated with a type of psychological acceptance. He thinks 'accept' must do general duty for both assertoric acceptance and boulomaic acceptance.
In Carnap, the issue, perhaps because he was no Gricean, was, perhaps, simpler, and he would say things like Paul asserting that it is raining is a relation between Paul and a sentence.
Davidson may come in here with his analysis of things like: Paul asserts that. It is raining. So one has to be careful. Etc. But this _is_ fun.
for The Carnap Corner
I AM GLAD to see that Brandom, a good philosopher, has paid good attention to 'asserting' qua verb, in a title of one of his essays, with special reference to the Carnap, shall we say, and Grice 'interface'.
For Carnap, to 'assert' is a, or the, pragmatic concept par excellence. He was possibly influenced by Morris on this, as to 'assertion' being 'evidence' for 'belief' -- and in turn Morris would have been influenced by Peirce.
The route to Grice is similar. He was also influenced by Peirce and Morris, and would use, as any Oxonian worth his name would, use 'assert' and 'state' perhaps interchangeably to deal with issues of 'belief' "expression".
A good point here is
Moore
It is raining but I don't believe it.
This amused Grice in ways that probably did not amuse Carnap. Grice spends a good whole pasage to deal with in in terms of the _semantics_ (rather than the 'pragmatics') of 'asserting'.
--- I drop these notes, because as we consider the sub-components or modules of a system (System C, System G, you name it), we may come to believe (and yet, also assert) that the pragmatic subcomponent is about _this_.
One problem of divergence of Carnap and Grice would be their reactions to Quine's idiocies (I use 'idiocy' alla Aristotle, to refer to his idiosyncratic things). In "Word and Object" he considers various alternatives to the analysis (the cheek! He thinks there's no such thing!) of
Paul asserts that p.
He wants "asserts that p" to be treated as a monadic predicate. Since he won't believe in "Paul" either, that comes out as:
Fx & Gx.
i.e. x is paulising and x is asserting that p. None of that nonsense (Grice calls it 'stupidity' in WoW:RE, last page) in Carnap or Grice.
In Grice it's all very complicated, but 'assert' is associated with a type of psychological acceptance. He thinks 'accept' must do general duty for both assertoric acceptance and boulomaic acceptance.
In Carnap, the issue, perhaps because he was no Gricean, was, perhaps, simpler, and he would say things like Paul asserting that it is raining is a relation between Paul and a sentence.
Davidson may come in here with his analysis of things like: Paul asserts that. It is raining. So one has to be careful. Etc. But this _is_ fun.
Carnap and Grice on the internal-external distinction
------------- By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
for the Carnap Corner
--- This is hot topic, and various scenarios can be devised.
Here, my gut reaction as a Gricean: "remember Hart!"
--- From an online source and vis a vis Grice's numerous Hart refs. in WoW:
"Hart has recourse to an "internal-external" analysis."
So has Carnap: in Carnap it applies to 'proposals'. And it's DIFFERENT questions. One question is internal, another is external. Hart is playing with the epithet, 'internal' or 'external' as applying to the _same_ phenomenon (under different guises):
"The point of view for validity is internal."
Cfr. Carnap, section 17 of his opus magnum, on principle of tolerance.
The view from inside the teapot, or from inside the fly-bottle:
"When we judge a law valid, we
do so from the perspective of a
member of the legal community - we
take the secondary rules for granted."
but think outside the box:
"The secondary rules do not follow
from any other rules. We can only
"justify" them from the outside.
Externally, then, Hart treats the
normative status of secondary
rules as a question "closed on fact."
The fact is the fact of implicit
internal acceptance."
The inter-play:
"That a secondary rule is accepted
is an external, descriptive fact.
Inside the system, we view the
secondary rules as norms.
Outside (from the point of view
of the sociologist) is
only descriptive fact.
This makes Hart's theory useful for
analytic/scientific purposes."
-- end of online source quoted.
--
To restrict:
To Language: Meta-Language, Object-Language.
Internal: object-linguistic
external: meta-linguistic
(a) assertoric construal
(b) other: proposal, "in logic there's no morals", etc.
---
Etc.
Howe
for the Carnap Corner
--- This is hot topic, and various scenarios can be devised.
Here, my gut reaction as a Gricean: "remember Hart!"
--- From an online source and vis a vis Grice's numerous Hart refs. in WoW:
"Hart has recourse to an "internal-external" analysis."
So has Carnap: in Carnap it applies to 'proposals'. And it's DIFFERENT questions. One question is internal, another is external. Hart is playing with the epithet, 'internal' or 'external' as applying to the _same_ phenomenon (under different guises):
"The point of view for validity is internal."
Cfr. Carnap, section 17 of his opus magnum, on principle of tolerance.
The view from inside the teapot, or from inside the fly-bottle:
"When we judge a law valid, we
do so from the perspective of a
member of the legal community - we
take the secondary rules for granted."
but think outside the box:
"The secondary rules do not follow
from any other rules. We can only
"justify" them from the outside.
Externally, then, Hart treats the
normative status of secondary
rules as a question "closed on fact."
The fact is the fact of implicit
internal acceptance."
The inter-play:
"That a secondary rule is accepted
is an external, descriptive fact.
Inside the system, we view the
secondary rules as norms.
Outside (from the point of view
of the sociologist) is
only descriptive fact.
This makes Hart's theory useful for
analytic/scientific purposes."
-- end of online source quoted.
--
To restrict:
To Language: Meta-Language, Object-Language.
Internal: object-linguistic
external: meta-linguistic
(a) assertoric construal
(b) other: proposal, "in logic there's no morals", etc.
---
Etc.
Howe
LSS §17
------------- by J. L. S.
From LSS, section 17:
"It is not our business to set up
prohibitions, but to arrive at
conventions […]. In logic
there are no morals.
Everyone is at liberty to build
up his own logic, i.e. his own
language, as he wishes.
All that is required of him is
that, if he wishes to discuss it,
he must state his methods
clearly, and give syntactical
rules instead of
philosophical arguments"
Tolerated Gricean reactions:
--"our"? Majestic 'we'! He does _not_ mean I. Carnap, out of whose typewriter the mimeo flowed!
--'convention'. This was pretty much a fuzzy notion till Lewis wrote his PhD on it! (and later his book got published. Alas, his thesis supervisor was you-know-who: "Orman" as I call him).
-- "at liberty": I like that. The correct connotation of 'liberalism' about it, which I am (Cfr. my "Meaning-Liberalism" in Grice and Carroll, for The Jabberwocky: the Journal of the Lewis Carroll Society).
-- Grice on Deutero-Esperanto in WoW: "that makes me the master". Meaning as NOT involving 'convention'. But this is a verbal point. What word we use is 'immaterial', and Grice would have agreed with the spirit of the Carnap thing here. There are various traces of what I call idiosyncrasism in Grice.
--- The opp. 'syntactic rule' -- can you FLOUT a rule like that? cfr. Carnap on Heidegger as going syntactically 'over the top' -- vs. ('philosophical') argument is one that Grice may have encountered difficult to swallow. He would NOT distinguish between philosophical and OTHER types of argument. And an argument MAY be required to back your 'proposal' that will be tolerated. But I see Carnap's point.
Etc.
From LSS, section 17:
"It is not our business to set up
prohibitions, but to arrive at
conventions […]. In logic
there are no morals.
Everyone is at liberty to build
up his own logic, i.e. his own
language, as he wishes.
All that is required of him is
that, if he wishes to discuss it,
he must state his methods
clearly, and give syntactical
rules instead of
philosophical arguments"
Tolerated Gricean reactions:
--"our"? Majestic 'we'! He does _not_ mean I. Carnap, out of whose typewriter the mimeo flowed!
--'convention'. This was pretty much a fuzzy notion till Lewis wrote his PhD on it! (and later his book got published. Alas, his thesis supervisor was you-know-who: "Orman" as I call him).
-- "at liberty": I like that. The correct connotation of 'liberalism' about it, which I am (Cfr. my "Meaning-Liberalism" in Grice and Carroll, for The Jabberwocky: the Journal of the Lewis Carroll Society).
-- Grice on Deutero-Esperanto in WoW: "that makes me the master". Meaning as NOT involving 'convention'. But this is a verbal point. What word we use is 'immaterial', and Grice would have agreed with the spirit of the Carnap thing here. There are various traces of what I call idiosyncrasism in Grice.
--- The opp. 'syntactic rule' -- can you FLOUT a rule like that? cfr. Carnap on Heidegger as going syntactically 'over the top' -- vs. ('philosophical') argument is one that Grice may have encountered difficult to swallow. He would NOT distinguish between philosophical and OTHER types of argument. And an argument MAY be required to back your 'proposal' that will be tolerated. But I see Carnap's point.
Etc.
LSS §17
"It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions […]. In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments" (Logical Syntax §17).
The Implicatures of Tolerance
--------------by J. L. S. of the Grice Club
for the Carnap Corner
--- QUINE infamously told Carnap in private correspondence which the world later all knew about: "Your principle is so 'tolerant' that it will tolerate 'Hitler'!"
----
There is an unwanted 'implicature' of 'tolerant'. Witness the online etymological note:
"tolerance. 1412, "endurance, fortitude," from O.Fr. tolerance (14c.), from L. tolerantia "endurance," from tolerans, prp. of tolerare "to bear, endure, tolerate" (see toleration). Of authorities, in the sense of "permissive," first recorded 1539; of individuals, with the sense of "free from bigotry or severity," 1765. Meaning "allowable amount of variation" dates from 1868; and physiological sense of "ability to take large doses" first recorded 1875. Tolerant is recorded from 1784. The verb tolerate is attested from 1531."
Smith tolerated him.
"him".
Implicature:
"Smith endured him"
--
There is a (-) ring to it. This must, or could, be 'implicatural'. Calvin, for example, may 'tolerate' something which he thinks is actually (+).
In which case, to analyse, 'tolerate', we may not need to import value-judgements like that!
Next: Stay tuned: Principle of Tolerance properly tolerated by you know who.
for the Carnap Corner
--- QUINE infamously told Carnap in private correspondence which the world later all knew about: "Your principle is so 'tolerant' that it will tolerate 'Hitler'!"
----
There is an unwanted 'implicature' of 'tolerant'. Witness the online etymological note:
"tolerance. 1412, "endurance, fortitude," from O.Fr. tolerance (14c.), from L. tolerantia "endurance," from tolerans, prp. of tolerare "to bear, endure, tolerate" (see toleration). Of authorities, in the sense of "permissive," first recorded 1539; of individuals, with the sense of "free from bigotry or severity," 1765. Meaning "allowable amount of variation" dates from 1868; and physiological sense of "ability to take large doses" first recorded 1875. Tolerant is recorded from 1784. The verb tolerate is attested from 1531."
Smith tolerated him.
"him".
Implicature:
"Smith endured him"
--
There is a (-) ring to it. This must, or could, be 'implicatural'. Calvin, for example, may 'tolerate' something which he thinks is actually (+).
In which case, to analyse, 'tolerate', we may not need to import value-judgements like that!
Next: Stay tuned: Principle of Tolerance properly tolerated by you know who.
Cassirer Lecture -- *CANCELLED*
------------- By J. L. S.
--- When I was in Yale, I was quite close to Cassirer. He instituted the Cassirer Lectures at Yale. I never attended one!
From an online source:
"In what follows I hope to show that the early Carnap was pursuing a program that is very similar to that of Cassirer."
Oddly, I still keep at my (Swimming-Pool) library (I add this as a touch of welcome frivolity -- who wants to have yet another biblio ref.? The world would be a more habitable place without them!), Cassirer's excellent ch. on the history of semantics.
He was very well read, but he is not, alas, very well read. Is that anti-analytic?
--- When I was in Yale, I was quite close to Cassirer. He instituted the Cassirer Lectures at Yale. I never attended one!
From an online source:
"In what follows I hope to show that the early Carnap was pursuing a program that is very similar to that of Cassirer."
Oddly, I still keep at my (Swimming-Pool) library (I add this as a touch of welcome frivolity -- who wants to have yet another biblio ref.? The world would be a more habitable place without them!), Cassirer's excellent ch. on the history of semantics.
He was very well read, but he is not, alas, very well read. Is that anti-analytic?
Husserlian prairies, Meinongian jungles
------------ By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
for the Carnap Corner
From an online source:
"Husserl exerted a crucial influence on the early Carnap."
It's _late_ now but: to consider: "the young Carnap", "the early Carnap", how early can you be?
Oddly Husserl exteerted a crucial influence on me: I tried to avoid all the seminars on phenomenology given by that fanatic of Mario Presas at my Philo Dept.!
------ Grice speaks of "Meinongian jungle" in "Vacuous Names". He is brief about them: "Avoid them".
Meinong was possibly Husserlian.
They say that Ogden/Richards, The meaning of meaning, is also Husserlian in parts. The idea of a phenomenology of content, etc.
-- Etc.
JLS
for the Carnap Corner
From an online source:
"Husserl exerted a crucial influence on the early Carnap."
It's _late_ now but: to consider: "the young Carnap", "the early Carnap", how early can you be?
Oddly Husserl exteerted a crucial influence on me: I tried to avoid all the seminars on phenomenology given by that fanatic of Mario Presas at my Philo Dept.!
------ Grice speaks of "Meinongian jungle" in "Vacuous Names". He is brief about them: "Avoid them".
Meinong was possibly Husserlian.
They say that Ogden/Richards, The meaning of meaning, is also Husserlian in parts. The idea of a phenomenology of content, etc.
-- Etc.
JLS
Under Carnap's Lamp
----------
If Philosopicallexicon.com plays superficially on the bel-nap of the carnap, the American logician takes Carnap to task (in a good way) in his "Under Carnap's Lamp".
The thing is found online.
He refers in the abstract to:
"the usefulness of Carnapian tolerance"
-- vis a vis that ungriceous student who mentioned, "You'll end up tolerating Hitler!" --.
---
One of the keywords is indeed "Carnap" and the thing was published, let me check, in Studia Logica, vol. 80 -- we don't name years because, as Grice says, "they date things" (In defense of a dogma).
---
On the first page, he uses the majestic 'we' (that Jones and I also use but non-majestically) and says 'we' is 'in the tolerant spirit of Carnap'.
The essay reads very well.
He says that Carnap 'softens (the) absolutism'
-- and he refers to Carnap's "two methods" with "L".
-- Goes on to qualify "Carnap's influence as legendary beneficent":
--- Oops. No: it's legendary taht his benefecent influence is!
Goes on to discuss Tarski. The fact that he finds him jargonistic endears me cheerfully to Belnap.
He makes a very interesting ref. to Carnap's "special favourite", of trans-categorialism, as it were:
operator -- predicate
sentence -- term
etc. Carnap would treat trans-categoremata as categoremata. (A topic that would have amused, gladly, Grice).
On p. 4 he makes the extraordinarily clever point that
"it seems reasonable, and Carnapian"
that the categoremata/syncategoremata distinction is spurious!
---
On p. 5 he keeps speaking of having "Carnapian tolerance" in mind.
On p. 13 he provides Carnapian "meaning postulates" for gorse and furze.
On p. 26, and you'll have to enjoy Belnap's style, he says,
"This is just right, and in accordance with common pratice and Carnap's methods of intension and extension".
And manages to mention the apostate when he refers to:
"Carnap's logical insight [on constant/variable for proposition] unfortunately spoofed on metaphysical grouds by Quine -- vide Appendix"
Belnap is amused by this but we are not!
--- He goes on to add (contingently local) identity (cfr. Grice) to "a Carnap-Bressan type of modal logic".
Under Carnap's Lamp indeed!
If Philosopicallexicon.com plays superficially on the bel-nap of the carnap, the American logician takes Carnap to task (in a good way) in his "Under Carnap's Lamp".
The thing is found online.
He refers in the abstract to:
"the usefulness of Carnapian tolerance"
-- vis a vis that ungriceous student who mentioned, "You'll end up tolerating Hitler!" --.
---
One of the keywords is indeed "Carnap" and the thing was published, let me check, in Studia Logica, vol. 80 -- we don't name years because, as Grice says, "they date things" (In defense of a dogma).
---
On the first page, he uses the majestic 'we' (that Jones and I also use but non-majestically) and says 'we' is 'in the tolerant spirit of Carnap'.
The essay reads very well.
He says that Carnap 'softens (the) absolutism'
-- and he refers to Carnap's "two methods" with "L".
-- Goes on to qualify "Carnap's influence as legendary beneficent":
--- Oops. No: it's legendary taht his benefecent influence is!
Goes on to discuss Tarski. The fact that he finds him jargonistic endears me cheerfully to Belnap.
He makes a very interesting ref. to Carnap's "special favourite", of trans-categorialism, as it were:
operator -- predicate
sentence -- term
etc. Carnap would treat trans-categoremata as categoremata. (A topic that would have amused, gladly, Grice).
On p. 4 he makes the extraordinarily clever point that
"it seems reasonable, and Carnapian"
that the categoremata/syncategoremata distinction is spurious!
---
On p. 5 he keeps speaking of having "Carnapian tolerance" in mind.
On p. 13 he provides Carnapian "meaning postulates" for gorse and furze.
On p. 26, and you'll have to enjoy Belnap's style, he says,
"This is just right, and in accordance with common pratice and Carnap's methods of intension and extension".
And manages to mention the apostate when he refers to:
"Carnap's logical insight [on constant/variable for proposition] unfortunately spoofed on metaphysical grouds by Quine -- vide Appendix"
Belnap is amused by this but we are not!
--- He goes on to add (contingently local) identity (cfr. Grice) to "a Carnap-Bressan type of modal logic".
Under Carnap's Lamp indeed!
