--- By J. L. S. of the Grice Club
------------for the Carnap Corner
I WOULD THINK that if you ask a German to say "neo-Carnapianism" in German he may say "neo-Carnapism". Google so far gives just one hit for that:
[PDF] Radical Interpretation, Normativity,
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
This amounts to a certain Neo-Carnapism which leads to the (re-)introduction of analyticity into L1. 11) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p.25. ...
www.mbph.de/Language/normanaly.pdf
Sunday, 28 February 2010
The Carnap-Grice Conversation (cf. The Carnap-Strawson Conversation)
--- By J. L. S.
----------- I WOULD THINK CARNAP was pretty fortunate, if that's a word, in having Strawson contribute to his Living Philosopher volume. It gave the occasion not so much to read the rather verbose thing by Strawson, but, to reply to it!
It may do to approach that 'conversation' bit by bit. While it's one stretch followed by 1/4 of same stretch by Carnap, it may be best to 'analyse' or dissect it in terms of particular conversational moves. I will provide a few clues:
---- STRAWSON starts the conversation. He proposes some neologisms or terms to 'frame' the question: constructionists versus _us_.
CARNAP replies that he rather speaks of 'naturalists', short for 'linguistic naturalists' for Strawson's ilk.
STRAWSON proposes to criticise Carnap on 'explanation.
CARNAP replies that Strawson fails to honour Carnap's own preferrence for the word 'explication' and that he totally forgets (not disingenously) to mention that role of 'clarification'. For Carnap it's first clarification, and then explication.
STRAWSON never provides one clear example. Except Carnap's own, "The room is warm" vs. "The temperature of the room is 20C". Quality versus Quantity. Strawson offers this example as a counter-example to Carnap on metaphysics. Strawson wants to say that 'has temperature 20C' fails to encapsulate the issue of 'is warm'.
CARNAP questions this.
STRAWSON brings in another example. The interpretation of '.' (the symbol he uses, after Principia Mathematica) and '-', the tilde or squiddly, also used in Principia. He does not, fortunately, care to state what they stand for (He made a point about this in "'.' and 'and'" and "'-' and 'not'" in the book most criticised by Grice in his lifetime, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952).
CARNAP takes up the issue.
STRAWSON wants to say that there may be a difference or divergence of meaning (between '.' and 'and' and '-' and 'not'. He is suggesting there may be valid inferences in the vernaculars of NL that are not reproduced in the analogues of FL.
CARNAP considers this but is not worried. He himself proposes a more interesting, perhaps, case of 'or', not as 'v' but as 'w'. His point is that, if a divergence IS noted, it can still be marked, or remarked by the use of a new symbol (the exclusive 'disjunction') (All this has Gricean relevance -- since Grice's metier is to elucidate how we go on multiplying senses, or avoiding common mistakes in both constructionalists and naturalists).
STRAWSON brings in 'science', and 'common sense', and 'philosophy'.
CARNAP is unimpressed and makes some sharp criticism to OLP (ordianary langauge philosopher), drawing from Sellars, etc, and being especially punny and playful that he IS NOT MEANING Strawson!
STRAWSON continues to bring in the philosophical relevance of ordinary language.
CARNAP goes on, in his perhaps most effective, or at least most amusing move, to declare the 'barbarity' of the new world. He is identifying Strawson with the Good Old World of England and Oxford and Grice and Germany and Ruhr, and Vienna and Jena. Instead, Carnap opposes the New World (! With old-worlders like that!). His geographical metaphor is just that: he wants to say that, to use Grice's term, there is no SANCTITY in ordinary language, and that barbarous expressions WILL be tolerated.
STRAWSON continues to dwell on how ordinary our philosophical practice is.
CARNAP criticises the 'naturalists' with sticking with what is 'talent' for them -- things they are used to -- as a fixation, and an ability to expand the horizons, and just be more blooming tolerant. "This does not apply to Strawson, of course", Carnap concludes!
A good tour-de-force!
----------- I WOULD THINK CARNAP was pretty fortunate, if that's a word, in having Strawson contribute to his Living Philosopher volume. It gave the occasion not so much to read the rather verbose thing by Strawson, but, to reply to it!
