The Carnap-Grice Conversation (cf. The Carnap-Strawson Conversation)

--- By J. L. S.


----------- I WOULD THINK CARNAP was pretty fortunate, if that's a word, in having Strawson contribute to his Living Philosopher volume. It gave the occasion not so much to read the rather verbose thing by Strawson, but, to reply to it!

It may do to approach that 'conversation' bit by bit. While it's one stretch followed by 1/4 of same stretch by Carnap, it may be best to 'analyse' or dissect it in terms of particular conversational moves. I will provide a few clues:


---- STRAWSON starts the conversation. He proposes some neologisms or terms to 'frame' the question: constructionists versus _us_.

CARNAP replies that he rather speaks of 'naturalists', short for 'linguistic naturalists' for Strawson's ilk.

STRAWSON proposes to criticise Carnap on 'explanation.

CARNAP replies that Strawson fails to honour Carnap's own preferrence for the word 'explication' and that he totally forgets (not disingenously) to mention that role of 'clarification'. For Carnap it's first clarification, and then explication.

STRAWSON never provides one clear example. Except Carnap's own, "The room is warm" vs. "The temperature of the room is 20C". Quality versus Quantity. Strawson offers this example as a counter-example to Carnap on metaphysics. Strawson wants to say that 'has temperature 20C' fails to encapsulate the issue of 'is warm'.

CARNAP questions this.

STRAWSON brings in another example. The interpretation of '.' (the symbol he uses, after Principia Mathematica) and '-', the tilde or squiddly, also used in Principia. He does not, fortunately, care to state what they stand for (He made a point about this in "'.' and 'and'" and "'-' and 'not'" in the book most criticised by Grice in his lifetime, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952).

CARNAP takes up the issue.

STRAWSON wants to say that there may be a difference or divergence of meaning (between '.' and 'and' and '-' and 'not'. He is suggesting there may be valid inferences in the vernaculars of NL that are not reproduced in the analogues of FL.

CARNAP considers this but is not worried. He himself proposes a more interesting, perhaps, case of 'or', not as 'v' but as 'w'. His point is that, if a divergence IS noted, it can still be marked, or remarked by the use of a new symbol (the exclusive 'disjunction') (All this has Gricean relevance -- since Grice's metier is to elucidate how we go on multiplying senses, or avoiding common mistakes in both constructionalists and naturalists).

STRAWSON brings in 'science', and 'common sense', and 'philosophy'.

CARNAP is unimpressed and makes some sharp criticism to OLP (ordianary langauge philosopher), drawing from Sellars, etc, and being especially punny and playful that he IS NOT MEANING Strawson!

STRAWSON continues to bring in the philosophical relevance of ordinary language.

CARNAP goes on, in his perhaps most effective, or at least most amusing move, to declare the 'barbarity' of the new world. He is identifying Strawson with the Good Old World of England and Oxford and Grice and Germany and Ruhr, and Vienna and Jena. Instead, Carnap opposes the New World (! With old-worlders like that!). His geographical metaphor is just that: he wants to say that, to use Grice's term, there is no SANCTITY in ordinary language, and that barbarous expressions WILL be tolerated.

STRAWSON continues to dwell on how ordinary our philosophical practice is.

CARNAP criticises the 'naturalists' with sticking with what is 'talent' for them -- things they are used to -- as a fixation, and an ability to expand the horizons, and just be more blooming tolerant. "This does not apply to Strawson, of course", Carnap concludes!

A good tour-de-force!