Under Carnap's Lamp
---- By J. L. S.
from Philosophicallexicon.com
belnap, n. (from bel-, beautiful, + carnap) A carnap felicitously defined in ordinary idiomatic language (e.g. "synonymous" for "intensionally isomorphic").
-- Must say I like the idea!
Surely Carnap _meant_ what he said when he said it!
---
His personal page lists
1955 as his first publication.
--- Not sure where he was born. The "Jr." thing is very interesting and pro-American.
--- His "Tonk, Plonk, and Plink" is of course a genial classic -- repr. I think in Strawson, "Philosophical Logic", 1969. Indeed, it's 1967, and credited in his personal page, too.
His most relevant item here should be "Under Carnap's Lamp" which he links online.
from Philosophicallexicon.com
belnap, n. (from bel-, beautiful, + carnap) A carnap felicitously defined in ordinary idiomatic language (e.g. "synonymous" for "intensionally isomorphic").
-- Must say I like the idea!
Surely Carnap _meant_ what he said when he said it!
---
His personal page lists
1955 as his first publication.
--- Not sure where he was born. The "Jr." thing is very interesting and pro-American.
--- His "Tonk, Plonk, and Plink" is of course a genial classic -- repr. I think in Strawson, "Philosophical Logic", 1969. Indeed, it's 1967, and credited in his personal page, too.
His most relevant item here should be "Under Carnap's Lamp" which he links online.
Peppered With Carnaps
-------------By J. L. Speranza
From the philosophicallexicon.com -- silly, I know, but may merit a comment, or two:
-- begin quoted text:
carnap, n. (1) A formally defined symbol, operator, special bit of notation. "His prose is peppered with carnaps" or "the argument will proceed more efficiently if we introduce a few carnaps." n. (2) Loss of consciousness while being taken for a ride.
-- end quoted text.
From the philosophicallexicon.com -- silly, I know, but may merit a comment, or two:
-- begin quoted text:
carnap, n. (1) A formally defined symbol, operator, special bit of notation. "His prose is peppered with carnaps" or "the argument will proceed more efficiently if we introduce a few carnaps." n. (2) Loss of consciousness while being taken for a ride.
-- end quoted text.
Wednesday 17 February 2010
Carnap and Grice on 'analytic'
By J. L. S.
---- It should be noted that keep talking, as I did in the past, of the analytic-syntehtic distinction, we are echoing Quine, and we shouldn't be doing THAT all the time!! Surely 'analytic' is more of an important concept than a fine distinction!
------ Grice writes in Foreword to WoW:
"I hope the reader will not pass over the epilogue. It contains some relevant material". And it does.
For, for the first time, the "In defense of a dogma" was repr. by any of its two co-authors.
So let's check what he says about the dogma in the Retrospective Epilogue:
He detects 'strands' in his life:
"The very second strand I detect is a concern to DEFEND (against Quine, no doubt, who was rushed from Oxford by all of us) the viability of an analytic/synthetic [I'm glad Grice uses / rather than -] distinction."
"It is my belief [faith?] that there is a possibility of findicating one or more of a number of distinctions which might present themselves under the casual title of 'The analytic/synthetic distintion'".
And here comes illuminating Grice as often:
"I shall say ****NOTHING******* here bot this
strand."
"Not because I think it is UNimportant, mind."
"Rather, I shan't say anything because I think it is
THE most important topic in philosophy".
"It is required in determining not merely the
answers to PARTICULAR questions, but the
nature of PHILOSOPHY itself".
He is of course implicating that Quine did not know the first thing about it!
Grice goes on:
"Yet, I feel."
"And I feel that I have yet to complete some work in this area."
"The lacuna may be mitigated by the fact that
I provide some discussion of it in my below."
"Prejudices and Predilections, which
become The Life and Opinions of Paul Grice"
--.
And he also refers to the concluding note of the "Valedictory Essay".
---Here Grice throws in _Ryle_!
"Far from being a basis for
REJECTING the analytic-synthetic distinction"
Grice has Ryle -- or R* as he prefers: a rational reconstruction of an uninhibted Ryle -- saying,
"opposition to the idea that there ARE
initially
TWO
bundles of statements,
such as
"my neighbour's 3-year old son
understands Russell's theory
of types"
and
"my neighbour's 3-year old
son is an adult"
--- lying AROUND, somewhere OUT THERE,
in the world of thought, bearing
the labels 'analytic' and 'synthetic'
(irrespectively), waiting to be noticed,
DOES provide us with the
KEY
to making the analytic-synthetic
distinction ACCEPTABLE."
-------------- It is at this point that I refer to Grice's self-entrenched pragmatism (he would not of course share my etiquette or lack of it).
"For, the proper view will then be that
ANALYTIC propositions
are among the INVENTIONS of theorists
who are SEEKING, in one way or another"
-- read: Scientists or Ordinary-Languageists --
"to ORGANISE and SYSTEMATISE"
--- and this is a big good CarnapGrice interface: the system --
"an initially unidifferentiated"
-- surely by Quine
"corpus of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE."
"Suncess in this area is a matter of intellectual VISION"
-- that's Greek for 'theoria'.
"not of good eyesight."
-- as Quine may have prided hisself of having.
"As Plato once remarked,"
-- the man who needed his beard cut with Occam razor in the imagery of our Akron-born nominalist --
"the ability to see horses
without seeing horseness
is a mark of STUPIDITY."
Implicature???!!! :)
"Such considerations as THESE
are said to lie behind
reports that yet
a FIFTH fairy godmother"
-- and the only one from across the 'pond'
-- "Q*". "She was LAST SEEN rushing HEADLONG
out of the gates of Never-Never Land"
and the City of Eternal Truth, no doubt.
"loudly SCREAMING ["Opaque context!"] and
hotly pursued by G*."
"But the narration of these stirring events must be left to another and longer day".
Vide "City of Eternal Truth", your next blog, as you keep tuned!
---- It should be noted that keep talking, as I did in the past, of the analytic-syntehtic distinction, we are echoing Quine, and we shouldn't be doing THAT all the time!! Surely 'analytic' is more of an important concept than a fine distinction!
------ Grice writes in Foreword to WoW:
"I hope the reader will not pass over the epilogue. It contains some relevant material". And it does.
For, for the first time, the "In defense of a dogma" was repr. by any of its two co-authors.
So let's check what he says about the dogma in the Retrospective Epilogue:
He detects 'strands' in his life:
"The very second strand I detect is a concern to DEFEND (against Quine, no doubt, who was rushed from Oxford by all of us) the viability of an analytic/synthetic [I'm glad Grice uses / rather than -] distinction."
"It is my belief [faith?] that there is a possibility of findicating one or more of a number of distinctions which might present themselves under the casual title of 'The analytic/synthetic distintion'".
And here comes illuminating Grice as often:
"I shall say ****NOTHING******* here bot this
strand."
"Not because I think it is UNimportant, mind."
"Rather, I shan't say anything because I think it is
THE most important topic in philosophy".
"It is required in determining not merely the
answers to PARTICULAR questions, but the
nature of PHILOSOPHY itself".
He is of course implicating that Quine did not know the first thing about it!
Grice goes on:
"Yet, I feel."
"And I feel that I have yet to complete some work in this area."
"The lacuna may be mitigated by the fact that
I provide some discussion of it in my below."
"Prejudices and Predilections, which
become The Life and Opinions of Paul Grice"
--.
And he also refers to the concluding note of the "Valedictory Essay".
---Here Grice throws in _Ryle_!
"Far from being a basis for
REJECTING the analytic-synthetic distinction"
Grice has Ryle -- or R* as he prefers: a rational reconstruction of an uninhibted Ryle -- saying,
"opposition to the idea that there ARE
initially
TWO
bundles of statements,
such as
"my neighbour's 3-year old son
understands Russell's theory
of types"
and
"my neighbour's 3-year old
son is an adult"
--- lying AROUND, somewhere OUT THERE,
in the world of thought, bearing
the labels 'analytic' and 'synthetic'
(irrespectively), waiting to be noticed,
DOES provide us with the
KEY
to making the analytic-synthetic
distinction ACCEPTABLE."
-------------- It is at this point that I refer to Grice's self-entrenched pragmatism (he would not of course share my etiquette or lack of it).
"For, the proper view will then be that
ANALYTIC propositions
are among the INVENTIONS of theorists
who are SEEKING, in one way or another"
-- read: Scientists or Ordinary-Languageists --
"to ORGANISE and SYSTEMATISE"
--- and this is a big good CarnapGrice interface: the system --
"an initially unidifferentiated"
-- surely by Quine
"corpus of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE."
"Suncess in this area is a matter of intellectual VISION"
-- that's Greek for 'theoria'.
"not of good eyesight."
-- as Quine may have prided hisself of having.
"As Plato once remarked,"
-- the man who needed his beard cut with Occam razor in the imagery of our Akron-born nominalist --
"the ability to see horses
without seeing horseness
is a mark of STUPIDITY."
Implicature???!!! :)
"Such considerations as THESE
are said to lie behind
reports that yet
a FIFTH fairy godmother"
-- and the only one from across the 'pond'
-- "Q*". "She was LAST SEEN rushing HEADLONG
out of the gates of Never-Never Land"
and the City of Eternal Truth, no doubt.
"loudly SCREAMING ["Opaque context!"] and
hotly pursued by G*."
"But the narration of these stirring events must be left to another and longer day".
Vide "City of Eternal Truth", your next blog, as you keep tuned!
Implicit Definitions in Carnap and Grice
* * * * By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
* * * * * * * * for the Carnap Corner
**************************** NOT MUCH TO SAY, actually, but I may! I see that the issue of 'implicit' definition features well in Carnap's elaborations on Frege.
Indeed, Boghossian, whom I met, discusses two types of analytic:
frege-analytic
and
carnap-analytic
to which I will of course add
grice-analytic
For Boghossian (discussed in a pdf online in "Analysis" by a member of the Sheffield Univ Philo Dept):
frege-analytic
has to do with 'substitution' of synonym for synonym.
Examples
(x) Bx --> not Mx
(no bachelor is married, example (c) Carnap)
(x) Rx --> Blx
(ravens are black)
or as I prefer
(x) Px --> Kx (pirots karulise elatically).
----
For Carnap, rather, it's via 'implicit definitions'. This relates notably to the definition of the 'logical' particles (i.e. the non-descriptive ones, as he has them) in, say, "Pirots karulise elatically":
ALL pirots karulise elatically
A is a pirot
______
A karulises elatically
In Boghossian's reconstruction:
(A) -- argument above is VALID.
Therefore, "C" (where "C" stands for logical constant, (x) in our case) means what it means. (For (A) would NOT be valid if "C" meant other).
-- Defining "all" (or "(x)", for the choice of symbol is immaterial here) like that is _implicitly_ defining it. Short for or of 'stipulating'.
GRICE COMES IN.
Alas, his locus classicus is contro with Strawson, but surely we can trace Grice's own, versus Strawsonianly shared, views on this.
--- Biblio should include
Grice "Prejudices and predilections of Paul Grice".
-- on the status of the analytic-synthetic distinction. What I call, "You've come a LONG way, Grice", from the Paradigm-Case-Argument defense of 1956.
Grice, Retrospective Epilogue in WoW. I may append some relevant quotes from WoW later.
Cheers.
* * * * * * * * for the Carnap Corner
**************************** NOT MUCH TO SAY, actually, but I may! I see that the issue of 'implicit' definition features well in Carnap's elaborations on Frege.
Indeed, Boghossian, whom I met, discusses two types of analytic:
frege-analytic
and
carnap-analytic
to which I will of course add
grice-analytic
For Boghossian (discussed in a pdf online in "Analysis" by a member of the Sheffield Univ Philo Dept):
frege-analytic
has to do with 'substitution' of synonym for synonym.
Examples
(x) Bx --> not Mx
(no bachelor is married, example (c) Carnap)
(x) Rx --> Blx
(ravens are black)
or as I prefer
(x) Px --> Kx (pirots karulise elatically).
----
For Carnap, rather, it's via 'implicit definitions'. This relates notably to the definition of the 'logical' particles (i.e. the non-descriptive ones, as he has them) in, say, "Pirots karulise elatically":
ALL pirots karulise elatically
A is a pirot
______
A karulises elatically
In Boghossian's reconstruction:
(A) -- argument above is VALID.
Therefore, "C" (where "C" stands for logical constant, (x) in our case) means what it means. (For (A) would NOT be valid if "C" meant other).
-- Defining "all" (or "(x)", for the choice of symbol is immaterial here) like that is _implicitly_ defining it. Short for or of 'stipulating'.
GRICE COMES IN.
Alas, his locus classicus is contro with Strawson, but surely we can trace Grice's own, versus Strawsonianly shared, views on this.
--- Biblio should include
Grice "Prejudices and predilections of Paul Grice".
-- on the status of the analytic-synthetic distinction. What I call, "You've come a LONG way, Grice", from the Paradigm-Case-Argument defense of 1956.
Grice, Retrospective Epilogue in WoW. I may append some relevant quotes from WoW later.
Cheers.
My Kind of Hero
* * * * * By J. L. Speranza, of The Grice Club
* * * * * * * for The Carnap Corner
From a review of Quine's autobiography, "The time of my life":
"Insofar as Quine ever had a hero it was Carnap."
-- which has the nice quality of a graffito to it.
I was reminded of Strawson's manifesto in his inaugural Oxford talk (Logico-Linguistic Papers repr.):
"A homeric struggle calls for ... heroes".
And trust he'll place his former tutor (once a tutor always a tutor), Grice as such. He fails to have Quine or Carnap, but he has Frege alright!
----
* * * * * * * for The Carnap Corner
From a review of Quine's autobiography, "The time of my life":
"Insofar as Quine ever had a hero it was Carnap."
-- which has the nice quality of a graffito to it.
I was reminded of Strawson's manifesto in his inaugural Oxford talk (Logico-Linguistic Papers repr.):
"A homeric struggle calls for ... heroes".
And trust he'll place his former tutor (once a tutor always a tutor), Grice as such. He fails to have Quine or Carnap, but he has Frege alright!
----
Carnap and Grice on 'true' as redundant
By J. L. Speranza, of The Grice Club
for The Carnap Corner
---
I read from R. B. Jones's interesting page at
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/quine53a2.htm
(a running commentary on Quine's "Two Dogmas"):
"En passant, at the beginning of this
section [on so-called "semantical RULES"]
is Quine's complaint about the difficulty
in deciding whether
i. Anything green is extended.
is analytic. This is he says down to the
meaning of analytic, not to any difficulty
with the meanings of 'green' or 'extended'.
I believe that Grice has observed that
this is a bad example because we
have difficulty even in deciding
whether it is true [never
mind 'analytic'] and this can
hardly be because of a difficulty
with the concept of analyticity.
--- Yes, that sounds like Grice alright! I would think it's straight from the Grice/Strawson 1956 thing "In defense of a dogma", now in WoW (Strawson was fortunately never allowed to reprint the thing in any of his works!).
----
Chapman notes that Grice was concerned in private notes (e.g. his draft for his valedictory essay) on similar things --. This seems like a case of 'analytic' alright, as opposed to 'nothing can be red and green all over' which Grice regarded as synthetic a priori, or at least Karen's and Tim's playmates did (*Grice would experiment with his children's playmates for criteria of intensionality).
----
But back to the thing, 'true, yet not analytic',
I was amused by I think it's a footnote in "Meaning and Necessity" by Carnap where he cursorily rejects Ramsey's view, or cursorily endorses it, rather. The idea that
"... is true" is redundant.
(More interestingly, that "... is false" is equipolent with an L-statement involving negation).
So, here we could play a bit on that.
For if "... is true" is redundant (as I actually think it _is_),
"Anything green is extended"
and
"'Anything green is extended' is true"
are, well, truth-conditionally equivalent (yes: we know '... is true' is metalinguistic, but we are playing Ramsey here).
--- So, what redundant equivalence can we provide for
"... is analytic".
Oddly, this is a perfect case of a meaning postulate for Carnap -- for what is a meaning postulate but a "semantical rule"? --.
(x)Gx --> Ex
---
I cannot think right now what the corresponding for 'is analytic' would be in redundant terms, but Grice will!
Grice/Strawson write (WoW: reprint, p. 201)
"There is a certain circle or family of expressions: ... Other members of the family are ... "semantical rule"".
But Roger Bishop Jones is perfectly right, and here is the Grice/Strawson passage, straight from WoW: 207. After quoting in extenso from Quine:
--- QUINE:
"I do not know whether the statement, 'Everything green is extended' is analytic. Now does my indecision over this example really betray an incomplete understanding, an incomplete grasp, of the 'meanings' of 'green' and 'extended'? I think not. The trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended' but with 'analytic'
---- end of Quine quote
-- Begin of Grice/Strawson:
"If, as Quine says, the trouble is with 'analytic,'
then the trouble should DOUBTLESS disappear when
'analytic' is removed. So let us remove it, and replace
it with a word Quine himself has contrasted
favourably with 'analytic' in respect of perspicuity --
the word 'true'. Does the indecision at once disappear.
We think not."
--------------must say I love the cheek of this double act! They are avoiding the auxiliary 'do' as saracastically minimised by Quine, "We don't think so!".
---Grice/Strawson continue:
"The indecision over 'analytic' (and equally,
in this case, the indecision over 'true')
arises, of course, from a further indecision:
namely, that which we feel when confronted with
such questions as,
'Should we count a _point_
of green light as _extended_ or not?'
As is frequent enough in such cases
-----
[Other Cases: Should we count this albino raven as one? Should this pirot who is blatantly karulising, but not elatically enough, be counted as one? Should this featherless biped which is naturally irrational be counted as human, etc.]