It may do to approach that 'conversation' bit by bit. While it's one stretch followed by 1/4 of same stretch by Carnap, it may be best to 'analyse' or dissect it in terms of particular conversational moves. I will provide a few clues:
---- STRAWSON starts the conversation. He proposes some neologisms or terms to 'frame' the question: constructionists versus _us_.
CARNAP replies that he rather speaks of 'naturalists', short for 'linguistic naturalists' for Strawson's ilk.
STRAWSON proposes to criticise Carnap on 'explanation.
CARNAP replies that Strawson fails to honour Carnap's own preferrence for the word 'explication' and that he totally forgets (not disingenously) to mention that role of 'clarification'. For Carnap it's first clarification, and then explication.
STRAWSON never provides one clear example. Except Carnap's own, "The room is warm" vs. "The temperature of the room is 20C". Quality versus Quantity. Strawson offers this example as a counter-example to Carnap on metaphysics. Strawson wants to say that 'has temperature 20C' fails to encapsulate the issue of 'is warm'.
CARNAP questions this.
STRAWSON brings in another example. The interpretation of '.' (the symbol he uses, after Principia Mathematica) and '-', the tilde or squiddly, also used in Principia. He does not, fortunately, care to state what they stand for (He made a point about this in "'.' and 'and'" and "'-' and 'not'" in the book most criticised by Grice in his lifetime, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952).
CARNAP takes up the issue.
STRAWSON wants to say that there may be a difference or divergence of meaning (between '.' and 'and' and '-' and 'not'. He is suggesting there may be valid inferences in the vernaculars of NL that are not reproduced in the analogues of FL.
CARNAP considers this but is not worried. He himself proposes a more interesting, perhaps, case of 'or', not as 'v' but as 'w'. His point is that, if a divergence IS noted, it can still be marked, or remarked by the use of a new symbol (the exclusive 'disjunction') (All this has Gricean relevance -- since Grice's metier is to elucidate how we go on multiplying senses, or avoiding common mistakes in both constructionalists and naturalists).
STRAWSON brings in 'science', and 'common sense', and 'philosophy'.
CARNAP is unimpressed and makes some sharp criticism to OLP (ordianary langauge philosopher), drawing from Sellars, etc, and being especially punny and playful that he IS NOT MEANING Strawson!
STRAWSON continues to bring in the philosophical relevance of ordinary language.
CARNAP goes on, in his perhaps most effective, or at least most amusing move, to declare the 'barbarity' of the new world. He is identifying Strawson with the Good Old World of England and Oxford and Grice and Germany and Ruhr, and Vienna and Jena. Instead, Carnap opposes the New World (! With old-worlders like that!). His geographical metaphor is just that: he wants to say that, to use Grice's term, there is no SANCTITY in ordinary language, and that barbarous expressions WILL be tolerated.
STRAWSON continues to dwell on how ordinary our philosophical practice is.
CARNAP criticises the 'naturalists' with sticking with what is 'talent' for them -- things they are used to -- as a fixation, and an ability to expand the horizons, and just be more blooming tolerant. "This does not apply to Strawson, of course", Carnap concludes!
A good tour-de-force!
Carnap and Grice on Linguistic Naturalism
----- By J. L. S.
--------- for the Carnap Corner
LEARNING FROM
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap63.htm
that Sir Peter Strawson (once collaborator with Grice) did contribute with "Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy", which prompted his (commisioned, we realise), "Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism" I am tempted to imagine a closer conversation here with Strawson's mentor in the field: Grice!
--------- for the Carnap Corner
LEARNING FROM
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/bibliog/carnap63.htm
that Sir Peter Strawson (once collaborator with Grice) did contribute with "Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy", which prompted his (commisioned, we realise), "Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism" I am tempted to imagine a closer conversation here with Strawson's mentor in the field: Grice!
Good online link for Carnap on metametaphysics!
---- JLS
for the Carnap Corner
----- I AM PLEASED that I THINK I'm 'guiding' if that's the word, Jones towards the use of 'metaphilosophy'. In any case, here is 'meta-metaphyics', and it has a good essay, which I'll have to analyse in some more detail on 'ontological pluralism'. I arrived at it via googling for "Austinian Carnapian", and the Austinian glee is there alright!
Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology - Google Books ResultDavid John Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman - 2009 - Philosophy - 529 pages
... by shrugging it off with Carnapian tolerance for many different answers, or by insisting with Austinian glee that the answer is laughably trivial''.14 ...
books.google.com/books?isbn=0199546002...
for the Carnap Corner
----- I AM PLEASED that I THINK I'm 'guiding' if that's the word, Jones towards the use of 'metaphilosophy'. In any case, here is 'meta-metaphyics', and it has a good essay, which I'll have to analyse in some more detail on 'ontological pluralism'. I arrived at it via googling for "Austinian Carnapian", and the Austinian glee is there alright!
Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology - Google Books ResultDavid John Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman - 2009 - Philosophy - 529 pages
... by shrugging it off with Carnapian tolerance for many different answers, or by insisting with Austinian glee that the answer is laughably trivial''.14 ...
books.google.com/books?isbn=0199546002...
"More Carnapian than Austinian"
--- by J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Circle
----------- For the Carnap Corner
-- An online source -- I'm retrieving some crossreferences Austin/Carnap, and find this one from
REFRAINING (1979), by R. E. Moore
where a reference is made to Myles Barnd (1971)
Brand "describes his project there as "more Carnapian
than Austinian". (p. 45), so most probably he never
intended that (D5) capture our ordinary ...
www.springerlink.com/index/X23Q0505H020W550.pdf
--- So one could visualise something like
On many occasions -- R. B. Jones is a specialist in J. L. Austin, so he knows --, Grice would feel the burden of the Austinian Code a heavy one.
Grice had more of a theoretical spirit than Austin ever _tried_. Grice looked for generalities, abstractions, regularities beyond 'statistics'.
It would not be unreasonable to see Grice's choosing and sticking so ardently with Carnap's 'pirots' as Grice's feeling "more Carnapian than Austinian" in more than one respect!
----------- For the Carnap Corner
-- An online source -- I'm retrieving some crossreferences Austin/Carnap, and find this one from
REFRAINING (1979), by R. E. Moore
where a reference is made to Myles Barnd (1971)
Brand "describes his project there as "more Carnapian
than Austinian". (p. 45), so most probably he never
intended that (D5) capture our ordinary ...
www.springerlink.com/index/X23Q0505H020W550.pdf
--- So one could visualise something like
On many occasions -- R. B. Jones is a specialist in J. L. Austin, so he knows --, Grice would feel the burden of the Austinian Code a heavy one.
Grice had more of a theoretical spirit than Austin ever _tried_. Grice looked for generalities, abstractions, regularities beyond 'statistics'.
It would not be unreasonable to see Grice's choosing and sticking so ardently with Carnap's 'pirots' as Grice's feeling "more Carnapian than Austinian" in more than one respect!
Grice's "More Positivistic Vein"
--- By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club.
------------ for the Carnap Corner
IN A POST in GriceClub.Blogspot, "Grice on adaptiveness" I quote at some length, inviting a comment by Kramer, from Gr91, i.e. Grice's Conception of Value. This book actuall comprises two sepearate pieces: the 1983 Paul Carus Lectures, and the much earlier, Gr75, i.e. "Method in philosophical pscyhology". These things should be taken into consideration when viewing the CarnapGrice interface, as it were -- if we want to check a 'development' of this or that idea.
In the quotes from Gr75 in that post then, I direct the attention to Grice's 'turn of phrase':
"in a more positivistic vein"
---
Vis a vis the very interesting things that R. B. Jones has said, and is able to say, on 'positivism' as a _creed_, I will defer commentary! But not quite!
What Grice is willing to say is that
'a change of idiom'
may be just what it takes from one bete noire (e.g. Mechanism) to its twin enemy (Finalism).
Thus, he is considering 'pirots' (which he borrows from Carnap). These are _not_ animals, for the simple reason that they don't have an anima! (Grice is sceptical of 'animism' here).
Similarly, he envisages that someone may be, rightly, sceptical of attributions of 'causa finalis', telos.
-- for specific claims about 'pirots' -- in terms of their continued operancy.
Thus, in its stead, he proposes:
survival utilty.
Grice is willing to say that
finality =df survival utility
I.e what is a turn of phrase in one bete noire ('survival utility') -- i.e. Grice when in the 'positivistic mood' -- may well get translated to a turn of phrase in its corresponding twin bete: finalism.