..., the hesitation arises from the fact that
the _boundaries_ of application of words
are NOT determined in usage in all possible
directions."
They go on:
"But the example Quine has chosen is PARTICULARLY
unfortunate"
--- problematic I'd say. I leave unfortunate to victims of Tsunami --
"... for his thesis [that there is a dogma of empiricism],
in that it is ONLY TOO EVIDENT that our hesitations
are not HERE [emphasis Grice/Strawson's] attributable
to obscurities in 'analytic'"
--- CARNAP MUST have loved this! He MUST have referred to Grice/Strawson in work.
"It would be possible", Grice and Strawson continue,
"to chose other examples in which we should hesitate
between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' and have few qualms
about 'true'"
-- They are thinking of
"Nothing can be red and green all over: True no doubt. But synhetic? Karen's and Tim's playmates think so.
Grice/Strawson end their paragraph:
"But no more in these cases than in the sample
case does the hesitation necessarily imply
any obscurity in the notion of analyticity;
since the hesitation would be sufficiently
accounted for by the samr or a similar kind
of indeterminacy in the relations between words
occurring within the statement about which the
question, whether it is analytic or synthetic,
is raised".
For the record, it's best to see this as PDA (Paradigm Case Argument). Grice will have permanent qualms about it, and will consider it in retrospect in his valedictory essay. Speranza deals with it in "On the way of conversation" vis a vis J. F. Bennett's rather hurried evaluation of Grice/Strawson as a presequel to Grice's Meaning.
In the end, both Carnap and Grice possibly ended as pretty much pragmatists as to the ultimate viability or use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this connection, Grice's Prejudices and predilections (Gr86) being perhaps his clearest manifesto along those lines.
for The Carnap Corner
---
I read from R. B. Jones's interesting page at
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/quine53a2.htm
(a running commentary on Quine's "Two Dogmas"):
"En passant, at the beginning of this
section [on so-called "semantical RULES"]
is Quine's complaint about the difficulty
in deciding whether
i. Anything green is extended.
is analytic. This is he says down to the
meaning of analytic, not to any difficulty
with the meanings of 'green' or 'extended'.
I believe that Grice has observed that
this is a bad example because we
have difficulty even in deciding
whether it is true [never
mind 'analytic'] and this can
hardly be because of a difficulty
with the concept of analyticity.
--- Yes, that sounds like Grice alright! I would think it's straight from the Grice/Strawson 1956 thing "In defense of a dogma", now in WoW (Strawson was fortunately never allowed to reprint the thing in any of his works!).
----
Chapman notes that Grice was concerned in private notes (e.g. his draft for his valedictory essay) on similar things --. This seems like a case of 'analytic' alright, as opposed to 'nothing can be red and green all over' which Grice regarded as synthetic a priori, or at least Karen's and Tim's playmates did (*Grice would experiment with his children's playmates for criteria of intensionality).
----
But back to the thing, 'true, yet not analytic',
I was amused by I think it's a footnote in "Meaning and Necessity" by Carnap where he cursorily rejects Ramsey's view, or cursorily endorses it, rather. The idea that
"... is true" is redundant.
(More interestingly, that "... is false" is equipolent with an L-statement involving negation).
So, here we could play a bit on that.
For if "... is true" is redundant (as I actually think it _is_),
"Anything green is extended"
and
"'Anything green is extended' is true"
are, well, truth-conditionally equivalent (yes: we know '... is true' is metalinguistic, but we are playing Ramsey here).
--- So, what redundant equivalence can we provide for
"... is analytic".
Oddly, this is a perfect case of a meaning postulate for Carnap -- for what is a meaning postulate but a "semantical rule"? --.
(x)Gx --> Ex
---
I cannot think right now what the corresponding for 'is analytic' would be in redundant terms, but Grice will!
Grice/Strawson write (WoW: reprint, p. 201)
"There is a certain circle or family of expressions: ... Other members of the family are ... "semantical rule"".
But Roger Bishop Jones is perfectly right, and here is the Grice/Strawson passage, straight from WoW: 207. After quoting in extenso from Quine:
--- QUINE:
"I do not know whether the statement, 'Everything green is extended' is analytic. Now does my indecision over this example really betray an incomplete understanding, an incomplete grasp, of the 'meanings' of 'green' and 'extended'? I think not. The trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended' but with 'analytic'
---- end of Quine quote
-- Begin of Grice/Strawson:
"If, as Quine says, the trouble is with 'analytic,'
then the trouble should DOUBTLESS disappear when
'analytic' is removed. So let us remove it, and replace
it with a word Quine himself has contrasted
favourably with 'analytic' in respect of perspicuity --
the word 'true'. Does the indecision at once disappear.
We think not."
--------------must say I love the cheek of this double act! They are avoiding the auxiliary 'do' as saracastically minimised by Quine, "We don't think so!".
---Grice/Strawson continue:
"The indecision over 'analytic' (and equally,
in this case, the indecision over 'true')
arises, of course, from a further indecision:
namely, that which we feel when confronted with
such questions as,
'Should we count a _point_
of green light as _extended_ or not?'
As is frequent enough in such cases
-----
[Other Cases: Should we count this albino raven as one? Should this pirot who is blatantly karulising, but not elatically enough, be counted as one? Should this featherless biped which is naturally irrational be counted as human, etc.]
..., the hesitation arises from the fact that
the _boundaries_ of application of words
are NOT determined in usage in all possible
directions."
They go on:
"But the example Quine has chosen is PARTICULARLY
unfortunate"
--- problematic I'd say. I leave unfortunate to victims of Tsunami --
"... for his thesis [that there is a dogma of empiricism],
in that it is ONLY TOO EVIDENT that our hesitations
are not HERE [emphasis Grice/Strawson's] attributable
to obscurities in 'analytic'"
--- CARNAP MUST have loved this! He MUST have referred to Grice/Strawson in work.
"It would be possible", Grice and Strawson continue,
"to chose other examples in which we should hesitate
between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' and have few qualms
about 'true'"
-- They are thinking of
"Nothing can be red and green all over: True no doubt. But synhetic? Karen's and Tim's playmates think so.
Grice/Strawson end their paragraph:
"But no more in these cases than in the sample
case does the hesitation necessarily imply
any obscurity in the notion of analyticity;
since the hesitation would be sufficiently
accounted for by the samr or a similar kind
of indeterminacy in the relations between words
occurring within the statement about which the
question, whether it is analytic or synthetic,
is raised".
For the record, it's best to see this as PDA (Paradigm Case Argument). Grice will have permanent qualms about it, and will consider it in retrospect in his valedictory essay. Speranza deals with it in "On the way of conversation" vis a vis J. F. Bennett's rather hurried evaluation of Grice/Strawson as a presequel to Grice's Meaning.
In the end, both Carnap and Grice possibly ended as pretty much pragmatists as to the ultimate viability or use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this connection, Grice's Prejudices and predilections (Gr86) being perhaps his clearest manifesto along those lines.
Carnap and Grice on "logical" versus "non-logical"/"descriptive"
By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
for the Carnap Corner
----
I have shared this info elsewhere, but it amuses me and it comes straight from the pages of the OED -- with which Grice SHOULD have been more familiar with! ("I don't care what the dictionary says!" "And that's where you make your big mistake", got the rebuke from Austin)
-- A pirot, the OED has as follows
-- begin cited text:
pirot.
[Apparently < French pirot (1611 in Cotgrave: see quot. 1611 at sense 1),
although this is apparently not recorded elsewhere, and is of unknown
origin. Compare PIDDOCK n.]
1. A razor shell.
1611 R. COTGRAVE Dict. French & Eng. Tongues, Pirot, the Pirot, or
Hag-fish; a kind of long shell-fish.
2. A piddock.
1686 R. PLOT Nat. Hist. Staffs. vii. 250 A sort of Solenes (which the
Venetians call Cape longe, and the English Pirot)..a kind of Shell-fish deep
bedded in a solid rock.
-- end cited text.
---
In "Meaning and Necessity" Carnap uses the terminology (loose, i.e. he is not doing 'carnaps' here -- (a "carnap" defined in the philosopher's lexicon as "a formally defined symbol, operator, bit of notation")),
Pirots karulise elatically
A is a pirot
____________________________
A karulises elatically
----
He would have (as per "Meaning and Necessity" and intuitively enough):
"is" and "a" as 'logical words' -- especially in their formal counterparts.
'pirot' (as well as 'karulise' and 'elatic') as 'descriptive' words.
----
This has a slight connection with Grice, as misunderstood by Cohen.
In an infamous paper, Cohen ("Grice and the logical particles of natural language"), argues against Grice's thesis for things like 'if' -- which will feature in the logical form of
'pirots karulise elatically' (on the standard reading).
The meaning of the horseshoe -- the meaning of 'if'?
"if" as a logical (non descriptive) word. Yet not a variable, so a "logical constant" word.
When it comes to 'truth-functional operators' in the bivalent system that both Carnap adn Grice abode by, the thing is easy enough: the truth-table will do it for us.
When it comes to "(x)", for every x, for all xs, if x is a pirot, x karulises elatically, the idea of talking of the 'meaning' of '(x)' is somewhat trickier, in that it ceases to be algorithmically decided by a truth-table, but reference to general guidelines (what guideline is not general?) for standard models in standard interpretations -- in the semantics sub-domain of the formal system -- are required. Nothing too fancy: (x)(Px --> Kx) will be true iff all items falling under the extension of P are and none of them can be shown to fail to be K.
Etc.
for the Carnap Corner
----
I have shared this info elsewhere, but it amuses me and it comes straight from the pages of the OED -- with which Grice SHOULD have been more familiar with! ("I don't care what the dictionary says!" "And that's where you make your big mistake", got the rebuke from Austin)
-- A pirot, the OED has as follows
-- begin cited text:
pirot.
[Apparently < French pirot (1611 in Cotgrave: see quot. 1611 at sense 1),
although this is apparently not recorded elsewhere, and is of unknown
origin. Compare PIDDOCK n.]
1. A razor shell.
1611 R. COTGRAVE Dict. French & Eng. Tongues, Pirot, the Pirot, or
Hag-fish; a kind of long shell-fish.
2. A piddock.
1686 R. PLOT Nat. Hist. Staffs. vii. 250 A sort of Solenes (which the
Venetians call Cape longe, and the English Pirot)..a kind of Shell-fish deep
bedded in a solid rock.
-- end cited text.
---
In "Meaning and Necessity" Carnap uses the terminology (loose, i.e. he is not doing 'carnaps' here -- (a "carnap" defined in the philosopher's lexicon as "a formally defined symbol, operator, bit of notation")),
Pirots karulise elatically
A is a pirot
____________________________
A karulises elatically
----
He would have (as per "Meaning and Necessity" and intuitively enough):
"is" and "a" as 'logical words' -- especially in their formal counterparts.
'pirot' (as well as 'karulise' and 'elatic') as 'descriptive' words.
----
This has a slight connection with Grice, as misunderstood by Cohen.
In an infamous paper, Cohen ("Grice and the logical particles of natural language"), argues against Grice's thesis for things like 'if' -- which will feature in the logical form of
'pirots karulise elatically' (on the standard reading).
The meaning of the horseshoe -- the meaning of 'if'?
"if" as a logical (non descriptive) word. Yet not a variable, so a "logical constant" word.
When it comes to 'truth-functional operators' in the bivalent system that both Carnap adn Grice abode by, the thing is easy enough: the truth-table will do it for us.
When it comes to "(x)", for every x, for all xs, if x is a pirot, x karulises elatically, the idea of talking of the 'meaning' of '(x)' is somewhat trickier, in that it ceases to be algorithmically decided by a truth-table, but reference to general guidelines (what guideline is not general?) for standard models in standard interpretations -- in the semantics sub-domain of the formal system -- are required. Nothing too fancy: (x)(Px --> Kx) will be true iff all items falling under the extension of P are and none of them can be shown to fail to be K.
Etc.
Carnap and Cooley on "postulate"
By J. L. Speranza
----
The idea of a meaning-postulate, especially in the Johnson/Lakoff variant, is one which is familiar with Griceans.
Carnap introduces it in his "Necessity" book with a nod to Cooley. Carnap allows that perhaps the term, 'postulate', _is_ controversial, but then Cooley (1942) had used it in "a similar sense".
---
The two he works with in his appendix are
(x) Bx --> - Mx
(with "B" and "M" for bachelor and married, respectively)
and a similar one, minus the "-", of course, with "R" and "Bl" for 'raven' and 'black', for which he proposes a counterexample in terms of state-descriptions challenging its status as such (alleged meaning postulate).
While Johnson/Lakoff play with Gricean ideas in terms of these postulates ("Conversational postulates" in Cole/Morgan) it is to Grice/Strawon, Defense of a dogma (repr. WoW) that we must go for a better elaboration of the Carnap concept.
The term or predicate Grice/Strawson consider in that essay is
adult
3-year old
-- My neighbour's three year old is an adult.
This they deem, intuitively enough (and of course against Quine's 'dogma of empiricism' as he saw it), analytic. It will provoke the counterreply: "That cannot be!"
Grice/Strawson contrast, then
(x)((3YO)x --> - Ax)
with things like
My neighbour's three-year old son understands Russell's theory of types.
This will rather provoke, "I can't _believe_ that!" (rather that, "I fail to understand what you mean") and is thus better NOT seen as a meaning-postulate (Carnap's "All ravens are black" scenario).
Of course with the 'raven-black' the scenario is subtler. My mentor on this has been Thomas Simpson, in a rather obscure book. He goes on to fantasy about the white-raven. Surely an albino raven won't do. We want a genotype of the right phenotype. And the corvus corvus does require 'black' as phenotype, making the thing "almost" "like" a meaning postulate. I know ALL my birder friends will agree!
----
The idea of a meaning-postulate, especially in the Johnson/Lakoff variant, is one which is familiar with Griceans.
Carnap introduces it in his "Necessity" book with a nod to Cooley. Carnap allows that perhaps the term, 'postulate', _is_ controversial, but then Cooley (1942) had used it in "a similar sense".
---
The two he works with in his appendix are
(x) Bx --> - Mx
(with "B" and "M" for bachelor and married, respectively)
and a similar one, minus the "-", of course, with "R" and "Bl" for 'raven' and 'black', for which he proposes a counterexample in terms of state-descriptions challenging its status as such (alleged meaning postulate).
While Johnson/Lakoff play with Gricean ideas in terms of these postulates ("Conversational postulates" in Cole/Morgan) it is to Grice/Strawon, Defense of a dogma (repr. WoW) that we must go for a better elaboration of the Carnap concept.
The term or predicate Grice/Strawson consider in that essay is
adult
3-year old
-- My neighbour's three year old is an adult.
This they deem, intuitively enough (and of course against Quine's 'dogma of empiricism' as he saw it), analytic. It will provoke the counterreply: "That cannot be!"
Grice/Strawson contrast, then
(x)((3YO)x --> - Ax)
with things like
My neighbour's three-year old son understands Russell's theory of types.
This will rather provoke, "I can't _believe_ that!" (rather that, "I fail to understand what you mean") and is thus better NOT seen as a meaning-postulate (Carnap's "All ravens are black" scenario).
Of course with the 'raven-black' the scenario is subtler. My mentor on this has been Thomas Simpson, in a rather obscure book. He goes on to fantasy about the white-raven. Surely an albino raven won't do. We want a genotype of the right phenotype. And the corvus corvus does require 'black' as phenotype, making the thing "almost" "like" a meaning postulate. I know ALL my birder friends will agree!
Tuesday 16 February 2010
Something to Consider: The "Elatically"
By J. L. Speranza
----
I put this frivolously, but it's not meant to be!
Consider
i. Pirots karulize elatically.
A is a pirot
-----
Thus, A karulizes elatically.
The 'elatically' bit has given so many problems to logicians, that one has to adjudicate a lot of insight, foresight and sight to Carnap on _that_ one!
----
This leads to:
i. Carnap held to be a pragmatist in matters of choosing a language.
ii. I don't think the same holds for Grice: leaving aside the issue of a scientific unified physicalist language to hold all the truths worth holding, there is for Grice (and indeed all logicians I met!) the problem that a System (G, C, what not) has to recover, testify, justify, model, retrieve, yield, all the arguments that we deem 'valid' in NL.
iii. "Elatically" in arguments:
Pirots karulize elatically
_____________________________
Thus, pirots karulize.
This seems blatantly valid, yet it _is_ a minor problem to get that 'valid' in first-order predicate calculus with identity!
iv. I pose the problem, if problem it is, to consider, reflect on, different aims at playing with Symbolo, or Systems C, or G. If one takes a mere pragmatist standpoint one is not putting oneself in a position to be held accountable if one's system fails to model an ordinary-language argument. And that _would_ be a problem (for some logicians, and indeed philosophers (of language, included)).
Cheers,
JL
----
I put this frivolously, but it's not meant to be!
Consider
i. Pirots karulize elatically.
A is a pirot
-----
Thus, A karulizes elatically.
The 'elatically' bit has given so many problems to logicians, that one has to adjudicate a lot of insight, foresight and sight to Carnap on _that_ one!
----
This leads to:
i. Carnap held to be a pragmatist in matters of choosing a language.
ii. I don't think the same holds for Grice: leaving aside the issue of a scientific unified physicalist language to hold all the truths worth holding, there is for Grice (and indeed all logicians I met!) the problem that a System (G, C, what not) has to recover, testify, justify, model, retrieve, yield, all the arguments that we deem 'valid' in NL.
iii. "Elatically" in arguments:
Pirots karulize elatically
_____________________________
Thus, pirots karulize.
This seems blatantly valid, yet it _is_ a minor problem to get that 'valid' in first-order predicate calculus with identity!
iv. I pose the problem, if problem it is, to consider, reflect on, different aims at playing with Symbolo, or Systems C, or G. If one takes a mere pragmatist standpoint one is not putting oneself in a position to be held accountable if one's system fails to model an ordinary-language argument. And that _would_ be a problem (for some logicians, and indeed philosophers (of language, included)).
Cheers,
JL
System CR and System GHP
By J. L. Speranza, of The Grice Club
for The Carnap Corner
The following is a running commentary on a 'semantics' for a formal system like System C-R (apres Rudolf Carnap, that is -- a revised System C) and System G-HP (a hopefully plausible rewrite of System G, apres H. P. Grice).
Our guiding tutor here will be B. Mates, Elementary Logic (that Grice quotes in the building of his system Q to honour Quine):
In System C and System G, "the formulae of the languages are assembled from atomic formulas using the logical connectives and the two quantifiers, (x) and (Ex)".
"To ascribe meaning to all sentences of a first-order language, the following information is needed: a domain of discourse D, usually required to be non-empty."
But vide Grice, "Vacuous Names" for a lifting of this requirement.
"An object carrying full information about the domain is known as a structure (of signature σ, or σ-structure, or L-structure), or as a "model"".
"As to how to interpret formulas of the form ∀ x φ(x) and ∃ x φ(x), the idea is to see the domain of discourse as forming the range for these quantifiers."
"The idea is that the sentence ∀ x φ(x) is true under an interpretation exactly when every substitution instance of φ(x), where x is replaced by some element of the domain, is satisfied."
"On the other hand, the formula ∃ x φ(x) is satisfied if there is at least one element d of the domain such that φ(d) is satisfied."
EXTENSIONALISM:
"Because the first-order interpretations described here are defined in set theory, they do not associate each predicate symbol with a property (or relation), but rather with the EXTENSION of that property (or relation)."
"Example of a first-order interpretation"
Domain: pirots a, b, c, karulising
Individual constants:
a: pirot called Augustus.
b: pirot called Basil.
c: pirot called Crispin.
Px: x is a pirot
Kx: x karulises.
x is perceiving/potching x'
x is perceiving/pocthing x' as another pirot/karuliser.
In the interpretation of G:
some statements are true, and some are false.
"A first-order interpretation is usually required to specify a nonempty set as the domain of discourse. However, empty relations do not cause any problem for first-order interpretations, because there is no similar notion of passing a relation symbol across a logical connective, enlarging its scope in the process. Finally, the identity relation (x = y) is often treated specially in first order logic and other predicate logics. The axioms related to equality are automatically satisfied by every normal model, and so they do not need to be explicitly included in first-order theories."
"There are reasons to restrict study of first-order logic to normal models. If non-normal models are considered, then every consistent theory has an infinite model; this affects the statements of results such as the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, which are usually stated under the assumption that only normal models are considered."
Etc.
Refs.
Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language -- the seminal work of 1937 (German original 1934) that set many a trend in this area
Grice, in Festchrift for Quine.
Mates, Elementary Logic.
---
for The Carnap Corner
The following is a running commentary on a 'semantics' for a formal system like System C-R (apres Rudolf Carnap, that is -- a revised System C) and System G-HP (a hopefully plausible rewrite of System G, apres H. P. Grice).
Our guiding tutor here will be B. Mates, Elementary Logic (that Grice quotes in the building of his system Q to honour Quine):
In System C and System G, "the formulae of the languages are assembled from atomic formulas using the logical connectives and the two quantifiers, (x) and (Ex)".
"To ascribe meaning to all sentences of a first-order language, the following information is needed: a domain of discourse D, usually required to be non-empty."
But vide Grice, "Vacuous Names" for a lifting of this requirement.
"An object carrying full information about the domain is known as a structure (of signature σ, or σ-structure, or L-structure), or as a "model"".
"As to how to interpret formulas of the form ∀ x φ(x) and ∃ x φ(x), the idea is to see the domain of discourse as forming the range for these quantifiers."
"The idea is that the sentence ∀ x φ(x) is true under an interpretation exactly when every substitution instance of φ(x), where x is replaced by some element of the domain, is satisfied."
"On the other hand, the formula ∃ x φ(x) is satisfied if there is at least one element d of the domain such that φ(d) is satisfied."
EXTENSIONALISM:
"Because the first-order interpretations described here are defined in set theory, they do not associate each predicate symbol with a property (or relation), but rather with the EXTENSION of that property (or relation)."
"Example of a first-order interpretation"
Domain: pirots a, b, c, karulising
Individual constants:
a: pirot called Augustus.
b: pirot called Basil.
c: pirot called Crispin.
Px: x is a pirot
Kx: x karulises.
x is perceiving/potching x'
x is perceiving/pocthing x' as another pirot/karuliser.
In the interpretation of G:
some statements are true, and some are false.
"A first-order interpretation is usually required to specify a nonempty set as the domain of discourse. However, empty relations do not cause any problem for first-order interpretations, because there is no similar notion of passing a relation symbol across a logical connective, enlarging its scope in the process. Finally, the identity relation (x = y) is often treated specially in first order logic and other predicate logics. The axioms related to equality are automatically satisfied by every normal model, and so they do not need to be explicitly included in first-order theories."
"There are reasons to restrict study of first-order logic to normal models. If non-normal models are considered, then every consistent theory has an infinite model; this affects the statements of results such as the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, which are usually stated under the assumption that only normal models are considered."
Etc.
Refs.
Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language -- the seminal work of 1937 (German original 1934) that set many a trend in this area
Grice, in Festchrift for Quine.
Mates, Elementary Logic.
---
Carnapiana, Griceana
A look, Gricean, at Carnapiana
The 1920s.
1922 Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, dissertation, in Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, n. 56
--- on space as synthetic a priori
1925 "Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften der Raumes von denen der Zeit" in Kant-Studien, 30
--- the correspondence of 'space' (raum) and 'time' (zeit). Spatio-temporal continuants.
1926 Physikalische Begriffsbildung, Karlsruhe : Braun, (Wissen und Wirken ; 39)
--- physicalist as narrowly interpreted: three levels: lower one being 'perceived things or objects and their properties'.
1928 Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie, Berlin : Weltkreis-Verlag
'schein' being Carnap for 'pseudo-'. Literally, 'apparent'. Cfr. "pirots karulize...". Pseudo-sense, nonsense? We don't think so. Uninterpreted at most.
1928 Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Leipzig : Felix Meiner Verlag (English translation The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1967)
aufbau really gives 'house'. Speranza's father being an architect, he knows. Bauhaus. Bauer, architect. So this is, more poetically, the house of the world.
1929 (with Otto Neurath and Hans Hahn) Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis, Vienna : A. Wolf
-- a lovely historical reference: "Wiener Kreis" the Vienna Circle. Cfr. all the refs. by Grice (Prejudices and predilections, Actions and Events, PPQ, to "Vienna")
1929 Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen, Vienna : Springer
1932 "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" in Erkenntnis, II (English translation The Unity of Science, London : Kegan Paul, 1934)
-- interesting idea of the 'characteristica universalis'.
1934 Logische Syntax der Sprache (English translation The Logical Syntax of Language, New York : Humanities, 1937)
tr. by E. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin. Includes the "pirots karulize elatically" manifesto.
1935 Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London : Kegan Paul
1936 "Testability and meaning" in Philosophy of Science, III (1936) and IV (1937)
-- Interesting for the language game including: to prove, to test, to verify. Cfr. Popper, to falsify. Observational vs. theoretical.
1938 "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 1, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1939 "Foundations of Logic and Mathematics" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 3, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1942 Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
1943 Formalization of Logic, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
--- Carnap as a formalist. Formal logic, symbolic logic. Grice on formalists vs. informalists. Important topic: the meaning of the connectors. Connectors formally defined, connectors syntactically defined. Pseudo-questions in the search for the 'meaning' of the connectives, etc.
1947 Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
--- Carnap on 'must'. A must here! Cfr. Grice on must, Gr. 2001.
1950 Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
-- vis a vis Grice on Kneale. The metaphysical bearing of probability. Induction, primary and secondary.
1952 "Meaning postulates" in Philosophical Studies, III (now in Meaning and Necessity, 1956, 2nd edition)
-- Carnap on 'entailment'. He uses the 'horseshoe' as early as 1937 -- list of symbols online. A meaning postulate formulated with the horseshoe. Moore on entailment. Grice's take on "Bachelors are unmarried males" in "In defense of a dogma" (with Strawson). "Meaning postulates" as correctly defining 'meaning'. The vagaries of the term 'postulate', revived by Johnson/Lakoff to apply to Grice's pragmatic generalisations (as 'conversational postulates' -- and thus in terms of Carnapian entailments).
1952 The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1954 Einführung in die Symbolische Logik, Vienna : Springer (English translation Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications, New York : Dover, 1958)
-- Symbolic, rather than formal logic now.
1956 "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, ed. by H. Feigl and M. Scriven, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press
--- on Ramsey, observational vs. theoretical. Against a more 'theoretical' take by Ramsey (Ramsification), Carnap opts for a 'pragmatic' approach to theoretical concepts. Grice on theoretical concepts in philosophical psychology: "... thinks that..." as theoretical. For Grice, the questions of psychology are _theoretical_, not a matter for mere _analysis_.
1958 "Beobacthungssprache und theoretische Sprache" in Dialectica, XII (English translation "Observation Language and Theoretical Language" in Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975)
--- Good in providing the German for 'observation', a tricky English term if ever there was one. It's be-ob-acht-ung in German.
1966 Philosophical Foundations of Physics, ed. by Martin Gardner, New York : Basic Books
--- cfr. Grice on "Eddington's Tables". Surely Grice's knowledge of physics can't compare with Carnap's, but he can always play.
1977 Two Essays on Entropy, ed. by Abner Shimony, Berkeley : University of California Press
Other Sources
1962 Logic and Language: Studies Dedicated to Professor Rudolf Carnap on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Oddly, Grice would contribute to Flew's volume, "Language and Logic"!
1963 The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillp, La Salle, Ill. : Open Court Pub. Co.
1970 PSA 1970: Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: In Memory of Rudolf Carnap, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
1971 Analiticità, Significanza, Induzione, ed. by Alberto Meotti e Marco Mondadori, Bologna, Italy : il Mulino
1975 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist. Materials and Perspectives, ed. by Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Carnap as a "logical" empiricist rather than as a logical 'positivist'. The importance of slogans, or lack thereof!
1986 Joëlle Proust, Questions de Forme: Logique at Proposition Analytique de Kant a Carnap, Paris, France: Fayard (English translation Questions of Forms: Logic and Analytic Propositions from Kant to Carnap, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press)
--- Interesting in that they skip Locke that R. B. Jones and I love: Note Jones's website for Locke on 'trifling propositions' in the Essay of 1690!
1990 Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work, ed. by Richard Creath, Berkeley : University of California Press
--- Quine wrote extensively on Grice, too. Very good excerpts in Chapman's book on Grice. Quine would attend parties at Grice's college, St. John's, etc. This was the hedyday of "Dogmas of Empiricism" -- that gave Carnap (if not Carnap) the 'dogmatic' slur. The fact that Grice came to the defense of the underdog did not help! ('underdog' being Grandy's 'joke').
1991 Maria Grazia Sandrini, Probabilità e Induzione: Carnap e la Conferma come Concetto Semantico, Milano, Italy : Franco Angeli
1991 Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, ed. by Wolfgang Spohn, Dordrecht; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991 Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991 Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press; [Konstanz] : Universitasverlag Konstanz
---- Grice cites Reichenbach at some length in his PPQ 1986.
1995 L'eredità di Rudolf Carnap: Epistemologia, Filosofia delle Scienze, Filosofia del Linguaggio, ed. by Alberto Pasquinelli, Bologna, Italy : CLUEB
--- Etc.
The 1920s.
1922 Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, dissertation, in Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, n. 56
--- on space as synthetic a priori
1925 "Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften der Raumes von denen der Zeit" in Kant-Studien, 30
--- the correspondence of 'space' (raum) and 'time' (zeit). Spatio-temporal continuants.
1926 Physikalische Begriffsbildung, Karlsruhe : Braun, (Wissen und Wirken ; 39)
--- physicalist as narrowly interpreted: three levels: lower one being 'perceived things or objects and their properties'.
1928 Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie, Berlin : Weltkreis-Verlag
'schein' being Carnap for 'pseudo-'. Literally, 'apparent'. Cfr. "pirots karulize...". Pseudo-sense, nonsense? We don't think so. Uninterpreted at most.
1928 Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Leipzig : Felix Meiner Verlag (English translation The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1967)
aufbau really gives 'house'. Speranza's father being an architect, he knows. Bauhaus. Bauer, architect. So this is, more poetically, the house of the world.
1929 (with Otto Neurath and Hans Hahn) Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis, Vienna : A. Wolf
-- a lovely historical reference: "Wiener Kreis" the Vienna Circle. Cfr. all the refs. by Grice (Prejudices and predilections, Actions and Events, PPQ, to "Vienna")
1929 Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen, Vienna : Springer
1932 "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" in Erkenntnis, II (English translation The Unity of Science, London : Kegan Paul, 1934)
-- interesting idea of the 'characteristica universalis'.
1934 Logische Syntax der Sprache (English translation The Logical Syntax of Language, New York : Humanities, 1937)
tr. by E. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin. Includes the "pirots karulize elatically" manifesto.
1935 Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London : Kegan Paul
1936 "Testability and meaning" in Philosophy of Science, III (1936) and IV (1937)
-- Interesting for the language game including: to prove, to test, to verify. Cfr. Popper, to falsify. Observational vs. theoretical.
1938 "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 1, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1939 "Foundations of Logic and Mathematics" in International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. I n. 3, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1942 Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
1943 Formalization of Logic, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press
--- Carnap as a formalist. Formal logic, symbolic logic. Grice on formalists vs. informalists. Important topic: the meaning of the connectors. Connectors formally defined, connectors syntactically defined. Pseudo-questions in the search for the 'meaning' of the connectives, etc.
1947 Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
--- Carnap on 'must'. A must here! Cfr. Grice on must, Gr. 2001.
1950 Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
-- vis a vis Grice on Kneale. The metaphysical bearing of probability. Induction, primary and secondary.
1952 "Meaning postulates" in Philosophical Studies, III (now in Meaning and Necessity, 1956, 2nd edition)
-- Carnap on 'entailment'. He uses the 'horseshoe' as early as 1937 -- list of symbols online. A meaning postulate formulated with the horseshoe. Moore on entailment. Grice's take on "Bachelors are unmarried males" in "In defense of a dogma" (with Strawson). "Meaning postulates" as correctly defining 'meaning'. The vagaries of the term 'postulate', revived by Johnson/Lakoff to apply to Grice's pragmatic generalisations (as 'conversational postulates' -- and thus in terms of Carnapian entailments).
1952 The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago : University of Chicago Press
1954 Einführung in die Symbolische Logik, Vienna : Springer (English translation Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications, New York : Dover, 1958)
-- Symbolic, rather than formal logic now.
1956 "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, ed. by H. Feigl and M. Scriven, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press
--- on Ramsey, observational vs. theoretical. Against a more 'theoretical' take by Ramsey (Ramsification), Carnap opts for a 'pragmatic' approach to theoretical concepts. Grice on theoretical concepts in philosophical psychology: "... thinks that..." as theoretical. For Grice, the questions of psychology are _theoretical_, not a matter for mere _analysis_.
1958 "Beobacthungssprache und theoretische Sprache" in Dialectica, XII (English translation "Observation Language and Theoretical Language" in Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975)
--- Good in providing the German for 'observation', a tricky English term if ever there was one. It's be-ob-acht-ung in German.
1966 Philosophical Foundations of Physics, ed. by Martin Gardner, New York : Basic Books
--- cfr. Grice on "Eddington's Tables". Surely Grice's knowledge of physics can't compare with Carnap's, but he can always play.
1977 Two Essays on Entropy, ed. by Abner Shimony, Berkeley : University of California Press
Other Sources
1962 Logic and Language: Studies Dedicated to Professor Rudolf Carnap on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Oddly, Grice would contribute to Flew's volume, "Language and Logic"!
1963 The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillp, La Salle, Ill. : Open Court Pub. Co.
1970 PSA 1970: Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: In Memory of Rudolf Carnap, Dordrect, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
1971 Analiticità, Significanza, Induzione, ed. by Alberto Meotti e Marco Mondadori, Bologna, Italy : il Mulino
1975 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist. Materials and Perspectives, ed. by Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht, Holl. : D. Reidel Publishing Company
--- Carnap as a "logical" empiricist rather than as a logical 'positivist'. The importance of slogans, or lack thereof!
1986 Joëlle Proust, Questions de Forme: Logique at Proposition Analytique de Kant a Carnap, Paris, France: Fayard (English translation Questions of Forms: Logic and Analytic Propositions from Kant to Carnap, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press)
--- Interesting in that they skip Locke that R. B. Jones and I love: Note Jones's website for Locke on 'trifling propositions' in the Essay of 1690!
1990 Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work, ed. by Richard Creath, Berkeley : University of California Press
--- Quine wrote extensively on Grice, too. Very good excerpts in Chapman's book on Grice. Quine would attend parties at Grice's college, St. John's, etc. This was the hedyday of "Dogmas of Empiricism" -- that gave Carnap (if not Carnap) the 'dogmatic' slur. The fact that Grice came to the defense of the underdog did not help! ('underdog' being Grandy's 'joke').
1991 Maria Grazia Sandrini, Probabilità e Induzione: Carnap e la Conferma come Concetto Semantico, Milano, Italy : Franco Angeli
1991 Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, ed. by Wolfgang Spohn, Dordrecht; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991 Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991 Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press; [Konstanz] : Universitasverlag Konstanz
---- Grice cites Reichenbach at some length in his PPQ 1986.