--- For each bete noire, then, and for the mother of them all, Minimalism, Grice seems to be suggesting a corresponding turn of phrase. This has methodological consequences in that it gives clues as to what constitutes each 'bete noire' and how to fight her!
JLS
------------ for the Carnap Corner
IN A POST in GriceClub.Blogspot, "Grice on adaptiveness" I quote at some length, inviting a comment by Kramer, from Gr91, i.e. Grice's Conception of Value. This book actuall comprises two sepearate pieces: the 1983 Paul Carus Lectures, and the much earlier, Gr75, i.e. "Method in philosophical pscyhology". These things should be taken into consideration when viewing the CarnapGrice interface, as it were -- if we want to check a 'development' of this or that idea.
In the quotes from Gr75 in that post then, I direct the attention to Grice's 'turn of phrase':
"in a more positivistic vein"
---
Vis a vis the very interesting things that R. B. Jones has said, and is able to say, on 'positivism' as a _creed_, I will defer commentary! But not quite!
What Grice is willing to say is that
'a change of idiom'
may be just what it takes from one bete noire (e.g. Mechanism) to its twin enemy (Finalism).
Thus, he is considering 'pirots' (which he borrows from Carnap). These are _not_ animals, for the simple reason that they don't have an anima! (Grice is sceptical of 'animism' here).
Similarly, he envisages that someone may be, rightly, sceptical of attributions of 'causa finalis', telos.
-- for specific claims about 'pirots' -- in terms of their continued operancy.
Thus, in its stead, he proposes:
survival utilty.
Grice is willing to say that
finality =df survival utility
I.e what is a turn of phrase in one bete noire ('survival utility') -- i.e. Grice when in the 'positivistic mood' -- may well get translated to a turn of phrase in its corresponding twin bete: finalism.
--- For each bete noire, then, and for the mother of them all, Minimalism, Grice seems to be suggesting a corresponding turn of phrase. This has methodological consequences in that it gives clues as to what constitutes each 'bete noire' and how to fight her!
JLS
Saturday, 20 February 2010
Überwindung
* * * * * * * * * By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club
* * * * * * * * * * * * * For the Carnap Corner.
"Überwindung" is the word Carnap used in his "Überwindung" essay. It has been translated, by A. P. (it "was" translated, indeed) as "elimination" but that's perhaps too strong.
I think 'windung' is cognate with 'winding' as in Sir Paul (McCartney), The long and winding road".
"Über" brings a sense of finality to it, and while this preposition is not usually capitalised, but written as "über", it _is_ when prefixing a noun, like '-windung' which yields "elimination".
---- The sentence in focus is
Heidegger
"Das Nichts selbst nichtet"
-- Carnap omits, but we need broader context, the 'selbst', as it is, perhaps, otiose.
Now: the arguments for the 'rejection' and 'elimination' of a whole enterprise surely cannot rest on a solecism, and Carnap KNEW it.
But analytic philosophers (unlike Quine: he cannot have his cake and eat it, so he's no more an 'analytic philosopher' to me) will like to analyse in some detail. So whatever Heidegger's "external" considerations, we want to focus on this particular sentence. And more importantly, on Carnap's arguments for 'rejecting' or ueberwinden-ing it. But later,
JLS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * For the Carnap Corner.
"Überwindung" is the word Carnap used in his "Überwindung" essay. It has been translated, by A. P. (it "was" translated, indeed) as "elimination" but that's perhaps too strong.
I think 'windung' is cognate with 'winding' as in Sir Paul (McCartney), The long and winding road".
"Über" brings a sense of finality to it, and while this preposition is not usually capitalised, but written as "über", it _is_ when prefixing a noun, like '-windung' which yields "elimination".
---- The sentence in focus is
Heidegger
"Das Nichts selbst nichtet"
-- Carnap omits, but we need broader context, the 'selbst', as it is, perhaps, otiose.
Now: the arguments for the 'rejection' and 'elimination' of a whole enterprise surely cannot rest on a solecism, and Carnap KNEW it.
But analytic philosophers (unlike Quine: he cannot have his cake and eat it, so he's no more an 'analytic philosopher' to me) will like to analyse in some detail. So whatever Heidegger's "external" considerations, we want to focus on this particular sentence. And more importantly, on Carnap's arguments for 'rejecting' or ueberwinden-ing it. But later,
JLS
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