1995 L'eredità di Rudolf Carnap: Epistemologia, Filosofia delle Scienze, Filosofia del Linguaggio, ed. by Alberto Pasquinelli, Bologna, Italy : CLUEB
--- Etc.
System C, System G
By J. L. Speranza
R. B. Jones entitles his recent post, "meaningless 'systems'" or rather he refers to that phrase as provoked by Chapman on Grice.
The mention of 'system' is very relevant here.
Grice was fortunate to have a friend like Myro. In unpublished work -- but also in Myro's contribution to the Grice festschrift, Myro introduces the "System G".
This is of course apres Grice.
Grice had done the very same thing when inventing a System Q for Quine, which he had presented to the Quine festschrift. What amused me is that Quine responded, with a one-page long, "Reply to H. P. Grice" where he finds Grice's system to be 'forbiddingly complex' (Quine's word).
So we need a System C for comparison.
These Systems -- are indeed FL for short -- comprise
Syntactics: this is actually the _second_ component, since the 'vocabulary' is not even listed.
Semantics (optional): the truth-tables and the interpretations I, I', ... under a model M, M', ... etc.
Pragmatics (informal): where issues such as 'assertion', 'implicature' are considered.
So the idea of a 'meaningless' system relates to the "semantics" component. Many notions (if we may call them so) are perfectly manageable at the syntactics level only. This is the Hilbertian influence on Carnap. And it is what lies behind the very idea of a well-formed formula.
I often find 'well-formed' and 'formula' to trade on the redundant. After all a formula has to be well formed. An ill-formed formula is not a formula:
(x) Px --> Kx
Pirots karulise elatically.
is a wff.
The other possibilities
pirots elatically karulise
karulise pirots elatically
karulise elatically pirots.
elatically pirots karulise
elatically karulise pirots
seem okay but none of that freedom at the syntactic formal level.
Only
(x) Px --> Kx
is well formed. Also of course
(x) Kx --> Px
(x) Kx --> Kx
(x) Px --> Px
-- i.e. "Every karuliser is a pirot", "Karulisers karulise" and "pirots pirotise".
But you cannot have things like
Kx(x) Px-->
which is just an ill-formed formula, i.e. not a wff, i.e not a formula.
In some systems, any string from vocabulary items is deemed a formula and so the above "Kx(x)Px -->" would count as a formula. The syntactic rules (formation and transformation rules -- I'm using the latter apres Carnap) define a 'wff'. This gives 'wff' a value-oriented side to it. Like 'sentence', to use Grice's example, the idea of a formula is built upon our notion of a good formula, or well formed one. Etc.
R. B. Jones entitles his recent post, "meaningless 'systems'" or rather he refers to that phrase as provoked by Chapman on Grice.
The mention of 'system' is very relevant here.
Grice was fortunate to have a friend like Myro. In unpublished work -- but also in Myro's contribution to the Grice festschrift, Myro introduces the "System G".
This is of course apres Grice.
Grice had done the very same thing when inventing a System Q for Quine, which he had presented to the Quine festschrift. What amused me is that Quine responded, with a one-page long, "Reply to H. P. Grice" where he finds Grice's system to be 'forbiddingly complex' (Quine's word).
So we need a System C for comparison.
These Systems -- are indeed FL for short -- comprise
Syntactics: this is actually the _second_ component, since the 'vocabulary' is not even listed.
Semantics (optional): the truth-tables and the interpretations I, I', ... under a model M, M', ... etc.
Pragmatics (informal): where issues such as 'assertion', 'implicature' are considered.
So the idea of a 'meaningless' system relates to the "semantics" component. Many notions (if we may call them so) are perfectly manageable at the syntactics level only. This is the Hilbertian influence on Carnap. And it is what lies behind the very idea of a well-formed formula.
I often find 'well-formed' and 'formula' to trade on the redundant. After all a formula has to be well formed. An ill-formed formula is not a formula:
(x) Px --> Kx
Pirots karulise elatically.
is a wff.
The other possibilities
pirots elatically karulise
karulise pirots elatically
karulise elatically pirots.
elatically pirots karulise
elatically karulise pirots
seem okay but none of that freedom at the syntactic formal level.
Only
(x) Px --> Kx
is well formed. Also of course
(x) Kx --> Px
(x) Kx --> Kx
(x) Px --> Px
-- i.e. "Every karuliser is a pirot", "Karulisers karulise" and "pirots pirotise".
But you cannot have things like
Kx(x) Px-->
which is just an ill-formed formula, i.e. not a wff, i.e not a formula.
In some systems, any string from vocabulary items is deemed a formula and so the above "Kx(x)Px -->" would count as a formula. The syntactic rules (formation and transformation rules -- I'm using the latter apres Carnap) define a 'wff'. This gives 'wff' a value-oriented side to it. Like 'sentence', to use Grice's example, the idea of a formula is built upon our notion of a good formula, or well formed one. Etc.
Carnap and Grice on Morris
By J. L. Speranza
In his note on Chapman on Carnap, Jones takes issue with Chapman's rather simplified view of syntactics vs. semantics.
We are discussing
pirots karulize elatically
A is a pirot
-----
A karulizes elatically
-- tr. from the German original
by A. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin, 1937
---
Chapman notes that Carnap is sticking to 'syntax'. A point she and indeed Carnap fails to give enough attention to is that some sem- (call it semantics) is present in the above: nothing is said about the morphogrammatical words like the -s marker for singular, the -ly marker for adverb, and the totally meaningful formation of "is a" (in "A is a pirot").
So, what Carnap seems to be concerned here -- but I wouldn't know what form he gives to universally quantified sentences:
(x) Px --> KEx
Pa & KEa
i.e. he _is_ using "A" as a singular term ("A is a pirot"). In Quine's scheme, and indeed Grice, in his talk "How pirots karulize elatically", this "A" comes out as "a" as per above.
Then we have to turn onto a semantic bloc the idea of karulising-elatically (KE) because the logical form of adverbial modifiers was unknown till Davidson's first shots at this in "The logical form of action sentences".
But if we see the above, we see that it's only with the "extension" of predicates:
"P" and "K" (or "KE" if you wish) that he is concerned as leaving 'meaning-free', or as I prefer, "interpretation" free. This may be, as Jones suggests, a bit of an influence from Hilbert (rather than Frege) and that's a very good thing to have, if we are going to deem Carnap a die-hard formalist, for nobody can be more of a formalist than Hilbert was.
I _love_ the label 'formalist' because that's precisely the one that Grice uses to oppose these people (say Hilbertians -- here we may need to see the Hilbert/Russell-Whitehead interface) and, ... Strawson! (Who Grice, amusingly, calls an 'INformalist'). Later, Grice learned the lesson and changed this into modernists versus neo-traditionalists!
---
Roger Bishop Jones writes of Carnap's oevure where, to use Jones's apt wording, he
"he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts" (emphasis mine. JLS).
For it's precisely that what we want. Let's propose four words here:
to semiotise: to turn into a semiotic system.
This has three subbranches:
The first is indeed:
to syntactise: to turn syntactic. Where syntactics is that branch of semiotics that deals with formation and transformation rules -- Carnap was enamoured with syntax, and so was Grice. Carnap wrote of "the logical syntax of language"; Grice has an unpublished thing on "The syntax of illusion" (for an investigation of phenomenalist talk _sans_ physicalist backing: 'that stick is bent').
Then we have
(b) to semanticise. This is done via interpretations. It's the truth-table thing. BUT it can be done more 'formally' via 'syntactising'. I.e. no interpretation required, or truth-table indeed. The system remains purely a syntactic one.
(c) to pragmaticise. This is done via leaving room for things like 'assertion', which is Carnap's paradigmatical pragmatic notion. One can have a syntactic string ("(x)Px --> Kx") and we may go on to semanticise it ("P" -- meaning postulate, "K", meaning postulate") and we may go on to pragmaticise it by examining what belief the utterer is endorsing when he asserts to pirots karulising elatically.
Etc.
In his note on Chapman on Carnap, Jones takes issue with Chapman's rather simplified view of syntactics vs. semantics.
We are discussing
pirots karulize elatically
A is a pirot
-----
A karulizes elatically
-- tr. from the German original
by A. Smeaton, Countess of Zeppelin, 1937
---
Chapman notes that Carnap is sticking to 'syntax'. A point she and indeed Carnap fails to give enough attention to is that some sem- (call it semantics) is present in the above: nothing is said about the morphogrammatical words like the -s marker for singular, the -ly marker for adverb, and the totally meaningful formation of "is a" (in "A is a pirot").
So, what Carnap seems to be concerned here -- but I wouldn't know what form he gives to universally quantified sentences:
(x) Px --> KEx
Pa & KEa
i.e. he _is_ using "A" as a singular term ("A is a pirot"). In Quine's scheme, and indeed Grice, in his talk "How pirots karulize elatically", this "A" comes out as "a" as per above.
Then we have to turn onto a semantic bloc the idea of karulising-elatically (KE) because the logical form of adverbial modifiers was unknown till Davidson's first shots at this in "The logical form of action sentences".
But if we see the above, we see that it's only with the "extension" of predicates:
"P" and "K" (or "KE" if you wish) that he is concerned as leaving 'meaning-free', or as I prefer, "interpretation" free. This may be, as Jones suggests, a bit of an influence from Hilbert (rather than Frege) and that's a very good thing to have, if we are going to deem Carnap a die-hard formalist, for nobody can be more of a formalist than Hilbert was.
I _love_ the label 'formalist' because that's precisely the one that Grice uses to oppose these people (say Hilbertians -- here we may need to see the Hilbert/Russell-Whitehead interface) and, ... Strawson! (Who Grice, amusingly, calls an 'INformalist'). Later, Grice learned the lesson and changed this into modernists versus neo-traditionalists!
---
Roger Bishop Jones writes of Carnap's oevure where, to use Jones's apt wording, he
"he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts" (emphasis mine. JLS).
For it's precisely that what we want. Let's propose four words here:
to semiotise: to turn into a semiotic system.
This has three subbranches:
The first is indeed:
to syntactise: to turn syntactic. Where syntactics is that branch of semiotics that deals with formation and transformation rules -- Carnap was enamoured with syntax, and so was Grice. Carnap wrote of "the logical syntax of language"; Grice has an unpublished thing on "The syntax of illusion" (for an investigation of phenomenalist talk _sans_ physicalist backing: 'that stick is bent').
Then we have
(b) to semanticise. This is done via interpretations. It's the truth-table thing. BUT it can be done more 'formally' via 'syntactising'. I.e. no interpretation required, or truth-table indeed. The system remains purely a syntactic one.
(c) to pragmaticise. This is done via leaving room for things like 'assertion', which is Carnap's paradigmatical pragmatic notion. One can have a syntactic string ("(x)Px --> Kx") and we may go on to semanticise it ("P" -- meaning postulate, "K", meaning postulate") and we may go on to pragmaticise it by examining what belief the utterer is endorsing when he asserts to pirots karulising elatically.
Etc.
A Fantasy World: Was Carnap's Pirots Gricefied
By J. L. Speranza
for the Carnap Corner
--- R. B. Jones, our Carnap expert, does, very amusingly and interestingly, take up my reference to S. R. Chapman. She teaches English at Liverpool and has published extensively on various philosophers, including Chapman. We are discussing her references to Carnap/Grice (in particular the interface). I thought that Chapman cared to quote a specific passage from the Grice lectures (which Grice _amusingly_ thought of titling, "How pirots karulize elatically: some simpler ways", but did not), but she doesn't. So the actual written ref. by Grice on this continues to be the already published "Gr75 repr. Gr91:140" ("pirots (which Russell and Carnap...")).
In any case, I'm pleased Jones uses 'fantasy':
"Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe..."
And this is serendipitous, because Chapman uses 'fantasy' in particular the same context, only he thinks it's Grice who's the fantasier (and I follow her there!)
She wants to say that the pirots inhabit a fantasy world. I like that! I like Peter Pan, too -- and I'm amused that Grice saw Q in the Never-Never Land --. In a way the city of eternal truth is also a bit of fantasy, if you ask me!
Anyway, Chapman (in a way, aptly) contrasts the motivations of Carnap and Grice here:
---1) Carnap is writing (or being translated in 1937)
---2) Grice is lecturing in California in the 1970s.
Chapman writes about the pirots. Do not be confused, she says, by these two authors using the same word (same 'nonsense' I would go on to say), for:
"Carnap wanted to use SEMANTICALLY OPAQUE forms"
-- read 'nonsense'
"to hint at how an analysis of syntax"
-- syntactics I wrote on my margin. Cfr. Carnap on semeiosology, or something that he uses: he is indeed working on this originally Peircean idea that semiosis includes three branches: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
"might proceed without reference to meaning"
-- here the problem is that Carnap is already using 'semiosiology' or something, and this, alas, makes a reference to 'sem-', which is the Greek for 'meaning'. There is an overlap, in mere roots of words, between SEMiosis, and SEMantics. So one has to be careful here.
"[On the other hand, though not necessarily the right one] Grice's intention in borrowing his [i.e. Carnap's] example is to consider what concepts might be necessary to the discussion of MEANING and reference, freed from the normal preconceptions of such a discussion".
This is sort of alright. For in this 'fantasy world' that pirots inhabit, Chapman cares to quote, slighly condescendingly as her wont is, how Grice "treated his audience to pieces of" [things like]:
I quote directly from Grice now:
"a pirot _a_ can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng: also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o1 as being fid to one another"
--- These notes are transcripts (by one wonders who) from a tape. So there are some typos there: notably, 'karulize' is spelled 'carulise'!
Etc.
for the Carnap Corner
--- R. B. Jones, our Carnap expert, does, very amusingly and interestingly, take up my reference to S. R. Chapman. She teaches English at Liverpool and has published extensively on various philosophers, including Chapman. We are discussing her references to Carnap/Grice (in particular the interface). I thought that Chapman cared to quote a specific passage from the Grice lectures (which Grice _amusingly_ thought of titling, "How pirots karulize elatically: some simpler ways", but did not), but she doesn't. So the actual written ref. by Grice on this continues to be the already published "Gr75 repr. Gr91:140" ("pirots (which Russell and Carnap...")).
In any case, I'm pleased Jones uses 'fantasy':
"Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe..."
And this is serendipitous, because Chapman uses 'fantasy' in particular the same context, only he thinks it's Grice who's the fantasier (and I follow her there!)
She wants to say that the pirots inhabit a fantasy world. I like that! I like Peter Pan, too -- and I'm amused that Grice saw Q in the Never-Never Land --. In a way the city of eternal truth is also a bit of fantasy, if you ask me!
Anyway, Chapman (in a way, aptly) contrasts the motivations of Carnap and Grice here:
---1) Carnap is writing (or being translated in 1937)
---2) Grice is lecturing in California in the 1970s.
Chapman writes about the pirots. Do not be confused, she says, by these two authors using the same word (same 'nonsense' I would go on to say), for:
"Carnap wanted to use SEMANTICALLY OPAQUE forms"
-- read 'nonsense'
"to hint at how an analysis of syntax"
-- syntactics I wrote on my margin. Cfr. Carnap on semeiosology, or something that he uses: he is indeed working on this originally Peircean idea that semiosis includes three branches: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.
"might proceed without reference to meaning"
-- here the problem is that Carnap is already using 'semiosiology' or something, and this, alas, makes a reference to 'sem-', which is the Greek for 'meaning'. There is an overlap, in mere roots of words, between SEMiosis, and SEMantics. So one has to be careful here.
"[On the other hand, though not necessarily the right one] Grice's intention in borrowing his [i.e. Carnap's] example is to consider what concepts might be necessary to the discussion of MEANING and reference, freed from the normal preconceptions of such a discussion".
This is sort of alright. For in this 'fantasy world' that pirots inhabit, Chapman cares to quote, slighly condescendingly as her wont is, how Grice "treated his audience to pieces of" [things like]:
I quote directly from Grice now:
"a pirot _a_ can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng: also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o1 as being fid to one another"
--- These notes are transcripts (by one wonders who) from a tape. So there are some typos there: notably, 'karulize' is spelled 'carulise'!
Etc.
Chapman and Carnap's "Meaningless" systems
By Roger Bishop Jones
for the Carnap Corner
On Tuesday 16 Feb 2010 00:08, J. L. Speranza wrote:
> As Chapman notes, the agenda of regimenting FL vs. NL is already
> there in the Intro to this book (Cfr. Carnap's two lectures in
> London):
>
> "In the introduction to The Logical Syntax of Language", Chapman
> expands, "Carnap presents a typically LOGICAL POSITIVIST accont of
> the PHILOSOPHER's reason for taking language seriously."
>
> Seriously? This seems like the antonymy of seriousness to me, but I
> see her point.
>
> "A suitably rigorous language will provide the necessary tools for
> logical and SCIENTIFIC exposition. This language is to be a FORMAL
> SYSTEM, concerned with types and orders of symbols but paying no
> attention to MEANING."
Chapman is fantasizing about Carnap here I believe, though I have not
actually read "Logical Syntax".
I believe Carnap, as a formalist, is like Hilbert (probably was
influenced in this by Hilbert rather than Frege).
Hilbert was not a formalist who regarded formal languages as
meaningless.
His formalism consisted in requiring meaning to be expressed
purely through a formal axiomatisation (often called an implicit
definition).
Carnap systematised this idea in his Philosophy of Logical Syntax, in
which he syntacticised all the relevant semantic concepts.
He did not regard his formal languages as meaningless, he simply
advocated that the semantics be rendered through the rules which
defined the analytic sentences.
RBJ
Monday 15 February 2010
Gricean Look at Carnap Biblio
This is a further look at some of the later publications by Carnap too.
1922. Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, no. 56. His Ph.D. thesis.
--- We have discussed this. The Space as a synthetic-apriori category in Kant. The fact that Carnap narrows the focus to 'wissenschaftslehre' suggests he may be into Kant's rather dogmatic presumption that Newton had to be right regardless (as he wasn't).
1926. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Karlsruhe: Braun.
This is about 'physics' rather than physicalism, which is usually understood more narrowly (as Carnap will, in other publications) to deal with third-person reports of mental ascriptions of behaviour ("He is thinking of a platter of spaghetti"). This one touches on phenomenalism rather in the sections on 'perceived objects and their properties'. This is the lowest level (qualitative) from which Carnap raises to quantitative and abstract higher levels.
1928. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Pseudoproblems of Philosophy). Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag.
Shows his concern with methodological questions. Pseudoproblems will become in linguistic key his pseudo-statemens. E.g. Heidegger, Nothing noths.
1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. English translation by Rolf A. George, 1967. The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. University of California Press.
1929. Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen. Springer.
1934. Logische Syntax der Sprache. English translation 1937, The Logical Syntax of Language. Kegan Paul. This was tr. By A. Smeaton, countess of Zeppelin, and includes the charming, "Pirots karulize elatically; A is a pirot; thus A karulizes elatically". Formal calculus. Formation rules, etc.
1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK: Thoemmes. Excerpt.
1939, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 3. University of Chicago Press.
1942. Introduction to Semantics. Harvard Uni. Press.
1943. Formalization of Logic. Harvard Uni. Press.
1956 (1947). Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press.
1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-15 online.
1950. "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20-45.
1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. University of Chicago Press.
1958. Introduction to Symbolic Logic with Applications. Dover.
1963, "Intellectual Autobiography" in Schilpp (1963: 1-84). Vide Roger Bishop Jones, and ch. ii of Bishop Roger Jones and J. L. Speranza.
1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Martin Gardner, ed. Basic Books. Online excerpt.
1971. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 1. University of California Press.
1977. Two essays on entropy. Shimony, Abner, ed. University of California Press.
1980. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 2. Jeffrey, R. C., ed. University of California Press.
2000. Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik. Edited from unpublished manuscript by T. Bonk and J. Mosterín. Darmstadt: Wissenschftliche Buchgesellschaft. 167 pp. ISBN 3-534-14298-5.
------ Pirot, you've gone a long way!
1922. Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungshefte, no. 56. His Ph.D. thesis.
--- We have discussed this. The Space as a synthetic-apriori category in Kant. The fact that Carnap narrows the focus to 'wissenschaftslehre' suggests he may be into Kant's rather dogmatic presumption that Newton had to be right regardless (as he wasn't).
1926. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Karlsruhe: Braun.
This is about 'physics' rather than physicalism, which is usually understood more narrowly (as Carnap will, in other publications) to deal with third-person reports of mental ascriptions of behaviour ("He is thinking of a platter of spaghetti"). This one touches on phenomenalism rather in the sections on 'perceived objects and their properties'. This is the lowest level (qualitative) from which Carnap raises to quantitative and abstract higher levels.
1928. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Pseudoproblems of Philosophy). Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag.
Shows his concern with methodological questions. Pseudoproblems will become in linguistic key his pseudo-statemens. E.g. Heidegger, Nothing noths.
1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. English translation by Rolf A. George, 1967. The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. University of California Press.
1929. Abriss der Logistik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen. Springer.
1934. Logische Syntax der Sprache. English translation 1937, The Logical Syntax of Language. Kegan Paul. This was tr. By A. Smeaton, countess of Zeppelin, and includes the charming, "Pirots karulize elatically; A is a pirot; thus A karulizes elatically". Formal calculus. Formation rules, etc.
1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK: Thoemmes. Excerpt.
1939, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 3. University of Chicago Press.
1942. Introduction to Semantics. Harvard Uni. Press.
1943. Formalization of Logic. Harvard Uni. Press.
1956 (1947). Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press.
1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-15 online.
1950. "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20-45.
1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. University of Chicago Press.
1958. Introduction to Symbolic Logic with Applications. Dover.
1963, "Intellectual Autobiography" in Schilpp (1963: 1-84). Vide Roger Bishop Jones, and ch. ii of Bishop Roger Jones and J. L. Speranza.
1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Martin Gardner, ed. Basic Books. Online excerpt.
1971. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 1. University of California Press.
1977. Two essays on entropy. Shimony, Abner, ed. University of California Press.
1980. Studies in inductive logic and probability, Vol. 2. Jeffrey, R. C., ed. University of California Press.
2000. Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik. Edited from unpublished manuscript by T. Bonk and J. Mosterín. Darmstadt: Wissenschftliche Buchgesellschaft. 167 pp. ISBN 3-534-14298-5.
------ Pirot, you've gone a long way!
A Gricean Look at Carnap's Publications
The early Carnap wrote, naturally enough, in German. Here is what a neo-Grice finds of interest, today, of some of what Carnap wrote:
1921
Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der hohen philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Jena. (Jena: Universität Jena, 1921)
--- the space. Obviously, the ROOM, literally, but not as in the living room (but cfr. lebensraum). This is indeed the synthetic a priori category of Kant's space. Grice will show an interest in this vis a vis his student Strawson writing a book on Kant and the 'bounds of sense'. The topic merges with Carnap in that 'sense' is pretty ambiguous as used by Kant. What goes beyond the a priori, yet synthetic constraints of the apperception of 'space' dictates what we find and fail to find meaningful.
Contents: Introduction. Formal space. Intuitive space. Physical space. The mutual relation among formal, intuitive, and physical space.
--- the idea of 'formal space' would have pleased the late Grice, with all his emphasis on Platonic supralunary entities. The formal space is the space of Greek geometry of course, and it merges with ideas that the analytic statements of our cathedral of learning are both algebraic (or arithmetical) _and_ geometrical statements.
The relations between experience and knowledge of space. Bibliography and suggested reading. Biography.
---- Strawson was the big one here to focus on 'spatio-temporal continuity' as a metaphysical constraint on our conception of things. Grice was more of a mentalist, phenomenalist, memory-theoretical one (he saw 'memory' rather than spatio-temporal continuity as providing the key questions to the self).
1922
"Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre." Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte Nr. 56. (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1922). 87 pages.
1923
"Über die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Einfachstheit" Kant-Studien (Berlin), Band 28 Heft 1/2 (1923), pp. 90 - 107.
1924
"Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen" Annalen der Philosophy und Philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 3 (1924), pp. 105-130.
The idea of 'causality' will feature large in some of Strawson's and Grice's metaphysical views. The early Grice (WoW) has some essays on the notion of 'cause' as involving a 'willing' element to be avoided by critics of ordinary language.
1925
"Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der Zeit" Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 30 Heft 3/4 (1925), pp. 331-345
-- Here the spatio-temporal continuity is considered, with the dropping of 'zeit' (time, literally, 'tide') onto the bargain.
1926
"Physikalische Begriffsbildung" in Ungerer, Emil (ed.) Wissen und Wirken, Einzelschriften zu den Grundfragen des Erkennens und Schaffens, Band 39 (Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun, 1926). 66 pages.
--- intersting for the early use of 'physicalist' or 'physicalic' literally.
Contents: Introduction, the task of physics. The first level of physical concept formation, qualitative level: Perceived things and properties. The second level of physical concept formation, quantitative level: Physical magnitudes. The third level of physical concept formation, abstract level: The four-dimensional world process. Bibliography. Index of topics and individuals cited.
---- it seems to be the first level: the qualitative level of perceived things and properties that will keep interesting Grice for _decades_, vide his "Remarks about the senses" in WoW: indeed, the phenomenalist challenge: how to transcend the phenomeanlist level of perceived things and properties to higher levels (quantitative and abstract).
1927
1. Carnap wrote a synopsis of Physikalische Begriffsbildung: "Physikalische Begriffsbildung" Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 6, Heft 4 (July 18, 1927), pp. 76 - 77.
2. "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe" Symposion: Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache (Berlin-Schlachtensee) Band 1 Heft 4 (1927), pp. 355 - 374.
In the Schilpp volume, "Aussprache" is written "Ausprache."
1928
1. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928). 290 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna, May 1928). Introduction: Task and Plan of the Investigations. Preparatory Elucidations. On the form of scientific assertions. Overview of the types of objects and their relations. The problems of form of a constitution system. The forms of level. The form of system. (Formal investigations. Material investigations.) The basis. (The basic elements. The basic relations.) The form of objects. The form of presentation of a constitution system. Development of a constitution system. The lower levels: Objects of one's own psyche. The middle level: physical objects.
--- it's these two levels that will concern Grice:
lower level: object or content of one's own psyche.
middle level: material objects.
The upper levels: mental objects and objects of other psyches.
--- there seems to be an asymmetry with Grice at this level. Grice does not seem to have considered too serioulsy the problem of 'Other Minds', perhaps because he was Oxon, and he thought that Wisdom had bored people enough about it! But the later Grice HAS to give an answer to this: his functionalist manifesto is a third-person programme for the development of 'third-person' descriptions of 'mental predicates' ("Jack is thinking about Jill"). But this third-person programme needs adaptation by Grice to render first-person ascriptions possible ("I am thinking about Jill"): here Grice considers privileged access and incorrigibility which are NOT available, ceteris paribus, in third-person ascriptions.
Clarification of some philosophical problems on the basis of the constitution theory. Some problems of being. The psycho-physical problem.
It's good that Carnap, sticking with German -- and thus Greek -- keeps the Greek root of 'psyche'. The philosophical jargon Grice had to endure was that of 'mind', and he made a point of calling his thing 'philosophical psychology'. So the continuity that Carnap suggests between scientific and philosophical psychology would have pleased Grice.
The constitutional or empirical problem of reality. The problem of metaphysical reality. Task and limits of Science. Summary. Bibliography and index.
2. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928). 46 pages.
1929
1. Notice of Paul Bommersheim Beiträge zur Lehre von Ding und Gesetz. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 36 Heft 1 (1929), pp. 27-28 of the separately paged reviews (= ger. "Literaturberichte")
---- interesting: Ding und Gesetz has an awful Quinean ring to it. Grice contributed to Quine's festshcrift, Word (Gesetz) and Object (Ding).
2. Abriss der Logistik, Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen Volume two in the series "Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, edited by Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick. (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1929). 114 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna in January 1929). System of Logistic (sections 1 through 29). The task of logistic. Functions. Truth-functions.
---- The early Grice was a thoroughly truth-functionalist. His whole polemic with Strawson originated because of this. Grice would often retreat to Whitehead/Russell, PM, for relaxation!
Axioms. Theorems of propositional logic. Universal and existential propositions. Symbols. Classes. The theory of types. Class operations. Relations. Operations of relations. The hierarchy of types. Symbolic functions of converse, regions and field. Chains. Operations. Three and many-placed relations. The classes of 0, 1, and 2; freedom from ambiguity. The principle of abstraction. The cardinal numbers. isomorphism; the relational (ordinal?) numbers. The R-chains. Groups. Finite and infinite. Various analyses of relation. Progressions. Series. Limit concepts. Continuity. Applied logistic. Section thirty, on the axiomatic method.
--- Grice entered logic seriously (as late as 1969, for the Hintikka/Davidson festschrift for Quine when the vogue for axiomatic presentations was kaput, and Gentzen was all over the place. Grice relies on Mates, Elementary Logic. However, the spirit is pretty much 'axiomatic' in this sense Carnap is alluding to here.
Set theory and arithmetic (sections 31 and 32). AS [Axiom system] of set theory. Peano's axiom system for the natural numbers. Geometry (sections 33 - 35). Axioms of topology (axioms of surroundings). Axioms of projective geometry (first form: planes as classes). Axiom system of projective geometry (second form: planes as relations). Physics (sections 36 - 37). Axiom system of space-time topology. Determination and causality. Theory of relationship [Verwandtschaft] (section 38). Axiom system of relationship-relations [Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen] among people.
---- This sounds interesting, "among people". I don't think Grice went as far as to symbolise people like that, but people I know (Rosenschein, Levinson, etc, me on a good day) did!
Analysis of knowledge (section 39). The lowest levels of the constitution system. Analysis of language (sections 40 - 43). Logical semasiology of a definite language. Exhibition of the logical skeleton of presented sentences. Mass numbers. Situations and events. Place and time. Appendix (sections 44 -50). Exercises. Overview of the most important logistical symbols. Bibliography. Suggested reading. Index of people and topics, with comparitive terminology. List of logical constants.
3. A notice of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 8 Heft 1/2 (15 May 1929), page 10 of separately paged "Literatureberichte."
4. Tagung fuer Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften. In Prag, von Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn und Hans Reichenbach. Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik Band 8 Heft 4/5 (31 July 1929) pp. 113-114.
-- the idea of 'epistemology' as erknenntinislehre is an interesting one. Grice himself did not expand on 'epistemology' as such, since he focused on general psychological attitudes (judicative attitudes, perceptual attitudes) and rarely on larger issues regarding the _truth_ of these attitudes!
Proceedings of this congress were published in Erkenntnis (Band 1 Heft 2/4, pp. 89-339).
5. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis Von Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, und Rudolf Carnap. Veröffentlichung des Vereines Ernst Mach Heft I. (Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929). 64 pages.
--- good for an early ref. to the Vienna Circle (Coffa has written extensively on this).
Contents: Preface (Vienna, August 1929). The Vienna circle of the scientific world-view. Prehistory. The Circle around Schlick. The scientific world-view. Problem areas. Foundations of Arithmetic. Foundations of physics. Foundations of geometry. The problem of foundations in biology and psychology.
--- this is topical. The problem of Emergentism, I assume. You talk to a philosophical biologist and they are so onto telos and against mechanism. I am expecting Carnap took the idea of a mechanistic reduction seriously enough!
Foundations of the socal sciences. Review and outlook. Suggested readings. Bibliography. The members of the Vienna Circle. Authors closest to the Vienna Circle. Leading representatives of the scientific world-view. Index of names.
---- I like the 'adolescent' idea that you have a circle with members. Grice was like that. He has notes where he writes:
"Anscombe, no; Murdoch, no; Dummett, no" -- people NOT accepted as members of Austin's kindergartens (they were called Kindergartens because everyone had to be younger than Austin, b. 1911).
6. Review of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Kant Studien (Berlin) Band 34 Heft 3/4 (1929), pp. 428-429.
7. Review of Karl Menger, Dimensionstheorie in ibid., pp. 457-458.
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The 1930s.
1930
1. Notice. Herbert Feigl Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 37 Heft 1 (1930), p. 6 of seperately paged "Literatureberichte."
2. "Die alte und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 heft 1 (1930), pp. 12 - 26.
---- Grice was at odds when doing history of logic. While Carnap speaks of old and new, Grice speaks of: traditionalism, modernism, neo-traditionalism, neo-modernism. Confusing!
---
3. "Einheitswissenschaft auf physischer Basis. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Review of Felix Kaufmann, Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung, Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Leipzig), 51. Jahrgang (3. Folge, 1. Jahrgang) Heft 35 (August 30, 1930), cols. 1674-1678.
5. "Die Mathematik als Zweig der Logik" Blätter für deutsche Philosophie (Berlin) Band 4 Heft 3/4 (1930), pp. 298 - 310.
6. "Diskussion über Wahrschenlichkeit." Von Edgar Zilsel und anderen. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 Heft 2/4 (1930) pp. 260 - 285.
verosimilitude (wahrschenlichkeit).
7. Bericht über Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik. Ibid., pp. 303 - 307.
8. A bibliography of Rudolf Carnap in Ibid., pp. 315 - 317.
1931
1. "Ergebnisse der logischen Analyse der Sprache" Forschungen und Fortschritte (Berlin) 7. Jahrgang, Nummer 13 (May 1, 1931), pp. 183 - 184.
2. A review of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 1 (1931), pp. 73 - 75.
--- Grice often speaks (WoW:RE) of the 'heirs of PM' so we know who he is talking about now.
3. A review of Eino Kaila, Der logistische Neupositivismus. Ibid., pp. 75 - 77.
The idea of the logical positivists as neo-positivists is appealing. Grice has Positivism (and see the -ismus ending in German here) when he is really onto neo-Positivismus.
4. "Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 2/3 (1931), pp. 91 - 105.
5. "Diskussion zur Grundlegung der Mathematik" Von Hans Hahn und anderen. Ibid., pp. 135 - 149.
1932
1. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 4 (1932), pp. 219 - 241.
*****************This is the Classic, where ueberwindung was perhaps too grossly tr. as 'rejection'.
2. "Die Sprache der Physik" Ibid., p. 311.
3. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid., p. 311.
4. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 5/6 (1932), pp. 432 - 465.
--- this is referred to by Roger Bishop Jones in a post to HIST-ANAL. Physicalist speech as universal speech of science. This is fascinating in that the idea of the universalsprache is so ... well debabelized! Speranza has studied different attempts at 'characteristica universalis', and here is one of the most important ones! It will become Americanised, of course, as the idea of a unified science.
5. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid. Band 3 Heft 2/3 (December 30, 1932), pp. 107 - 142.
6. "Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker" Ibid., pp. 177 - 188.
7. "Über Protokollsätze" Ibid., pp. 215 - 228. A reply to Neurath's article in the same issue of Erkenntnis on pp. 204 - 214.
---- this is interesting, as it concerns O-T terms, observational and theoretical. To what extent are protokollsaetze observational and to what extent are they theory-laden? Grice deals with some of these questions in his Method repr. 1991.
1933
1. A review of Philipp Frank, Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen in Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 38 Heft 1/2 (1933), p. 275.
He had spoken of Kausalitaet, now it's kausalgesetz, where gesetz is ambiguous as to law, principle, what have you. Not to be confused with the synthetic a priori, "Every event has a cause" beloved of Oxonians like Pears.
2. "L'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Logique" Trad. du generale Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 76. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1933). 36 pages.
Revised translation of 1930-2.
3. Review of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 3 Heft 4/6 (September 5, 1933), pp 436 - 437.
1934
1. "On the Character of Philosophic Problems," translated by W.M. Malisoff, in Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) volume 1 number 2 (April 1934), p. 251.
2. A review of Walter Dubislav Die Philosophie der Mathematik in der Gegenwart, Erkenntnis (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 1 (May 8, 1934), pp. 64 - 65.
3. A review of C.I. Lewis & C.H. Langford Symbolic Logic, Ibid., pp. 65 - 66.
---- This is intersting in that Lewis supersedes the material implication and enters metaphysical waters with his strict implication. So we are not talking of common or garden truth-functionalists here.
4. The Unity of Science, translated and with an introduction by Max Black in Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 63 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934). 101 pages.
--- Black will have occasion to discuss Grice at large ("Literary Theory", 1970).
Contents: Introduction by M. Black. Author's introduction (Prague, January 1934). Advice to the reader. Physics as a universal science. The heterogeneity of science. Languages. Protocol language. The physical language as an intersubjective language.
--- this topic is anti-Wittgensteinian. I don't think discussed by Grice, but by Griceans, e.g. Colin McGinn, in Woodfield, Thought and Object: to what extent can an intention-based semantics respond to the solipsistic challenge?
The physical language as a universal language. Protocol language as a part of physical language. Unified science in physical language.
5. Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik Einheitswissenschaft, schriften hrsg. von Otto Neurath in Verbindung mit Rudolf Carnap und Hans Hahn. Heft 3. (Wien: Verlag Gerold & Co., 1934). 30 pages.
6. Logische Syntax der Sprache Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, hrsg. von Philipp Frank und Moritz Schlick, Band 8 (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1934). 274 pages.
Contents: Introduction--What is Logical syntax? Languages as calculi.
-- the use of the term 'calculus' here is interesting in that it predates the OED for 'predikatkalkuel' that Grice uses.
Part I--The definite language I. Formation and transformation rules, and remarks on definite forms of language.
The ref. to transformational rules is Chomskyan apres la lettre.
Part II--Formal construction of the syntax of language I. Part III--The indefinite language II. Formation and transformation rules, along with further investigations. Part IV--General syntax. Object language and syntax language.
This must be a development of Russell, who speaks of object-language and meta-language. People often drop 'object-' but they shouldn't.
The syntax of an arbitrary language (in general; variables; arithmetic; translation; extensionality). Part V--Philosophy and Syntax. On the form of the sentences of the logic of science. Logic of science as syntax. Bibliography and Index.
The English translation of Logische Syntax appears here also as 1937-1.
7. "Meaning, Assertion, and Proposal" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) vol. 1 no. 3 (July 1934), pp. 359 - 360. This is a reply to Dewey's article of the same title in Ibid., pp. 237 - 238.
--- Grice gave a John Dewey Lecture. Carnap will get Gricean when he expands on 'assertion' as the basic statement for pragmatics (within what he calls semiosology).
8. La Science et la Metaphysique devant L'Analyse Logique du Langage Trad. du general Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 172. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1934). 44 pages. Revised translation of 1932-1.
9. "Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen" Natur und Geist (Dresden) 2. Jahrgang Nummer 9 (September 1934), pp. 257 - 260.
--- excellent dichotomy that will figure large in the later Carnap. The questions are theoretical, but the decisions as to what the ANSWERS to such questions are are practical. Inconsistency there?
10. "The Rejection of Metaphysics" Psyche: An Annual of General and Linguistic Philosophy (Cambridge and London), vol. 14 (1934), pp. 100 - 111.
---- This has Cantab. connection. No wonder he was not so well known in Oxon.
11. "Die Antinomien und die Unvollständigkeit der Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 41 Heft 2 (1934), pp. 263 - 284.
1935
1. Philosophy and Logical Syntax [Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 70] (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935). 100 pages.
A revised version of three lectures given on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of October 1934 at the University of London. See 1934-10 and 1944-1.
Contents: Preface (Prague, Nov. 1934). The rejection of metaphysics.
--- this is interesting. The title of his early essay. Heidegger in mind: Nothing noths. Nicht nichtet.
Verifiability.
--- excellent in that it is considering Confirmationism and Inductivism as the offspring of Positivism, and is preparing his criticisms to Popper.
Metaphysics. Problems of reality. Ethics. Metaphysics as expression. Psychology. Logical analysis. Logical syntax of language. "Formal" theory. Formation rules. Transformation rules. Syntactical terms. L-terms. Content. Pseudo-object sentences. The material and the formal modes of speech. Syntax as the method of philosophy. The material mode of speech. Modalities. Relativity in regard to language. Pseudo-questions. Epistemology. Natural philosophy. What physicalism asserts. What physicalism does not assert. The unity of Science. Literature.
2. "Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 1 (March 31, 1935), pp. 30 - 37.
--- the problem that Carnap must face is that if his thing is a formal one (formalwissenschaft), how does it deal with 'empirical' questions of, say, physics?
3. "Les Concepts psychologiques et les concepts physiques sont-ils foncierement differents?" Trad. par Robert Bouvier. Revue de synthese (Paris), t. 10, no. 1 (April 1935), pp. 43 - 53.
The original German version of this article was not published.
4. "Ein Gültigkeitskriterium für die Sätze der klassischen Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 42 Heft 1 (1935), pp. 163 - 190.
5. A bibliography of Carnap in Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 2/3 (June 18, 1935), pp. 187 - 188.
6. A review of Willard van Orman Quine A System of Logistic, in Ibid., Band 5 Heft 4 (July 31, 1935), pp. 285 - 287.
--- Quine knew well and wrote about both Carnap and Grice. The correspondence Quine/Carnap now available, "Dear Van", he called him.
7. A review of Walter Dubislav, Naturphilosophie, in Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.
8. A review of Arend Heyting, Mathematische Grundlagenforschung, in Ibid., pp. 288 - 289.
9. A review of Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung, in Ibid., pp. 290 - 294.
cfr. Verifiability above.
10. "Le Probleme de la logique de la science. Science formelle et science du reel." Trad. due general Ernest Vouillemin, Actualites scientifiques et industrielles 291. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1935). 37 pages.
Translation of 1934-5 and 1935-2.
1936
1. "Discussion" in Actes du huiteme Congres international de philosophie a Prague 2 - 7 septembre 1934 (Prague: Comite d'organisation du Congres, 1936). Despositaire: Orbis, S.A., Prague. 1103 pages.
Work by Carnap and Neurath appears on pp. 244 - 245.
2. "Die Methode der logischen Analyse" appears in Ibid., pp. 142 - 145. There is a discussion by Carnap and others on pp. 158 - 159.
3. "Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik" in Actes du Congres international de philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 388. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936). pp. 36 - 41.
4. "Über die Einheitssprache der Wissenschaft: Logische Bemerkungen zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie" Ibid., [fasc.] 2. Unite de la science Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 389. Pp. 60 - 70.
5. "Wahrheit und Bewährung" Ibid., [fasc.] 4. Induction et probabilite. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 391. Pp. 18 - 23.
6. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" The Journal of Symbolic Logic (Menasha, Wisconsin), volume 1 number 2 (June 1936), p. 59.
This is an abstract of a paper Carnap presented on September 1, 1936 at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences. The full paper was not published.
7. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Menasha, Wisconsin and New York), volume 42 number 9, part 1 (September 1936), p. 642.
The same as the preceding item.
8. "Existe-t-il des premisses de la science qui soient incontrolables?" Trad. par Henri Buriot-Darsiles. "Scientia" (Rivista di scienza) (Bologna). Volume 60, Number 293 (September 1 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
Carnap's original German paper was never published.
9. "Über Extremalaxiome" Von Rudolf Carnap und Friedrich Bachmann. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 6 Heft 3 (October 31, 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
10, "Testability and Meaning" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) Volume 3 Number 4 (October 1936), pp. 419 - 471; Volume 4 Number 1 (January 1937), pp. 1 - 40.
cfr. Verifiability above, but also semantic range of 'provability'. To test, to prove. What is it that is proved?
Contents: Introduction (sections 1 - 4)--Our problem: Confirmation. Testing and meaning. The older requirement of veriafiability. Confirmation instead of verification. The material and the formal idioms. Logical analysis of Confirmation and testing (sections 5 - 10)--Some terms and symbols of Logic. Reducibility of confirmation. Definitions. Reduction sentences.
--- important vis a vis Grice's reductionism (bete noire) and his caveats regarding a healthy reductive analysis but a more dangerous reductionist eliminationist agenda.
Introductive chains. Reduction and definition. Empirical analysis of confirmation and testing (sections 11 - 16)--Observable and realizable predicates. Confirmability. Method of testing. Testability. A remark about positivism and physicalism. Sufficient bases. The construction of a language-system (sections 17 - 28)--The problem of a criterion of meaning. The construction of a language-system L. Atomic sentences; primitive predicates. The choice of a psychological or a physical basis.
--- the choice here is interesting. I would have expected, 'phenomeanlist' vs. physicalist, but Carnap is talking 'pscyhological' tout court (this suggest he saw, sense-datum sentences as psychological complete with empirical psychological subjects attached to them ("I see that...")).
--- Introduced atomic predicates. Molecular sentences. Molecular languages. The critical problem: Universal and existential sentences. The scale of languages. Incompletely confirmable hypotheses in physics. The principle of empiricism.
--- Interesting vis a vis Grice's Empiricism as bete noire.
Confirmability of predictions. Bibliography.
1937
1. The Logical Syntax of Language Translated by
*************************************
Amethe Smeaton, Countess von Zeppelin.
**************************************
The poor woman. I imagined her frustration,
"Dear Rudolf,
I'm on p. 2 and can't understand.
What _is_ a pirot. The Count does
not know.
Merry Christmas."
--
International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, gen. ed., C. K. Ogden. (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937). 352 pages.
Revised and enlarged translation of 1934-6.
Contents [to be linked here] -- in comments.
Index of Carnap's Syntactic Variables with Page References -- to be linked here -- in comments.
2. "Logic" in Factors Determining Human Behavior by Edgar Douglas Adrian and others. Harvard Tercentenary Publications. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937). Pp. 107 - 118.
3. "Einheit der Wissenschaft durch Einheit der Sprache" in Travaux du IXe Congres international de philosophie, Congres Descartes [fasc.] 4. L'Unite de la science: La Methode et les methodes, [Ier partie]. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, number 533. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1937). Pp. 51 - 57.
4. Notes For Symbolic Logic Chicago, 1937. Distributed by the University of Chicago Bookstore. 37 mimeographed pages.
Notes for a course in logic at the University of Chicago.
----
But of course there's zillions more -- but do not despair.
If you have been good and followed Carnap's developments this far, the rest is, as he would say, a piece of apfelstrudel.
1921
Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der hohen philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Jena. (Jena: Universität Jena, 1921)
--- the space. Obviously, the ROOM, literally, but not as in the living room (but cfr. lebensraum). This is indeed the synthetic a priori category of Kant's space. Grice will show an interest in this vis a vis his student Strawson writing a book on Kant and the 'bounds of sense'. The topic merges with Carnap in that 'sense' is pretty ambiguous as used by Kant. What goes beyond the a priori, yet synthetic constraints of the apperception of 'space' dictates what we find and fail to find meaningful.
Contents: Introduction. Formal space. Intuitive space. Physical space. The mutual relation among formal, intuitive, and physical space.
--- the idea of 'formal space' would have pleased the late Grice, with all his emphasis on Platonic supralunary entities. The formal space is the space of Greek geometry of course, and it merges with ideas that the analytic statements of our cathedral of learning are both algebraic (or arithmetical) _and_ geometrical statements.
The relations between experience and knowledge of space. Bibliography and suggested reading. Biography.
---- Strawson was the big one here to focus on 'spatio-temporal continuity' as a metaphysical constraint on our conception of things. Grice was more of a mentalist, phenomenalist, memory-theoretical one (he saw 'memory' rather than spatio-temporal continuity as providing the key questions to the self).
1922
"Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre." Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte Nr. 56. (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1922). 87 pages.
1923
"Über die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Einfachstheit" Kant-Studien (Berlin), Band 28 Heft 1/2 (1923), pp. 90 - 107.
1924
"Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen" Annalen der Philosophy und Philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 3 (1924), pp. 105-130.
The idea of 'causality' will feature large in some of Strawson's and Grice's metaphysical views. The early Grice (WoW) has some essays on the notion of 'cause' as involving a 'willing' element to be avoided by critics of ordinary language.
1925
"Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der Zeit" Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 30 Heft 3/4 (1925), pp. 331-345
-- Here the spatio-temporal continuity is considered, with the dropping of 'zeit' (time, literally, 'tide') onto the bargain.
1926
"Physikalische Begriffsbildung" in Ungerer, Emil (ed.) Wissen und Wirken, Einzelschriften zu den Grundfragen des Erkennens und Schaffens, Band 39 (Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun, 1926). 66 pages.
--- intersting for the early use of 'physicalist' or 'physicalic' literally.
Contents: Introduction, the task of physics. The first level of physical concept formation, qualitative level: Perceived things and properties. The second level of physical concept formation, quantitative level: Physical magnitudes. The third level of physical concept formation, abstract level: The four-dimensional world process. Bibliography. Index of topics and individuals cited.
---- it seems to be the first level: the qualitative level of perceived things and properties that will keep interesting Grice for _decades_, vide his "Remarks about the senses" in WoW: indeed, the phenomenalist challenge: how to transcend the phenomeanlist level of perceived things and properties to higher levels (quantitative and abstract).
1927
1. Carnap wrote a synopsis of Physikalische Begriffsbildung: "Physikalische Begriffsbildung" Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 6, Heft 4 (July 18, 1927), pp. 76 - 77.
2. "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe" Symposion: Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache (Berlin-Schlachtensee) Band 1 Heft 4 (1927), pp. 355 - 374.
In the Schilpp volume, "Aussprache" is written "Ausprache."
1928
1. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928). 290 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna, May 1928). Introduction: Task and Plan of the Investigations. Preparatory Elucidations. On the form of scientific assertions. Overview of the types of objects and their relations. The problems of form of a constitution system. The forms of level. The form of system. (Formal investigations. Material investigations.) The basis. (The basic elements. The basic relations.) The form of objects. The form of presentation of a constitution system. Development of a constitution system. The lower levels: Objects of one's own psyche. The middle level: physical objects.
--- it's these two levels that will concern Grice:
lower level: object or content of one's own psyche.
middle level: material objects.
The upper levels: mental objects and objects of other psyches.
--- there seems to be an asymmetry with Grice at this level. Grice does not seem to have considered too serioulsy the problem of 'Other Minds', perhaps because he was Oxon, and he thought that Wisdom had bored people enough about it! But the later Grice HAS to give an answer to this: his functionalist manifesto is a third-person programme for the development of 'third-person' descriptions of 'mental predicates' ("Jack is thinking about Jill"). But this third-person programme needs adaptation by Grice to render first-person ascriptions possible ("I am thinking about Jill"): here Grice considers privileged access and incorrigibility which are NOT available, ceteris paribus, in third-person ascriptions.
Clarification of some philosophical problems on the basis of the constitution theory. Some problems of being. The psycho-physical problem.
It's good that Carnap, sticking with German -- and thus Greek -- keeps the Greek root of 'psyche'. The philosophical jargon Grice had to endure was that of 'mind', and he made a point of calling his thing 'philosophical psychology'. So the continuity that Carnap suggests between scientific and philosophical psychology would have pleased Grice.
The constitutional or empirical problem of reality. The problem of metaphysical reality. Task and limits of Science. Summary. Bibliography and index.
2. Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit (Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928). 46 pages.
1929
1. Notice of Paul Bommersheim Beiträge zur Lehre von Ding und Gesetz. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 36 Heft 1 (1929), pp. 27-28 of the separately paged reviews (= ger. "Literaturberichte")
---- interesting: Ding und Gesetz has an awful Quinean ring to it. Grice contributed to Quine's festshcrift, Word (Gesetz) and Object (Ding).
2. Abriss der Logistik, Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer Anwendungen Volume two in the series "Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, edited by Philipp Frank and Moritz Schlick. (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1929). 114 pages.
Contents: Preface (Vienna in January 1929). System of Logistic (sections 1 through 29). The task of logistic. Functions. Truth-functions.
---- The early Grice was a thoroughly truth-functionalist. His whole polemic with Strawson originated because of this. Grice would often retreat to Whitehead/Russell, PM, for relaxation!
Axioms. Theorems of propositional logic. Universal and existential propositions. Symbols. Classes. The theory of types. Class operations. Relations. Operations of relations. The hierarchy of types. Symbolic functions of converse, regions and field. Chains. Operations. Three and many-placed relations. The classes of 0, 1, and 2; freedom from ambiguity. The principle of abstraction. The cardinal numbers. isomorphism; the relational (ordinal?) numbers. The R-chains. Groups. Finite and infinite. Various analyses of relation. Progressions. Series. Limit concepts. Continuity. Applied logistic. Section thirty, on the axiomatic method.
--- Grice entered logic seriously (as late as 1969, for the Hintikka/Davidson festschrift for Quine when the vogue for axiomatic presentations was kaput, and Gentzen was all over the place. Grice relies on Mates, Elementary Logic. However, the spirit is pretty much 'axiomatic' in this sense Carnap is alluding to here.
Set theory and arithmetic (sections 31 and 32). AS [Axiom system] of set theory. Peano's axiom system for the natural numbers. Geometry (sections 33 - 35). Axioms of topology (axioms of surroundings). Axioms of projective geometry (first form: planes as classes). Axiom system of projective geometry (second form: planes as relations). Physics (sections 36 - 37). Axiom system of space-time topology. Determination and causality. Theory of relationship [Verwandtschaft] (section 38). Axiom system of relationship-relations [Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen] among people.
---- This sounds interesting, "among people". I don't think Grice went as far as to symbolise people like that, but people I know (Rosenschein, Levinson, etc, me on a good day) did!
Analysis of knowledge (section 39). The lowest levels of the constitution system. Analysis of language (sections 40 - 43). Logical semasiology of a definite language. Exhibition of the logical skeleton of presented sentences. Mass numbers. Situations and events. Place and time. Appendix (sections 44 -50). Exercises. Overview of the most important logistical symbols. Bibliography. Suggested reading. Index of people and topics, with comparitive terminology. List of logical constants.
3. A notice of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik (Leipzig) Band 8 Heft 1/2 (15 May 1929), page 10 of separately paged "Literatureberichte."
4. Tagung fuer Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften. In Prag, von Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn und Hans Reichenbach. Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik Band 8 Heft 4/5 (31 July 1929) pp. 113-114.
-- the idea of 'epistemology' as erknenntinislehre is an interesting one. Grice himself did not expand on 'epistemology' as such, since he focused on general psychological attitudes (judicative attitudes, perceptual attitudes) and rarely on larger issues regarding the _truth_ of these attitudes!
Proceedings of this congress were published in Erkenntnis (Band 1 Heft 2/4, pp. 89-339).
5. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis Von Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, und Rudolf Carnap. Veröffentlichung des Vereines Ernst Mach Heft I. (Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929). 64 pages.
--- good for an early ref. to the Vienna Circle (Coffa has written extensively on this).
Contents: Preface (Vienna, August 1929). The Vienna circle of the scientific world-view. Prehistory. The Circle around Schlick. The scientific world-view. Problem areas. Foundations of Arithmetic. Foundations of physics. Foundations of geometry. The problem of foundations in biology and psychology.
--- this is topical. The problem of Emergentism, I assume. You talk to a philosophical biologist and they are so onto telos and against mechanism. I am expecting Carnap took the idea of a mechanistic reduction seriously enough!
Foundations of the socal sciences. Review and outlook. Suggested readings. Bibliography. The members of the Vienna Circle. Authors closest to the Vienna Circle. Leading representatives of the scientific world-view. Index of names.
---- I like the 'adolescent' idea that you have a circle with members. Grice was like that. He has notes where he writes:
"Anscombe, no; Murdoch, no; Dummett, no" -- people NOT accepted as members of Austin's kindergartens (they were called Kindergartens because everyone had to be younger than Austin, b. 1911).
6. Review of Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre 3. Auflage Kant Studien (Berlin) Band 34 Heft 3/4 (1929), pp. 428-429.
7. Review of Karl Menger, Dimensionstheorie in ibid., pp. 457-458.
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The 1930s.
1930
1. Notice. Herbert Feigl Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 37 Heft 1 (1930), p. 6 of seperately paged "Literatureberichte."
2. "Die alte und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 heft 1 (1930), pp. 12 - 26.
---- Grice was at odds when doing history of logic. While Carnap speaks of old and new, Grice speaks of: traditionalism, modernism, neo-traditionalism, neo-modernism. Confusing!
---
3. "Einheitswissenschaft auf physischer Basis. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Review of Felix Kaufmann, Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung, Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Leipzig), 51. Jahrgang (3. Folge, 1. Jahrgang) Heft 35 (August 30, 1930), cols. 1674-1678.
5. "Die Mathematik als Zweig der Logik" Blätter für deutsche Philosophie (Berlin) Band 4 Heft 3/4 (1930), pp. 298 - 310.
6. "Diskussion über Wahrschenlichkeit." Von Edgar Zilsel und anderen. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 1 Heft 2/4 (1930) pp. 260 - 285.
verosimilitude (wahrschenlichkeit).
7. Bericht über Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik. Ibid., pp. 303 - 307.
8. A bibliography of Rudolf Carnap in Ibid., pp. 315 - 317.
1931
1. "Ergebnisse der logischen Analyse der Sprache" Forschungen und Fortschritte (Berlin) 7. Jahrgang, Nummer 13 (May 1, 1931), pp. 183 - 184.
2. A review of A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 1 (1931), pp. 73 - 75.
--- Grice often speaks (WoW:RE) of the 'heirs of PM' so we know who he is talking about now.
3. A review of Eino Kaila, Der logistische Neupositivismus. Ibid., pp. 75 - 77.
The idea of the logical positivists as neo-positivists is appealing. Grice has Positivism (and see the -ismus ending in German here) when he is really onto neo-Positivismus.
4. "Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 2/3 (1931), pp. 91 - 105.
5. "Diskussion zur Grundlegung der Mathematik" Von Hans Hahn und anderen. Ibid., pp. 135 - 149.
1932
1. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 2 Heft 4 (1932), pp. 219 - 241.
*****************This is the Classic, where ueberwindung was perhaps too grossly tr. as 'rejection'.
2. "Die Sprache der Physik" Ibid., p. 311.
3. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid., p. 311.
4. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft" Ibid. Band 2 Heft 5/6 (1932), pp. 432 - 465.
--- this is referred to by Roger Bishop Jones in a post to HIST-ANAL. Physicalist speech as universal speech of science. This is fascinating in that the idea of the universalsprache is so ... well debabelized! Speranza has studied different attempts at 'characteristica universalis', and here is one of the most important ones! It will become Americanised, of course, as the idea of a unified science.
5. "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache" Ibid. Band 3 Heft 2/3 (December 30, 1932), pp. 107 - 142.
6. "Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker" Ibid., pp. 177 - 188.
7. "Über Protokollsätze" Ibid., pp. 215 - 228. A reply to Neurath's article in the same issue of Erkenntnis on pp. 204 - 214.
---- this is interesting, as it concerns O-T terms, observational and theoretical. To what extent are protokollsaetze observational and to what extent are they theory-laden? Grice deals with some of these questions in his Method repr. 1991.
1933
1. A review of Philipp Frank, Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen in Kant-Studien (Berlin) Band 38 Heft 1/2 (1933), p. 275.
He had spoken of Kausalitaet, now it's kausalgesetz, where gesetz is ambiguous as to law, principle, what have you. Not to be confused with the synthetic a priori, "Every event has a cause" beloved of Oxonians like Pears.
2. "L'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Logique" Trad. du generale Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 76. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1933). 36 pages.
Revised translation of 1930-2.
3. Review of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 3 Heft 4/6 (September 5, 1933), pp 436 - 437.
1934
1. "On the Character of Philosophic Problems," translated by W.M. Malisoff, in Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) volume 1 number 2 (April 1934), p. 251.
2. A review of Walter Dubislav Die Philosophie der Mathematik in der Gegenwart, Erkenntnis (Leipzig), Band 4 Heft 1 (May 8, 1934), pp. 64 - 65.
3. A review of C.I. Lewis & C.H. Langford Symbolic Logic, Ibid., pp. 65 - 66.
---- This is intersting in that Lewis supersedes the material implication and enters metaphysical waters with his strict implication. So we are not talking of common or garden truth-functionalists here.
4. The Unity of Science, translated and with an introduction by Max Black in Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 63 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934). 101 pages.
--- Black will have occasion to discuss Grice at large ("Literary Theory", 1970).
Contents: Introduction by M. Black. Author's introduction (Prague, January 1934). Advice to the reader. Physics as a universal science. The heterogeneity of science. Languages. Protocol language. The physical language as an intersubjective language.
--- this topic is anti-Wittgensteinian. I don't think discussed by Grice, but by Griceans, e.g. Colin McGinn, in Woodfield, Thought and Object: to what extent can an intention-based semantics respond to the solipsistic challenge?
The physical language as a universal language. Protocol language as a part of physical language. Unified science in physical language.
5. Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik Einheitswissenschaft, schriften hrsg. von Otto Neurath in Verbindung mit Rudolf Carnap und Hans Hahn. Heft 3. (Wien: Verlag Gerold & Co., 1934). 30 pages.
6. Logische Syntax der Sprache Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, hrsg. von Philipp Frank und Moritz Schlick, Band 8 (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1934). 274 pages.
Contents: Introduction--What is Logical syntax? Languages as calculi.
-- the use of the term 'calculus' here is interesting in that it predates the OED for 'predikatkalkuel' that Grice uses.
Part I--The definite language I. Formation and transformation rules, and remarks on definite forms of language.
The ref. to transformational rules is Chomskyan apres la lettre.
Part II--Formal construction of the syntax of language I. Part III--The indefinite language II. Formation and transformation rules, along with further investigations. Part IV--General syntax. Object language and syntax language.
This must be a development of Russell, who speaks of object-language and meta-language. People often drop 'object-' but they shouldn't.
The syntax of an arbitrary language (in general; variables; arithmetic; translation; extensionality). Part V--Philosophy and Syntax. On the form of the sentences of the logic of science. Logic of science as syntax. Bibliography and Index.
The English translation of Logische Syntax appears here also as 1937-1.
7. "Meaning, Assertion, and Proposal" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) vol. 1 no. 3 (July 1934), pp. 359 - 360. This is a reply to Dewey's article of the same title in Ibid., pp. 237 - 238.
--- Grice gave a John Dewey Lecture. Carnap will get Gricean when he expands on 'assertion' as the basic statement for pragmatics (within what he calls semiosology).
8. La Science et la Metaphysique devant L'Analyse Logique du Langage Trad. du general Ernest Vouillemin. Introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 172. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1934). 44 pages. Revised translation of 1932-1.
9. "Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen" Natur und Geist (Dresden) 2. Jahrgang Nummer 9 (September 1934), pp. 257 - 260.
--- excellent dichotomy that will figure large in the later Carnap. The questions are theoretical, but the decisions as to what the ANSWERS to such questions are are practical. Inconsistency there?
10. "The Rejection of Metaphysics" Psyche: An Annual of General and Linguistic Philosophy (Cambridge and London), vol. 14 (1934), pp. 100 - 111.
---- This has Cantab. connection. No wonder he was not so well known in Oxon.
11. "Die Antinomien und die Unvollständigkeit der Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 41 Heft 2 (1934), pp. 263 - 284.
1935
1. Philosophy and Logical Syntax [Psyche Miniatures, General Series no. 70] (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935). 100 pages.
A revised version of three lectures given on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of October 1934 at the University of London. See 1934-10 and 1944-1.
Contents: Preface (Prague, Nov. 1934). The rejection of metaphysics.
--- this is interesting. The title of his early essay. Heidegger in mind: Nothing noths. Nicht nichtet.
Verifiability.
--- excellent in that it is considering Confirmationism and Inductivism as the offspring of Positivism, and is preparing his criticisms to Popper.
Metaphysics. Problems of reality. Ethics. Metaphysics as expression. Psychology. Logical analysis. Logical syntax of language. "Formal" theory. Formation rules. Transformation rules. Syntactical terms. L-terms. Content. Pseudo-object sentences. The material and the formal modes of speech. Syntax as the method of philosophy. The material mode of speech. Modalities. Relativity in regard to language. Pseudo-questions. Epistemology. Natural philosophy. What physicalism asserts. What physicalism does not assert. The unity of Science. Literature.
2. "Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft" Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 1 (March 31, 1935), pp. 30 - 37.
--- the problem that Carnap must face is that if his thing is a formal one (formalwissenschaft), how does it deal with 'empirical' questions of, say, physics?
3. "Les Concepts psychologiques et les concepts physiques sont-ils foncierement differents?" Trad. par Robert Bouvier. Revue de synthese (Paris), t. 10, no. 1 (April 1935), pp. 43 - 53.
The original German version of this article was not published.
4. "Ein Gültigkeitskriterium für die Sätze der klassischen Mathematik" Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik (Leipzig) Band 42 Heft 1 (1935), pp. 163 - 190.
5. A bibliography of Carnap in Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 5 Heft 2/3 (June 18, 1935), pp. 187 - 188.
6. A review of Willard van Orman Quine A System of Logistic, in Ibid., Band 5 Heft 4 (July 31, 1935), pp. 285 - 287.
--- Quine knew well and wrote about both Carnap and Grice. The correspondence Quine/Carnap now available, "Dear Van", he called him.
7. A review of Walter Dubislav, Naturphilosophie, in Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.
8. A review of Arend Heyting, Mathematische Grundlagenforschung, in Ibid., pp. 288 - 289.
9. A review of Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung, in Ibid., pp. 290 - 294.
cfr. Verifiability above.
10. "Le Probleme de la logique de la science. Science formelle et science du reel." Trad. due general Ernest Vouillemin, Actualites scientifiques et industrielles 291. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1935). 37 pages.
Translation of 1934-5 and 1935-2.
1936
1. "Discussion" in Actes du huiteme Congres international de philosophie a Prague 2 - 7 septembre 1934 (Prague: Comite d'organisation du Congres, 1936). Despositaire: Orbis, S.A., Prague. 1103 pages.
Work by Carnap and Neurath appears on pp. 244 - 245.
2. "Die Methode der logischen Analyse" appears in Ibid., pp. 142 - 145. There is a discussion by Carnap and others on pp. 158 - 159.
3. "Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik" in Actes du Congres international de philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 388. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936). pp. 36 - 41.
4. "Über die Einheitssprache der Wissenschaft: Logische Bemerkungen zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie" Ibid., [fasc.] 2. Unite de la science Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 389. Pp. 60 - 70.
5. "Wahrheit und Bewährung" Ibid., [fasc.] 4. Induction et probabilite. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, 391. Pp. 18 - 23.
6. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" The Journal of Symbolic Logic (Menasha, Wisconsin), volume 1 number 2 (June 1936), p. 59.
This is an abstract of a paper Carnap presented on September 1, 1936 at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences. The full paper was not published.
7. "Truth in Mathematics and Logic" Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Menasha, Wisconsin and New York), volume 42 number 9, part 1 (September 1936), p. 642.
The same as the preceding item.
8. "Existe-t-il des premisses de la science qui soient incontrolables?" Trad. par Henri Buriot-Darsiles. "Scientia" (Rivista di scienza) (Bologna). Volume 60, Number 293 (September 1 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
Carnap's original German paper was never published.
9. "Über Extremalaxiome" Von Rudolf Carnap und Friedrich Bachmann. Erkenntnis (Leipzig) Band 6 Heft 3 (October 31, 1936), pp. 166 - 188.
10, "Testability and Meaning" Philosophy of Science (Baltimore) Volume 3 Number 4 (October 1936), pp. 419 - 471; Volume 4 Number 1 (January 1937), pp. 1 - 40.
cfr. Verifiability above, but also semantic range of 'provability'. To test, to prove. What is it that is proved?
Contents: Introduction (sections 1 - 4)--Our problem: Confirmation. Testing and meaning. The older requirement of veriafiability. Confirmation instead of verification. The material and the formal idioms. Logical analysis of Confirmation and testing (sections 5 - 10)--Some terms and symbols of Logic. Reducibility of confirmation. Definitions. Reduction sentences.
--- important vis a vis Grice's reductionism (bete noire) and his caveats regarding a healthy reductive analysis but a more dangerous reductionist eliminationist agenda.
Introductive chains. Reduction and definition. Empirical analysis of confirmation and testing (sections 11 - 16)--Observable and realizable predicates. Confirmability. Method of testing. Testability. A remark about positivism and physicalism. Sufficient bases. The construction of a language-system (sections 17 - 28)--The problem of a criterion of meaning. The construction of a language-system L. Atomic sentences; primitive predicates. The choice of a psychological or a physical basis.
--- the choice here is interesting. I would have expected, 'phenomeanlist' vs. physicalist, but Carnap is talking 'pscyhological' tout court (this suggest he saw, sense-datum sentences as psychological complete with empirical psychological subjects attached to them ("I see that...")).
--- Introduced atomic predicates. Molecular sentences. Molecular languages. The critical problem: Universal and existential sentences. The scale of languages. Incompletely confirmable hypotheses in physics. The principle of empiricism.
--- Interesting vis a vis Grice's Empiricism as bete noire.
Confirmability of predictions. Bibliography.
1937
1. The Logical Syntax of Language Translated by
*************************************
Amethe Smeaton, Countess von Zeppelin.
**************************************
The poor woman. I imagined her frustration,
"Dear Rudolf,
I'm on p. 2 and can't understand.
What _is_ a pirot. The Count does
not know.
Merry Christmas."
--
International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, gen. ed., C. K. Ogden. (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937). 352 pages.
Revised and enlarged translation of 1934-6.
Contents [to be linked here] -- in comments.
Index of Carnap's Syntactic Variables with Page References -- to be linked here -- in comments.
2. "Logic" in Factors Determining Human Behavior by Edgar Douglas Adrian and others. Harvard Tercentenary Publications. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937). Pp. 107 - 118.
3. "Einheit der Wissenschaft durch Einheit der Sprache" in Travaux du IXe Congres international de philosophie, Congres Descartes [fasc.] 4. L'Unite de la science: La Methode et les methodes, [Ier partie]. Actualites scientifiques et industrielles, number 533. (Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1937). Pp. 51 - 57.
4. Notes For Symbolic Logic Chicago, 1937. Distributed by the University of Chicago Bookstore. 37 mimeographed pages.
Notes for a course in logic at the University of Chicago.
----
But of course there's zillions more -- but do not despair.
If you have been good and followed Carnap's developments this far, the rest is, as he would say, a piece of apfelstrudel.
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